RATIONALITY’S SPACE OF INDETERMINATION
RATIONALITY’S SPACE OF INDETERMINATION

Summary/Abstract: The article proposes a critical analysis of an influential perspective on practical rationality, based on the assumption that the rationality of decisions and actions can be, in principle, perfectly defined by applying a set of formal criteria of unidirectional adequacy of means to ends. Our critique notes that a crucial fact is ignored: most important decisions confront us with a space of indetermination, an area in which deliberation can not clearly delineate between rational and irrational solely on the basis of predefined and context-independent criteria. A more appropriate representation of rationality seems to be offered by the complementary and flexible application of formal criteria (which offer a minimal set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions) and norms open to adaptive adjustments. These adjustments are not generated by the application of postulated criteria, but by decisional practice and the confrontation with alternative norms developed in other contexts.

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