Series:DEM. POLICY COUNCIL - Policy Notes

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 02: Bosnia and Herzegovina after the February 2014 protests: is there a potential for renewed violent social unrest?

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 02: Bosnia and Herzegovina after the February 2014 protests: is there a potential for renewed violent social unrest?

Author(s): Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; February; 2014; protests; social unrest; post-war economy; recession; political instability; IFI; EU; structural reforms;

Despite a multitude of challenges and structural problems inherited from the pre-war and wartime socio-economic system and the post-war state structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) saw remarkable economic recovery and growth from 2004-06. This was partly due to some state-building reforms including the introduction of a unified VAT rate and a Single Account for indirect tax collection and revenue distribution, made possible by serious international engagement that in turn boosted the reform willingness of domestic political elites. However, hopes that domestic elites would continue structural reform on the way to Euro-Atlantic integration quickly proved unfounded when the West, in a policy shift in 2005/06, began handing increasing responsibility to domestic actors. Not only did the ruling elites not follow through with reforms, but they expanded the existing political-economic patronage system. The main elements of this patronage system are burgeoning public employment and a system of status-based social benefits for certain social groups, especially war veterans. Both elements are ethnically based and use administrative resources to tie the political loyalty of large social groups to the ruling ethnic parties. The exploding cost that went with the excessive expansion of patronage ate up the effects of the previous economic growth and fiscal performance and made Bosnia and Herzegovina enter the global economic crisis in 2008 on homemade terms. The country succeeded to escape from recession after 2010, but it failed to move towards socio-economic recovery and sustainable growth. The slow-down of the global recession and the implementation of basic initial structural reforms on domestic soil stopped the dramatic economic downturn. But the structural causes of the socio-economic weakness, and above all the patronage system, remained untouched. In order to uphold a fragile socio-economic stability, the ruling elites increasingly relied on foreign and domestic borrowing and on international financial institutions such as the IMF. The IMF has continued to provide credit arrangements since 2010, even though structural reforms were not being implemented and reform commitments were not being honored, and despite rising political instability. The reasons for this generosity lie primarily with the EU’s policy of that period: unable to muster the political will to confront domestic political resistance to reforms in BiH, the Union has lowered or dropped altogether its reform conditions. In 2013, the EU provided direct support to the BiH State budget without any serious conditionality. With rapidly rising levels of public indebtedness and social disaffection, this approach proved unsustainable in the long run – as became evident in the violent outburst of social frustrations in February 2014. The protests ended essentially without any results; all the socio-economic and political factors that provoked them in 2014 remain in place and pose a continuing security risk for the future of BiH. It remains to be seen if the EU’s new BiH initiative, spearheaded by Germany and the UK, really has the potential to promote serious structural economic and social reforms.

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 01: Inflammatory political rhetoric and hate speech in Bosnia and Herzegovina: political elites and the media

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 01: Inflammatory political rhetoric and hate speech in Bosnia and Herzegovina: political elites and the media

Author(s): Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; political rhetoric; hate speech; political elites; media; local elections; 2012; general elections 2014; Islamist terrorism; Zvornik; police station; social unrest; EU;

Since the international retreat to an “ownership” and EU enlargement-based policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) a decade ago, political rhetoric in the public space, propagated through the media, has become more polarizing and inflammatory. The pronounced nationalist themes articulated by politicians and their adjuncts, revolving around the future of the state and alleged threats posed to ethnic collectives by adversaries both domestic and foreign (and their supposed local allies), have radicalized the public discourse and contributed to an ambient of fear and homogenization. The topic of “war” has returned to popular discussion. This phenomenon has been observable in media coverage of the 2012 municipal elections, 2014 general elections, issues and events relating to Srebrenica, acts of Islamist terrorism, and popular protests of February 2014. In each instance, political leaders, dubious “experts,” and commentators have all fed a dynamic which could have dire consequences in BiH’s current rules-free environment – effectively generating volatility which could ignite by design or by accident. And while all those with unfulfilled agendas are pursuing them without restraint to form perceptions and opinions in the media arena, the most consistent and radical messaging is emanating from the Republika Srpska Government, and President Milorad Dodik in particular. While BiH politicians define the agenda, the politically captured media provides the means to inflame, intimidate, provoke anger, and stoke fear. This information dominance is a vital element of the BiH political elites’ life support system.

