İnsani Yardım Faaliyetlerinde Asıl-Vekil Sorunu
The Principal-Agent Problem in Humanitarian Aid Activities

Author(s): İbrahim Demir
Subject(s): Welfare systems, Socio-Economic Research
Published by: Oku Okut Yayınları
Keywords: Principal-Agent Problem; Humanitarian Aid; Donation; Airport Syndrome;
Summary/Abstract: The principal-agent problem is commonly encountered in social theory for transactions carried out by an agent of principal entity. The principal-agent problem refers to the misalignment between the principal’s maximization goals and the agent’s maximization goals in a transaction involving agency. Humanitarian aid is often carried out by intermediaries or agents, as donors’ direct assistance to those in need would be costly and technically difficult. For donors, which are the principals of humanitarian aid action, the subject, timing, place, and quality of the aid are crucial for utility maximization. For example, as a reflection of the principal-agent problem, the airport syndrome refers to the delivery of aid in a way that is easy to reach (low cost) but does not coincide with the donor’s objectives in terms of the location of the aid. Therefore, it is important to examine humanitarian aid activities in the context of the principal-agent problem in order to prevent the amount of donations from shrinking. In this context, this study explains principal-agent problems that may arise in humanitarian aid activities and discusses possible consequences. The study findings and recommendations will be useful in minimizing the problems encountered in humanitarian aid activities and will play a role in preventing potential contractions in the humanitarian aid sectors.

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