Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945.
The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the End of WWII 1944–1945

Author(s): Kosta Nikolić
Subject(s): Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism
Published by: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije
Keywords: Yugoslavia; communism; allies; The Second World War; international relations; USSR;
Summary/Abstract: The fate of Yugoslavia was decided within the triangle of the „Great Allies”, and the global agreement between USA and the Soviet Union was of major importance. It is needles to ask if the Yugoslav Communists understood the nature of this agreement – they were just consequently following the instructions from Moscow. Revolutionary logic proved very effective in contact with American officers too: they reported that the partisans were fighting. The estimate as to against whom, in what degree and with which goal depended on experience and sagacity of individual officers, but the partisans always fulfilled the first requirement of the Allied coalition: they fought or they made an impression they were fighting. The American government created on purpose an illusion that Yugoslavia wasn’t handed over to the Soviets, but to an autonomous resistance movement of unclear political orientation. Later reports which testified to the Communist character of the People’s Liberation Movement, about the clear intention of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to gain power by all means, about outright inimical attitude toward USA, about the reign of terror, about existence of aggressive mix of nationalism and Communism, about proofs that the new Yugoslav regime was a carbon copy of the Soviet system and that Tito was Moscow’s best pupil, didn’t cause any reaction on the part of the American administration. Yugoslavia was in the Soviet sphere of influence. Comparative analysis of British and American influence on the denouement of the civil war and the post-war social system of Yugoslavia shows that apparent disinterest is more nefarious and more important than excessive engagement. The American military establishment decided that the second front in Europe wouldn’t be opened in the Balkans, and Roosevelt drew political conclusions from this decision and left Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union. Churchill’s endeavors to exercise his own influence on Tito and to retain a modicum of political influence, must be seen in this context. USA had both military and political means of influencing the fate of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain hadn’t. USA cared exclusively about its interests and not about the proclaimed principles of foreign policy. Only the facade of democracy was to be preserved.

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