Nesvodivost sposobnosti osećanja
The Irreducibility of the Ability to Feel

Author(s): Igor Cvejić
Subject(s): Psychology, Phenomenology
Published by: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Keywords: Kant's philosophy; phenomenology;
Summary/Abstract: Igor Cvejić's book The Irreducibility of the Ability to Feel: Feelings of Pleasure and Dissatisfaction in Immanuel Kant's Philosophy presents an original phenomenological interpretation of feelings in Kant's philosophy as sui generis mental states. Entering into a dialogue with the main contemporary interpretations, the author explains that in order to understand Kant's interpretation of feelings we must abandon the causal model and the higher-order model of consciousness, and suggests that we understand feelings as the manifestation of the subjective causal force of representations. At the same time, the subjective causality of representations should also be understood as the way in which we become conscious, whereby feeling is shown as a special model of consciousness, and feeling appropriate intentionality as a special type of intentionality. The author explains his thesis by analyzing in particular three different types of feeling in Kant's philosophy: sensual pleasure and pain, intellectual pleasure and feeling in pure reflection.

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