FAITH AND REASON IN THE THEORIES OF OPEN AND CLOSED SOCIETY
FAITH AND REASON IN THE THEORIES OF OPEN AND CLOSED SOCIETY

Summary/Abstract: The article deals with the views of two eminent philosophers – Henry Bergson and Karl Popper, who are considered as representing different trends in European thought. The originality of the present article consists in an attempt to bridge the gap between the outlooks of both thinkers by way of looking for points of coincidence in their understanding of the open/closed society dichotomy. The article proposes to distinguish between the use of the terms openness and closedness, as well as by underscoring the rationalistic versus fideistic character in understanding morality by both authors. Following our theoretical interest, we analyse the concept of closeness and openness in Bergson’s and Popper’s philosophies, reveal their advantages and limits and consider the roles of faith and reason in their theories. At the same time, we aim to draw particular attention to those elements of the theories which may help to think about the most relevant problems of the relation between the individual and society and between different societies. Thus we recall their arguments and reconsider them taking into account the changes which have happened during the last half of the 20th century. Although both of our philosophers argue for the open society, their meanings of the very terms ‘openness’ and ‘closedness’ differ. Popper essentially supports Bergson’s opinion on a closed society, but he disagrees with Bergson’s interpretation of the basis of an open society and assesses an influence of mystical insights on social attitudes as a factor which increases closedness. Both of them hold to the opinion that human sociality in a small group is of biological nature and customs of social life are enforced by myths or some supernatural will, or at least they are as unalterable as regularities which may be seen in nature. Such beliefs justify the necessity to surrender to the group interest, so reason is not the ground for morality in closed societies. Bergson argues that reason first stimulates humans to behave egoistically and then the same reason gives arguments why it is not worthy to disregard the obligations committed to ensure the public welfare. Both of them acknowledge that an open society is not yet created and suggest means for its creation. Bergson asserts that the source of open morality is mystic love. He looks for moral actions which are not based on any kind of constraint and argues that open morality should act as an appeal to integrate into all-embracing cosmic emotion and freely follow the example given by Christian mystics. Popper agrees that Christian faith may make a great contribution to establishing fraternal human relationships, but argues that the appeal to love and to act as love suggests us is dangerous. This view is based on Popper’s belief that a person cannot feel the same emotions towards everybody, and thus emotional relationship inevitably supposes anti-equalitarian attitude. Popper’s treatment of the Bergsonian theory as dangerous might be justified only in case we ignore the criticism of Bergson of static religion and his attempt to consider the possibility of the religion as being dynamic. Certainly, even Bergson himself admits that dynamic religious faith could be only exceptional. Therefore, his attempt to generalize exceptional experiences of extraordinary individuals into the general strategy of society is highly dubious.

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