On the concept of truth in an intended model of the logic of beliefs
On the concept of truth in an intended model of the logic of beliefs

Summary/Abstract: First of all the article looks at the building of an a posteriori logic of beliefs i.e. observation developed on the principle of how, people usually think, what kind of judgments they make about reality and what actually is described by the truth of the judgments under the influences of beliefs. In this situation, we have to depart from the customary practice of a priori semantics of possible worlds in favour of semantics for models intended. Secondly, we find that in practice, human judgments indirectly accept a logic of thinking generally, which leads us - thirdly - to define this logical system as an extension of intuitionistic logic. Fourthly, and finally, our empirically generated logic of beliefs, proves to be logic of hypotheses and suppositions, because judgments made on the basis of intuitionistic logic are not assertive judgments.

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