On the impossibility of phenomenological langugage in the context of Wittgensteins manuscripts from 1929-1933
On the impossibility of phenomenological langugage in the context of Wittgensteins manuscripts from 1929-1933

Summary/Abstract: The article treats Ludwig Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts where he formulates the problemof impossibility of “phenomenological language” defined by him as the “description of immediate sensual perception without any hypothetical supplementation.” One may find this phase of his philosophy(1929–1933) a bit paradoxical because the philosopher claims this phase, from the very beginning,to have been overcome; we deal here with philosophical self-criticism. The Lewis Carroll’s paradox isconsidered in terms of analogy to this criticized project of “phenomenological language”—the paradoxof a ridiculously exact map which coincides with the mapped area. We open up new possibilities forcomparison between the Wittgensteinian project of the “primal language” and Husserlian, Heideggerian and Finkian projects of “phenomenological language.”

• Details
• Contents