A Note on the Lucas Argument
A Note on the Lucas Argument
Author(s): Rudy RuckerSubject(s): Semiology, Logic
Published by: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Summary/Abstract: We’re talking about J. Anthony Lucas’s classic argument that Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem rules out man-machine equivalence. This is an argument that Penrose revived and popularized in the 1990s. This fallacious argument is a thoroughly dead horse. But I’ll give it another beating here. Do note that the Lucas-Penrose argument is a completely distinct issue from PenroseHameroff speculation that the brain can act as a coherent quantum computer. It’s to Penrose’s credit that he’s associated with multiple controversial ideas!
Journal: Studia Semiotyczne
- Issue Year: 34/2020
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 81-82
- Page Count: 2
- Language: English