Asymmetric Rivalries: The Case of Lebanon’s Financial Crisis
Asymmetric Rivalries: The Case of Lebanon’s Financial Crisis

Author(s): Hachem Hicham
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, Economy, National Economy, Business Economy / Management, Economic policy, Socio-Economic Research
Published by: Университет за национално и световно стопанство (УНСС)
Keywords: money creation; parity; lending capacity; redistribution; rivalries
Summary/Abstract: Unlike mainstream explanations, this paper is less concerned with the causes of the financial crisis in Lebanon as much as it raises the problem of adverse relationships between institutions of money creation and destruction. The analysis builds on the theoretical approach of mimetic rivalries and applies tools from graphical models in games theory. It aims to study the sensitivity of solvency constraints to explain asymmetric relationships. The applied case of Lebanon shows two relevant results (1) asymmetric relationships between economic agents and (2) top-down dynamics of money creation and destruction. These findings imply an institutional model of extractive economic policy dominated by strategies of vindication and rivalry.

• Details
• Contents