Az észlelés tartalma
The Content of Perception
Author(s): Levente PappSubject(s): Philosophy of Mind, Phenomenology
Published by: Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület
Keywords: perception; consciousness; intentionality; content; concept;
Summary/Abstract: This study deals with the intentionality of perception with a primary focus on the content of experience. My question is: as long as we think about the general character of conscious intentionality as fundamentally a “subject‒psychological mode‒content‒object” structure, how can we apply this scheme to the nature of perception? Firstly, I will clarify how I intend to use the concept of perception, and I will briefly elaborate on the meaning of the mentioned intentional structure, generally construed. After this brief introduction, I will try to make a fundamental distinction between sensation and perception defending the thesis that conceptual contents are not essential to perception as such. Following this, I will pursue the question of what we mean by the content of perception in light of the content-object distinction given that we have put aside conceptual content. In the end, with the help of a couple of examples, I will try to make sense of what nonconceptual content is.
Journal: Erdélyi Múzeum
- Issue Year: LXXXII/2020
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 1-12
- Page Count: 12
- Language: Hungarian