„Metodološki pojam istine“ i epistemološke tendencije u klasičnom pragmatizmu Č. S. Persa i V. Džemsa
„Methodological Concept of Truth“ and Epistemological Tendencies in Classical Pragmatism of Ch. S. Peirce and W. James

Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I analyze Habermas' interpretation of Peirce’s pragmatism and its tendency to apply the theoretical approach of scientific methodology in solving problems of epistemology. Following this interpretation, I try to show that Peirce in his most famous essays fails to talk about knowledge solely from the perspective of scientific research methods, despite his open criticism of traditional philosophy. Although Habermas does not examine in his book Knowledge and Human Interests the philosophy of William James, in this paper, I discuss to what extent this author promotes the thesis of the „methodological concept of truth“, both in his critique of traditional philosophy and his own theory of knowledge. The paper comes to the conclusion that Habermas's „consistent pragmatism“ can be found in neither Peirce’s nor James’ philosophy, since both authors rely on the theoretical solutions taken from traditional epistemology, without remaining within the scope of the „methodological concept of truth“.

• Details
• Contents