PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION IN LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT – CASE STUDY KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION IN LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT – CASE STUDY KOSOVO AND METOHIJA

Author(s): Veljko Blagojevic
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Security and defense, Military policy, Geopolitics, Peace and Conflict Studies
Published by: Институт за међународну политику и привреду
Keywords: Kosovo and Metohija; Low-Intensity Conflict; Psychological Operation; Operation Allied Force
Summary/Abstract: This paper deals with western countries, led by the United States, psychological operations against Serbia’s political leadership and security and defense forces during the Kosovo crisis 1998-1999. Shortly after the end of war in Bosnia, the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija (K&M) escalated from the potential to a real and imminent threat to the national security of the SFRY. The Kosovo Albanians organized paramilitary formations the Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK) on a territorial basis, and intensified attacks on Serbia’s security forces and institutions. The situation in the region became “ideal” for applying the US concept of Low-Intensity Conflict. The basic aim of this paper is to analyze key elements of the psychological operations of the Western allies against Serbia/FRY in conditions of low-intensity conflicts in K&M. First, the paper will analyze US/NATO doctrinal documents of Low-Intensity Conflict and Psychological Operation that were in power at that time, representing the focus of engaging all national resources, from (public) diplomacy and the media through economic and political sanctions to security and defense measures, aimed at changing the behavior of the subject of international relations to which it was applied. Then, the focus will shift on the implementation of those doctrines in the Kosovo crisis. The paper will be divided into two phases, the Kosovo Albanians rebel in 1998/99 and the Operation Allied Force in 1999. Twenty years’ distance from those events gives us a very good historical perspective for an objective political analysis of Serbian and Western leadership of that time, the outcomes of the crisis and repercussions on the key national interests of Serbia.

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