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 03: EUFOR: The West’s Potemkin Deterrent in Bosnia and Herzegovina

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 03: EUFOR: The West’s Potemkin Deterrent in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; EUFOR; NATO; West’s Potemkin; security; interethnic conflict; security council; politics; Russia; veto;

The EU’s military deterrent force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), EUFOR/Operation Althea, is nearing the end of its 11th year of operation. It came into being in 2004 with great fanfare at a time of EU self-confidence and ambition, succeeding NATO in its role of maintaining a “safe and secure environment,” as prescribed by the Dayton Peace Accords. It appeared then to be a mission of guaranteed success. At its current 600 troops, it is now less than one-tenth of its original mandated strength of over 7,000, which itself was about one-sixth of the strength of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) of 54,000 troops. The force has atrophied as the political will to maintain executive instruments has evaporated among most EU member states. Perversely, its decimation in strength correlates with an incremental regression in BiH’s political atmosphere over the last 8 years; citizens feel less secure today than they did in 2006, according to EUFOR’s own polling data. The country is now completely polarized by an upcoming referendum in the Republika Srpska on the legitimacy of the state-level judicial institutions which Western diplomats and numerous local political actors have declared a “fundamental violation” of the Dayton Peace Accords Western military professionals assess EUFOR’s deterrent and reaction capability as effectively nonexistent. Essentially, it is just a placeholder force to provide a foundation for external reinforcement. Were a crisis, such as organized interethnic violence, to erupt, it would require outside forces to respond, let alone contain. Many interviewees for this report dispute EUFOR’s capacity to secure even Sarajevo International Airport. The legal platform for EUFOR, a UN Security Council resolution, is up for annual renewal in early November. Last year, the Republika Srpska called for the mission to end, followed by a Russian diplomatic attack on the mission in the Security Council and an unprecedented abstention. Russia’s veto in July of this year of the UK-sponsored Srebrenica commemoration resolution, in tandem with the overall tension between Russia and the West, most recently reflected in Russia’s deployment to Syria, make a veto of the renewal a strong possibility. The West, with the EU in a leading role, is responsible for the deterrence failure which has led to a dangerously degrading trajectory in BiH. The growing sense of insecurity has not only made durable progress impossible, but is leading to the increasing likelihood – and gravity – of political miscalculation by the BiH political leaders it has empowered. Renewed interethnic violence remains a real possibility. A credible Western deterrent force, be it under the EU or NATO umbrella, is not only essential to prevent disaster in BiH; it is a prerequisite to enabling a popular consensus in the country so that ultimately it no longer requires external guardians to ensure the peace. Now is the time for the West to take action to bolster its deterrent capability in BiH before, not after, events have spiraled out of control. Unless leading Western powers now forge a consensus on planning and action to fulfil the moral and legal obligations they undertook to maintain the peace in BiH, they will likely suffer the consequences of their failure.

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 04: The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 04: The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; armed forces; AFBIH; RS; Mladen Ivanić; government; NATO; political enviroment; regimental system; military capability; 2014; defense property;

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH or “the force”) will mark its tenth anniversary in 2016 and stands as a useful reminder of the considerable progress achieved in the first decade following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. However, the force was assembled just when all other state-building consolidation and reforms began to stop, stall or reverse.. The AFBiH is not immune to the effects of the polarized political environment and its attendant afflictions – patronage and clientelism, short-termism, and a lack of accountability. Furthermore, the Republika Srpska (RS) Government has perennially targeted the AFBiH’s budget for cuts as part of its policy to demilitarize BiH, and thereby further weaken the state. In addition, in much the same way that Dayton included compromises which have been proven to obstruct the creation of a functional and accountable governance system for BiH, the tradeoffs required to create the AFBiH impedes its integration. In particular, the maintenance of ethnic majority infantry battalions poses a risk in the event of the emergence of further interethnic polarization, as does the (ceremonial) regimental system – originally intended as a containment mechanism for Armija BiH, Vojske RS, and HVO traditions for veterans of these forces, but now being perpetuated by the encouragement of new recruits to join them. Full integration of the force down to the operational level remains unrealized. Furthermore, sources indicate that currying favor with political and religious authorities in pursuit of advancement has become ever more visible in the ranks. Progress toward the goal of NATO membership, questioned by both the RS Government and more recently by Serb member of the BiH Presidency Mladen Ivanić, has been hobbled by the fact that the ownership of defense property remains in dispute. Resolution of this issue, which would free troops from defending these sites for other duties, is an explicit requirement for the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to be activated. Registration of this property, ruled State property by the BiH Constitutional Court and more recently the Court of BiH, was part of the coalition agreement for the BiH Government, but remains vehemently opposed by the RS. Despite these considerable impediments, the AFBiH has performed admirably, both abroad in peace support operations (with regular contingents supporting ISAF in Afghanistan) and at home. In the latter case, during and following the May 2014 flood emergency, the AFBiH saved lives and property of BiH citizens throughout the flood affected areas. This boosted morale considerably and connected the force to the citizenry as never before. The AFBiH was the only state, entity, or cantonal official body to emerge with its reputation enhanced through its flood response; all others performed miserably. This disaster response experience also identified deficiencies in equipment, training and preparation which can be remediated to ensure better performance in the future. Finally, the AFBiH is inducting “new blood” into the officer corps through a British-sponsored program to recruit university graduates. The effort was universally lauded in the author’s interviews as an avenue to further professionalize the force. In short, the problems identified with the AFBiH are essentially the same as they were four years ago, when the first edition of the DPC/Atlantic Initiative (AI) Security Risk Analysis was published. There is no expectation that the AFBiH will generate destabilization or initiate inter-ethnic violence. But there is almost universal belief that in the event of such violence, it would collapse along its ethnic fault lines. The AFBiH cannot but reflect the politically-driven polarization which dominates the political arena in BiH.

