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The Road to Regime Shifts in Turkey

Players, Strategies and Instruments

Summary/Abstract: Recently, Turkey has possibly been the most intensely studied and discussed country not only by the community of scholars interested in regime changes from a comparative perspective but also by security and foreign policy experts. Turkey has changed its foreign policy and we have witnessed the growth of its influence in the region. It is arguable that the regional and foreign policy transformation is a product of the internal changes in Turkish regime, therefore in this paper, the author explores the regime shift. In literature, the current Turkish regime is characterised as a hybrid regime – a regime meeting the basic formal democratic conditions on the surface with real authoritarian features within. Indeed, the specific role of Turkish armed forces, designed as a guardian of the Republic since its foundation, is a typical feature of Turkish politics. The army’s mandate to intervene whenever the secular shape of the state is in danger was even explicitly enacted by the law. There were several cases when the army intervened and forced the government to step down – 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. However, the attempted coup failed in 2016. As a consequence, the constitutional referendum was held in 2017.The research is based on the political analyses supported by the perspective of the theory of securitisation (and desecuritisation) used by the Copenhagen School. The securitisation process is closely related to the integration process of Turkey to the EU. The behaviour of securitisation actors, its securitisation instruments, and the development of securitised issues is beneficial for our political analyses of the regime shift. There is some evidence that the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002, tended to reduce the army’s power in Turkey and changed the political system in Turkey. This paper is divided into two parts: Firstly, the relations between the AKP and the army culminating in the coup will be analysed; secondly, an analysis of the impact of the coup on the constitutional changes will ensue. The paper’s main questions are the following: 1) What caused the escalation of the conflict between the AKP government and the army culminating in the coup? How did the role of a securitisation actor, and the securitisation and desecuritisation strategy transform in time 2) What role did the coup play in the AKP's long-term effort to enforce the presidential system?The first part of the paper deals with the crucial army interventions that have taken place since the Republic’s establishment, its causes and consequences. Subsequently, the analysis of the relations between the AKP government and the army – the desecuritisation process (including new policy toward the so-called Kurdish issue) and Europeanisation follows. The paper aims to ascertain the clashes between these two actors and analyse the consequences (personal purges in the army, changes of the constitution) as well as evaluating the cooperation of the AKP and the Gülen movement and its effect on the army. The second part explores the transition from parliamentary to presidential political system in 2017. It is no secret that the implementation of presidentialism was one of the goals of the AKP since they came to power in 2002. Therefore, the main constitutional changes since 2002 are observed in the paper. All three of them were approved by way of a referendum – in 2007, 2010 and 2017. However, the causes of the referendums were different – in the first case it was a stalemate situation in the 2007 presidential elections, in the second case it was the process of European integration as well as the intervention of the judiciary against the AKP , and finally in the third case it was the opportunity to use the failed coup as an argument in favour of a “necessary” move toward presidentialism. Surprisingly, the National Movement Party (MHP) changed its long-term policy and initiated negotiations with the AKP regarding implementation of the presidential system which resulted in a constitutional referendum in 2017. Briefly, the relations between the AKP and the security forces were affected by the integration process, the AKP’s new approach towards the Kurdish issue and, in general, the desecuritisation process launched by the AKP. However, the army still tried to securitise some issues, which resulted in open clashes between the AKP and the army. One of them was the so-called e-memorandum, a threat to the government issued on the army’s official websites. After the 2007 election, the AKP has continued the desecuritisation process, trying to weaken the army as one of the securitisation actors. The AKP fabricated cases Ergenekon and Balyoz which helped the ruling party to realise purges in the security forces and install allied Gülenists. However, the alliance was not as harmonious as expected, and clashes between the AKP and the Gülen movement culminated in 2013. Again, as a reaction, the AKP initiated purges to get rid of the Gülenist from the army. The AKP simultaneously began to securitise this issue, so the former desecuritisation actor began to securitise, in order to maintain political power. The Kurdish issue was also securitised after failed long-term negotiations. The failed coup provided a perfect opportunity for the AKP to blame the Gülenist and finish the purge in the army aimed against them. The 2017 constitutional change resulted in strengthening the executive powers, represented by the president, at the expense of legislature and judiciary. Some indications of the move to a presidential system are apparent in the 2007 referendum as the president is elected directly; however, the checks and balances of a parliamentary system remained. The AKP which was not far from dissolution by the ruling of the Constitutional court in 2008, reduced the power of the judiciary in the 2010 constitutional referendum aiming for implementation of a presidential system. The essential milestone for a referendum call in 2017 was the change in the opposing MHP’s long-term policy. The MHP reflected the situation after the coup and surprisingly demanded formal legitimisation of the president’s real power.There is an evident move from a hybrid regime to authoritarianism since the AKP came to power in 2002. Undoubtedly, reducing the army’s power, changing the political system, and dismantling checks and balances will impact the shape of the regime and its foreign policy in the future.

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