The Legal and Practical Inefficiency of Systematically Introducing Human Rights Clauses in the European Union’s Agreements
The Legal and Practical Inefficiency of Systematically Introducing Human Rights Clauses in the European Union’s Agreements

Summary/Abstract: This paper’s goal is to provide a pertinent critique of the legal and practical deficiencies of the human rights conditionality model systematically implemented by the European Union in its foreign policy. This practice has been subject to academic examination since its introduction in 1995, yet very few analysed the issue from a public international law or practical perspective. This paper uses a qualitative method of research based on an investigation of the historical evolution of the human rights clause between multiple agreements concluded by the EU with third States. Starting from this collected information, it is revealed that the clause has developed heterogeneously and has a variable legal value. This has been determined in two ways: first, by comparing clauses with the Abbot-Snidal theory of distinguishing between soft law and hard law and, second, by analysing these clauses in light of the material breach of treaties doctrine. As for the practical point of view, it is found that no methodology has yet developed in order to properly assess the effects of human rights conditionality. Thus, the findings imply that this practice has, with a few exceptions, become outdated as the EU already is in possession of better instruments of human rights promotion which do not hinder its treaty-negotiation ability. This is a unique conclusion which, unlike previous works, does not suggest a mere reform of the system, but its entire removal.

• Details
• Contents