Odwoływalność i mówienie nie wprost
Cancellability and Saying Something Indirectly
Author(s): Tomasz A. PuczyłowskiSubject(s): Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: conversational implicature; cancellability; saying something indirectly; saying
Summary/Abstract: The aim of this article is to defend the thesis that every conversational implication is cancellable. To this end, I propose a precising definition of cancellability and, based on an analysis of examples proposed by Bach (2006) and Carston (2002), introduce the category of indirectly saying that p. I stipulate that person X said indirectly that p iff (i) X did not say (directly) that p, (ii) from what X said and the analytical truths of the language, it follows that p, and (iii) X meant that p. I definecancellability as follows: if the use of sentence S in context C implies proposition P then P is a cancellable part of this act iff there is a sentence S* and a context C* such that (i) S is a proper part of S*, (ii) S follows from S*, and (iii) P is not implied by S* in C*, but assertion of S* is admissible in C*.
Journal: Filozofia Nauki
- Issue Year: 28/2020
- Issue No: 3 (111)
- Page Range: 73-98
- Page Count: 26
- Language: Polish