Wolność i słabość woli u Donalda Davidsona
Free will and week weel in Donald Davidson

Author(s): Janusz Maciaszek
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Keywords: action;anomaly;freedom;intention;practical syllogism;propositional attitude;reason to act;theory of truth;weak will
Summary/Abstract: In the paper I present Donald Davidson’s solution of the problem of freedom against the background of his complex philosophical system. In spite of the fact that freedom understood as anomality was justified by Davidson by means of his philosophy of language I argue that it can be fully appreciated against the background of his philosophy of action. I argue also that the phenomenon of will explained by Davidson in terms of prima facie judgements and sans-phrase judgement is a necessary condition of freedom conceived as anomality. In the end I indicate that in spite of superficial analogies suggested by Davidson his solution of the problem of freedom is incomparable with the Kantian one.

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