The Human Rights in Habermas’ Discursive Democracy
The Human Rights in Habermas’ Discursive Democracy

Summary/Abstract: In my brief analysis, I will examine the question of the role Habermas’ liberal theories play in his discursive theory of democracy, with special regard to the success of classical liberal freedom providing classical liberal rights of freedom, especially prevailing private autonomy. The question is interesting in itself since, as it is well-known, Habermas’ theory of discussion refers to all parts of life and everyone concerned. It is a question then whether deliberate decision-making providing a wide-scale dispute is possible to conciliate with the liberal ideal advocating the sanctity of private life, whether the results of the discussion do not affect “detrimentally” private life and the regulations of the fi ght for status. Before fi nding a more accurate answer to these questions, I will examine how Habermas positions himself, on the one hand, advocating the importance of civil dialogue from the republican viewpoint and, on the other hand, against the deliberative ideals providing a wide multifariousness, and what kind of results he deems worthy of keeping from the liberal concept characterized by him as ideal-typical. According to my preliminary assumption, Habermas deems his own idea of democracy as a kind of a synthesis of liberal and republican theories, and he thinks he is capable of dissolving the contradiction existing between liberal and republican theories within his own theory, in the fi rst place with regard to the nature of political process, social integration, and rights. In the second part of my work, I will examine the strength of this idea of Habermas only according to one viewpoint: how much does democracy resolve in the discourse on the conflict of negative and positive freedom, the conflict of human rights and popular sovereignty?

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