ЗАЕДНИЧКАТА ЕВРОПСКА НАДВОРЕШНА И БЕЗБЕДНОСНА ПОЛИТИКА
COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Summary/Abstract: Joint European Security and Foreign Policy (ESFP) is a concept that is for a long time present within the EU agenda. Its practical realization became reality in the last decade of the twentieth century. Due to the process of integration, the greatest part of the national, economic, trade, social, and even political authorities were under the EU umbrella. These factors necessitate the need for creating the “second pillar” that would support the position of EU towards the other factors in the world. Security threats that came from the disintegration of the communist block were the main reason for creating the European Security and military structures and for harmonization of joint performance on the international scene. The key catalyst that speed up these European ambitions are wars in former Yugoslavia. Those wars only confirmed the weakness of the EU regarding this area and the fear that USA would not be always present when need for that occurs. The main outer factors that influence the formulating of the ESFP are Trans-Atlantic relations, relations between Russia and USA, condition on the Middle East, Mediterranean area and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. Although there is still potential conflicts, institutional relations on political and military level should be expected to remain stabile and complementary. Approach to the command structures of NATO would additionally speed up the efforts of creating the operative frame of SBI and would multiple their capabilities during the completion of the scheduled missions. Realization of the SBI concept depend on its priority in the EU political agenda, level of the investments, and dynamics of consolidation of security in the Europe. SBI could be operative around 2010-2020 but it depends on the level of investments and on the dynamics of the structuring and equipping. Besides the fact that there is no chance for accomplishing the operational readiness till the set time limit (2003), part of the set tasks could be performed as a minor operations. Those tendency would be supported by the need of showing at least declarative operational readiness of the forces in order political and economic funds invested could be justified.

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