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 06: The Police Forces in BiH – Persistent Fragmentation and Increasing Politicization.

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 06: The Police Forces in BiH – Persistent Fragmentation and Increasing Politicization.

Author(s): Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; police; fragmentation; public order; inter-ethnic conflicts; EU; EUPM; RS; FBiH; ministry of security; Milorad Dodik; SNSD; SDA; SDP; LIA; SIPA; post-war; reform; Zvornik; police station;

The police forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are assigned a key role in maintaining public order and security and in preventing the re-emergence of any kind of violent interethnic conflict. The police represented one of the weakest points when the international community started to engage in supporting the reconstruction and democratic transformation of the state in post-war BiH. Pre-war, the police had been highly professional but lacked any tradition of independence from politics. During the war they underwent a process of deep de-professionalization and further politicization, even criminalization, as the interior ministry was divided into ethnic components and police were drafted into participating in ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Reforming the police – with the goal to decriminalize them, raise their professional level and shield them from political interference – became one of the top priorities of international efforts to restore public order and safety and support democratic consolidation. Under international leadership police officers were vetted, the number of police officers was reduced, the posts of police director and police commissioner were established at entity and cantonal levels, Independent Boards were created to select candidates, transparent rules for hiring and promotion of police officials were set, and training and education was modernized. While these measures proved moderately successful, one crucial reform ultimately failed – the attempt to overcome the structural fragmentation of the country’s police among the various levels of government and the concomitant lack of institutional hierarchy among the numerous police agencies. The collapse of police reform in 2007 marked the first major development that resulted from a policy shift by the West, now under European Union (EU) leadership, towards lowering conditionality in the face of domestic resistance to reform, in the futile hope that this would create reform momentum. The consequence of Brussels initialing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2007 in return for a mere written commitment by political leaders to future police reform and the creation of a number of (impotent) agencies at the state level (first and foremost the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies of BiH) instead of actual agreement on police reform was that there was no reform; neither the political elites nor the EU ever revisited the reform commitment. In 2012 the EU closed its Police Mission (EUPM) despite not having completed its mandated task – quite the contrary: attempts in both entities to roll back reform in areas where EUPM had set closing benchmarks were in full swing. The EU’s disengagement from serious reform has meant that structural problems in both entities remain unaddressed. In the Republika Srpska (RS), the police remain both highly centralized and highly politicized. In the Federation, the police agencies remain fragmented. The Federation police agency remains weak, the ethnic Bosniak-Croat divide within cantonal police agencies in mixed cantons has not disappeared, and cooperation between Federation and cantonal police remains ad-hoc and dependent on goodwill. The state-level Ministry of Security and the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies of BiH exist in an institutional twilight zone; cooperation between them and among various other agencies depends on goodwill that is rarely forthcoming. As a second consequence of the EU’s reform disengagement, the police have faced massive reform rollback attempts by the ruling political elites since 2011, when the first general elections following the shift in Western policy were held. In the RS, a new Law on Police Officials and a new Law on Internal Affairs (LIA) have further strengthened the political stranglehold over the police. Up until 2014, RS President Milorad Dodik had further secured political control over the police through an informal, parallel command structure bypassing the interior minister. Following the October 2014 elections that weakened the ruling Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) of RS President Milorad Dodik, he picked a new interior minister whose political loyalty is beyond doubt, as part of his efforts to further strengthen his political grip over the police. In the Federation, an open conflict erupted between entity and cantonal interior ministers and heads of police at entity and cantonal levels, and between the two largest parties, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP), over the latter’s attempt to establish political control over the police by way of new cantonal and entity LIAs. The attempt failed in 2014 just as general elections and the end of the rule of the SDP were nearing; the Federation adopted an LIA version championed by the West. But attempts at re-politicization through new LIAs continue at the cantonal level; changes to the book of rules for the Federation police agency appear to have the same purpose. This massive push for stronger political control has prompted all levels of police forces, from the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) down to the cantonal police corps, to steer clear of organized crime and corruption cases that might implicate the ruling elites.

