The Logical and Systems Theoretical Presuppositions of the Law's Completeness: Law as Rule and Law as Norm
The Logical and Systems Theoretical Presuppositions of the Law's Completeness: Law as Rule and Law as Norm

Author(s): Csaba Varga
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Civil Law
Published by: Правни факултет Универзитета у Источном Сарајеву
Keywords: Civil Law; Common Law; Law as rule; Law as norm; Conceptualization; Logicisation; Systemic treatment; Gaps in law; Completeness of the law;
Summary/Abstract: Gaps in the law and the completeness of the law only become relevant issues when we consider the law as norms and treat it as a system itself. Albeit in language use, "rule" and "norm" are mostly taken as synonyms interchangeable, the former signals that there is a normative message made available and the latter stands for the logically processed conceptual embodiment of such a message. As norms presuppose a quasi axiomatic ideal of conceptualizing and logifying the law, they are at home only in regimes of the Civil Law where they are construed to form a Rechtsdogmatik. (For, in contrast to it, Common Law is mostly casual exemplification). Or, the norm is logical unit, indeed, while the rule is a kind of proposition. Accordingly, reconstruction can as well reveal that either no norm or several norms are in fact expressed in and by given rule.

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