Podstawy realizmu filozoficznego Étienne Gilsona i Mieczysława A. Krąpca OP
Étienne Gilson’s and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec’s Grounds of Philosophical Realism

Summary/Abstract: The paper presents and analyses E. Gilson’s and M. A. Krąpiec’s philosophical grounds of realism. The both authors, very famous and outstanding contemporary philosophers, distinguish between the cognition and thinking. They defend philosophical realism and object to the followers of idealism the error in the form of changing the cognition on the thinking; cat off the philosophical knowledge from the real world. In the history of philosophy there are two main trends (positions): the realism and the idealism. They are differ with its object of investigation – the acceptance of first principle (starting point). According to realism there is a real world, it means the world of things and a man can cognize it (its existence and its essence). According to idealism, a man can cognize only his ideas; it contents in his mind and the reflection is the first act of cognition. Moreover the followers of idealism reduced (limited) the philosophical knowledge to the epistemology and ontology. Gilson and Krąpiec accept so-called existential judgement as the background of human cognition (knowledge). This judgement directly expresses the existence of real world (being). Both authors defend the philosophical realism in three ways: presenting the fact of cognition and explaining it; showing the absurd and negative consequences the negation of realism; showing the history of idealism and its cognitive errors.

• Details
• Contents