DPC POLICY NOTE 13: Census taking in the Western Balkans: a challenging and often controversial task on the way to EU membership.

DPC POLICY NOTE 13: Census taking in the Western Balkans: a challenging and often controversial task on the way to EU membership.

Author(s): Anna-Lena Hoh / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; census; Western Balkans; EU membership; Croatia; Macedonia;

On the road towards EU enlargement, potential member states need to comply with the EU acquis communautaire. Chapter 18 of the acquis foresees the conduct of a population census by enlargement countries. This has proven to be more challenging in the post-war environment of the former Yugoslavia than in other countries. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the attributes of ethnicity and territory increased in importance as they were used to set or consolidate new borders and distribute rights and power according to population numbers and concentration. The sensitive aspects of ethnicity, language and religion, and the simple definition of the census category of ‘place of usual residence’ complicate the collection of census data in the region. This complication is rooted in the potential for an increase or decrease of ‘ethnic’ population numbers that can lead to the loss of rights or political influence. The significance of these aspects has been underestimated by the EU, which approaches the collection of population data as a rather technical exercise. This policy note reviews the recent census experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to identify similarities in problems, process and politics, and to offer lessons learned for the future.

DPC POLICY NOTE 11: DPC Advance Preview of the 2015 EC. Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our quick guide on what to expect—and what not to.

DPC POLICY NOTE 11: DPC Advance Preview of the 2015 EC. Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our quick guide on what to expect—and what not to.

Author(s): Patrick Dick / Language(s): English

Keywords: European Commission; BiH; progress report; agriculture; justice; constitutional reform;

Later this month, the European Commission is scheduled to publish its 2015 Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a document that purports to be the EU’s annual manifesto of priorities for the country. Like its predecessors of the last five years, however, the report will come up short. Its content will continue to be driven by inertia, though attempts by the Commission to inflate any signs of progress are a common feature that can be expected as well. There is some indication that turnover within the Commission following the 2014 European elections may open up some institutional space for a more frank reckoning with the lack of progress in the country, which has been mired in political stagnation for nearly a decade. However, there is also a risk that institutional commitment to the still vague “Reform Agenda” will limit this slender opportunity. The interaction of these forces is complex. Here is what to expect from this year’s report.

DPC POLICY NOTE 10: Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform.

DPC POLICY NOTE 10: Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Case for Comprehensive Education Reform.

Author(s): Valery Perry / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; extremism; cultivation; education; reform; educational policy; youth; ethnicity; fragmentation; critical thinking; analytical skills; media literacy; Balkans; Syria; Iraq; Ukraine; post-war;

This policy note argues that while educational policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) do not explicitly encourage radical or extremist thinking, they do decidedly facilitate the emergence of narrow-minded, ethnically exclusive groups of young citizens unequipped to operate in a heterogeneous, complex world. Insufficient measures exist to promote critical thinking, media literacy, multiperspectivity and inclusive civic-mindedness. At best, the present educational approach bodes poorly for the socio-economic prospects of BiH’s youth in an increasingly competitive global market; at worst, few preventive measures exist that would dissuade vulnerable individuals from gravitating towards extremist worldviews. BiH’s ethnically fragmented and exclusivist approaches to education are anathema to the development of critical thinking and analytical skills necessary to open young minds, reduce intolerance and question the ethnic status quo narrative. While global fears of Islamist extremism dominate discussions on radicalism and terrorism, other forms of extremism (radical nationalist; white supremacy; neo-Nazi; anti-immigrant; etc.) benefit from young minds unable to effectively digest and question messages of hate and intolerance. Young people from the Balkans have gone not only to Syria and Iraq, but also to Ukraine, as part of a perceived ideological, cultural struggle.

