DEEP CONCEPTUAL MORAL DISAGREEMENTS: OVER WHAT DO WE DISAGREE AND WHY?
DEEP CONCEPTUAL MORAL DISAGREEMENTS: OVER WHAT DO WE DISAGREE AND WHY?
Author(s): Margit SutropSubject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Ontology
Published by: Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus
Keywords: moral disagreement; deep conceptual disagreement; belief-disagreement; action-disagreement; value; value conflict; identities; concept of good life; incommensurable values; motivating reasons;
Summary/Abstract: We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, restrictions to freedom, or eating meat for fun. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which type of disagreements we are confronted with. The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and clarify their nature. I will argue that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements that similarly to disagreements in logic or ontology, are not resolvable, as the resolution of the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. I will suggest four possible sources of moral disagreements: incommensurable fundamental values, different concepts of the good life, different motivating reasons and different concepts of morality.
Journal: TRAMES
- Issue Year: XXIV/2020
- Issue No: 3
- Page Range: 295-314
- Page Count: 20
- Language: English
