Czesław Martyniak’s critique of Hans Kelsen’s normativism Cover Image

Czesława Martyniaka krytyka normatywizmu Hansa Kelsena
Czesław Martyniak’s critique of Hans Kelsen’s normativism

Author(s): Mirosław Piotr Stochmal
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law
Published by: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Keywords: Kelsen; normativism; pure theory of law; Martyniak; binding force of law; natural law

Summary/Abstract: The article aims to present a critique of Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law by Czesław Martyniak and to present a “positive’ solution. Martyniak reduced his criticism of Kelsen’s normativism to three issues: 1) the uniformity of its philosophical foundations, 2) the force of applicable law, and 3) natural law. Martyniak’s critique of Kelsen’s concept of law shows two extremely different attitudes regarding the separation of the sphere of being and duty in the field of law made by I. Kant. Kelsen is an extreme supporter of the separation of Sein and Sollen, while Martyniak, on the contrary, assumes the coexistence and connection of these spheres. According to Martyniak, a mutual separation of the spheres of being and duty results with many absurd consequences on the basis of law and its theory. Martyniak’s critique of normativism remains close to Thomistic doctrine and is clearly inspired by the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. However, it should be considered as a creative adaptation of Thomas ideas. It is debatable to what extent Czesław Martyniak’s criticism of Kelsen’s normativism is only of a historical value or could be considered timeless. It probably depends on the importance and “eternity” of the problems we take under our consideration, moreover, whether one is capable to work out their original solutions.

  • Issue Year: 19/2020
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 97-118
  • Page Count: 22
  • Language: Polish
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