Moscow’s long war: Russia’s political calculations after 100 days of conflict
Moscow’s long war: Russia’s political calculations after 100 days of conflict

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak
Subject(s): Military policy, Political behavior, Studies in violence and power, Geopolitics, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
Published by: OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia
Keywords: Russian invasion of Ukraine; Moscow; The Kremlin;
Summary/Abstract: Although 100 days have passed since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has not achieved even the hypothetical minimum objective of the operation: the capture of the entire Donbas. The fierce Ukrainian resistance and Western support for Kyiv mean that, despite the concentration of forces in selected sections, the Russian army’s progress is slow, and being paid for with high losses. However, the Kremlin has still not decided on a serious escalation of the conflict, whether by declaring general mobilisation, using weapons of mass destruction, or moving the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders. These scenarios, although they cannot be completely ruled out, seem unlikely today. Rather, Russia is limiting (albeit probably temporarily) the scale of its ambitions for territorial gains in Ukraine, and is striving to reach lines that could create the appearance of victory and the achievement of the formal objectives of its ‘special operation’. Above all, however, the Kremlin now proclaims and believes that the current situation is merely an episode in a long-term war with the West as a whole. Accordingly, it is attempting to conduct economic and humanitarian aggression, and seeking to maximise the costs on the part of both Ukraine and the West that supports it. At the same time, it hopes that their resilience has clear limits and will ultimately force them to make political concessions to Moscow, which will bring a needed pause allowing Russia to prepare for the next stage of confrontation.

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