Über Sokratische Weisheit als intellektuelle Bescheidenheit
On Socratic wisdom as intellectual humility
Author(s): Guido LöhrerSubject(s): Philosophy, Ethics / Practical Philosophy
Published by: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Keywords: wisdom; intellectual humility; second-order knowledge; epistemic modal logic
Summary/Abstract: In Plato’s Apology of Socrates, a humanly wise person is distinguished by her ability to correctly assess the epistemic status and value of her factual opinions. She knows whether she possesses knowledge or has mere opinion or is ignorant. It is also a widely shared view that intellectual humility, albeit not the same as wisdom, is one of a humanly wisdom’s necessary features. However, if the considerations presented here are valid and cover the spectrum of relevant interpretations, this is not tenable for Socratic wisdom. Fallible beings who claim to possess second-order knowledge of the epistemic status of their beliefs cannot be other than epistemically immodest. If Socratic wisdom requires epistemic humility, Socrates is not wise.
Journal: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica - Aesthetica - Practica
- Issue Year: 2018
- Issue No: 32
- Page Range: 141-163
- Page Count: 23
- Language: German