KI KORMÁNYOZZON? VÁLASZTÓI PREFERENCIÁK ÉS KORMÁNYALAKÍTÁS MAGYARORSZÁGON, 1990–2009.
WHO SHOULD GOVERN? VOTER PREFERENCES AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN HUNGARY, 1990–2009.

Summary/Abstract: In my paper I wish to refute the thesis of the classical theory of democracy that politicians implement people’s will, a product of aggregation of voter preferences. I seek to underpin my statement by testing the aggregative-populist model of democracy through empirical analysis of government formations in 1990–2009. I show that politicians ignore voter preferences in coalition composition and government formation scenarios and preferences to the coalition patterns in an ex post manner. Building on theories of leadership democracy and herestetics, I also demonstrate that government formation lies in the hands of party leaders who have intrinsic political volition. People’s will does not exist because preferences and outcome of government formation are produced by the politicians through herestetic manoeuvres and their autonomy vis-à-vis the voters. It is the politicians’ task to manage cross-cutting preferences and to form a viable government under power relations that are not completely predictable due to perverse effects. Politicians seek to minimize contingency by reducing the number of political alternatives, shaping or ignoring voter preferences, and by the rule of acknowledgement. In conclusion I make further conceptual restrictions for a minimalist definition of democracy. Voters set the political process of government formation in motion through their votes and authorize politicians to form a viable government, and they also give advance consent to the prospective outcome of government formation. Democracy, however, does not make voters’ role hollow for 1. politicians are unable to control the content of votes, and 2. party competition for votes continues to exist. At the same time this also highlights the limits of the explanatory power of leadership democracy and herestetics.

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