Insurance-Markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive (”Fair”) Wages
Insurance-Markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive (”Fair”) Wages
Author(s): Aleksandar VasilevSubject(s): Economy, Financial Markets
Published by: ASERS Publishing
Keywords: Indivisible labor; Lotteries; Unobservable effort; Fair wages; Insurance;
Summary/Abstract: The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive (”fair”) wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to ”complete” the market.
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance
- Issue Year: V/2019
- Issue No: 2(9)
- Page Range: 7-15
- Page Count: 9
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF
