Representationalism, Double Vision, and Afterimages: A Response to Işık Sarıhan
Representationalism, Double Vision, and Afterimages: A Response to Işık Sarıhan
Author(s): René JAGNOWSubject(s): Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Psychology
Published by: KruZak
Keywords: Perception; representationalism; qualia; afterimages; double vision;
Summary/Abstract: In his paper “Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia,” Işık Sarıhan addresses the debate between strong representationalists and qualia theorists (Sarıhan 2020). He argues that qualia theorists like Ned Block and Amy Kind who cite double-vision, afterimages, etc., as evidence for the existence of qualia are mistaken about the actual nature of these states. According to Sarıhan, these authors confuse the fact that these states are non-endorsed representational states with the fact that they are at least partly non-representational. I argue that Sarıhan’s argument contains gaps that suggest that he misidentifies the mistake that leads these qualia theorists to their conclusion. In my view, these qualia theorists do not confuse the fact that the states in question are non-endorsed states with the fact that they are non-representational, but rather mistake certain representational contents, or certain aspects of these contents, for qualia.
Journal: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: XX/2020
- Issue No: 60
- Page Range: 435-451
- Page Count: 17
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF