A létezés mint erő Spinoza és Leibniz filozófiájában
Existence as a Force in the Thought of Spinoza and Leibniz

Summary/Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show that conatus is not just one of the many philosophical terms discussed at the beginning of the modern era: it is not intended to highlight one of the many attributes inherent in natural objects, but concerns the most fundamental meaning of being. In addressing this phenomenon, Spinoza and Leibniz propose new definitions of the notion of being in terms of inner dynamism. According to this approach, whatever exists, realizes its own possibilities, counteracting all alternative pretensions to existence. I maintain that this thesis represents a real turning point in the history of modern metaphysics. It can best be understood against the backdrop of at least three different historical and intellectual contexts. The first one is centered upon the problem of dynamism discussed in the physical sciences of nature. The second context is that of the Platonic tradition which occupies an important place in the thought of Leibniz. The third has to do with how the traditional metaphysics was transformed by Duns Scotus and his followers during baroque scolasticism. It will be argued that the first two perspectives, well known to early modern scholars, fail to make sense of Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s attempts to reformulate the notion of the being in terms of force and effort (conatus).

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