Твърдият инкомпатабилизъм не променя нищо
Hard Incompatibilism Does Not Change a Thing

Summary/Abstract: In this article, I defend a version of hard incompatibilism with regard to free will. My central claim is that hard incompatibilism does not suffer from any of the problems that compatibilism and libertarianism face; ergo, that hard incompatibilism is the least problematic stance. Moreover, hard incompatibilism can be incorporated in any scientific system and theory. First, I propose a brief reconstruction of Hume`s classical version of compatibilism. In the second part, I focus on a couple of objections that classic compatibilism faces. I aim to show that some of these charges are applicable both to contemporary physicalist readings of compatibilism (such as that of Patricia Churchland) and to libertarian incompatibilism. The final section of my paper points out some reasons for rejecting the argument from contemplation of linguistic categories. My aim is to show that the same semantic critique of the meaning of “freedom” can just as easily be aimed at compatibilism. I conclude that hard incompatibilism successfully faces all of these charges and does not suffer from any additional disadvantages. Moreover, if hard incompatibilism holds, then we can continue to uphold the usual moral beliefs and practices.

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