The Peculiarities of Private and Family Life Protection: The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights
The Peculiarities of Private and Family Life Protection: The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights

Summary/Abstract: One of the most vulnerable spheres of life of any individual is his / her private and family life. Therefore, this issue could not slip the attention of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (hereinafter - the Convention) (Council of Europe, 1950). In fact, there have always been some prejudices within this issue, as it is not a secret that accusations of violating an individual’s right to privacy often provoke discussion in the public sphere. For example, when the UK Special Forces eliminated three terrorists (who were no longer resisting) on the territory of Gibraltar (Case of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1995), the media did not particularly intend to protect the right to life of these criminals. On the other hand, quite a few liberal media sources have resonantly responded to the interference with private life, when a group of stockbrokers and bankers were prosecuted for sadomasochism in a private residence. A similar behavior of the press was observed when discussing the mandatory use of seat belts.However, when considering the issues related to the violation of Article 8 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950), it is important to find answers to a few rather essential questions:Has there been an interference with private life under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950)? If so, then –Is this interference sufficiently justified in the light of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950), namely:Was the interference lawful? If yes, then –Did the interference have a lawful purpose? If yes, then –Was the interference necessary for a democratic society (can it be regarded as an adequate response to socially urgent necessity)?In case there arises a question concerning state’s positive obligations, it will no longer belong to the jurisdiction of paragraph 2, but will touch upon the analysis of the issue whether state’s positive obligation exists at all.

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