DPC POLICY NOTE 12: Stuck in Transition? Croatia’s Policy Toward Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DPC POLICY NOTE 12: Stuck in Transition? Croatia’s Policy Toward Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Author(s): Bodo Weber,Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; Croatia; transition; policy; Zoran Milanović; Vesna Pusić; SDP; Stipe Mesić; EU; Croats; HDZ; Tomislav Karamarko; Ivo Josipović; reconciliation policy; government; national interests; Western Balkans;

When a new Croatian government was formed at the end of 2011 under SDP leadership, Prime Minister Zoran Milanović and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Vesna Pusić, took office and shortly thereafter announced their intention to make good relations with neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) a top priority of their policy of strong regional engagement. This decision to re-engage in BiH came after years of inactivity due to official Zagreb’s all-consuming focus on its preparations for EU membership and at a time when the on-going structural political crisis in BiH had reached new heights. There were growing demands for action on the crisis from individual EU member states despite the EU itself being not willing to seriously re-engage and take action. The new government’s BiH policy was to be a “principled policy” – one that would follow the state policy defined by former President Stipe Mesić in 2000 and accepted by all subsequent governments which was based on respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and making it clear to BiH Croats that their capital is Sarajevo, not Zagreb. There was real hope in Zagreb that this was a new beginning. New opposition HDZ leader Tomislav Karamarko had generated further hope in a stronger, constructive BiH policy, on account of his political biography. But it soon became evident that there was no developed thinking or cohesive plan behind the basic declarations. Three years on, and hopes for change have been dashed. Croatia’s policy toward BiH has had little or no positive impact on relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Milanović’s efforts got mired in the conflictual relations among the key political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like former President Ivo Josipović’s earlier BiH policy initiative, it demonstrates that Croatia’s leverage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly over BiH Croat politics, has substantially diminished since the 1990s. Foreign and European Affairs Minister Pusić attempted to make an impact working within the framework of the EU after Croatia became its 28th member, but her BiH plan received little support among member states, despite the fact that its main elements were almost identical to those of the later German-British initiative – now the EU’s new and much-touted BiH policy. Pusić could do little more than insist that she thought of it first. The Pusić plan had presented a dramatic policy U-turn that left the BiH experts within her ministry largely marginalized. Now, toward the end of Pusić’s term in office, those in her ministry in charge of BiH and the wider region appear to be skeptical of the prospects for the EU’s new BiH initiative to succeed. The BiH policy of all the top political players in today’s Croatia – the Prime Minister, the Foreign and European Affairs Minister, the President, the opposition leader – seems to be schizophrenic. They seem to possess closely-held views that are both moderate and reality-based. They reject the idea of a third entity, repudiate the HDZ BiH’s cooperation with the government in the Republika Srpska, and see the BiH Croat political leadership, along with the country’s entire political elite, as corrupt and part of the problem - not a part of the solution. Yet these views hardly ever translate into public performance or policy. Instead, the government, president, and opposition repeatedly allow themselves to get drawn into paying public tribute to Croatia’s 1990s policy legacy on BiH, which views the country solely through the lens of ethno-politics. While this conduct is considerably less invasive than it was under Croatian BiH policy in the 1990s, it nevertheless prevents Croatia from completely breaking with the past and setting aside the war legacy – which could now be done at a very low political price due to the current general disinterest of Croatian citizens regarding BiH. As a consequence, Croatia’s already limited potential impact as an honest broker on Bosnia and Herzegovina both in its direct relations with BiH and within the EU framework is further reduced. In Brussels, for example, Croatia’s MEPs are more vocal, but they are less respected than those of other new member states. Another policy remnant of the recent past is the constitutional right granted to BiH Croats with dual citizenship to vote in Croatian elections. The practice of this right undermines the sovereignty and democratic development of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DPC POLICY NOTE 07: Is Substantial Political Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina Possible through the Ballot Box in October 2014?

DPC POLICY NOTE 07: Is Substantial Political Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina Possible through the Ballot Box in October 2014?

Author(s): Valery Perry / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; political reform; 2014; elections; electoral system;

Two comments are often (and increasingly) heard about politics, elections and citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): 1. “If citizens want political change, they should vote for political change”1 2. “BiH needs more political accountability from its elected leaders at all levels, (but without difficult, substantial, politically impossible changes to the constitutional structure or election system).” Few would doubt the apparent truth behind these statements. A core element of a functioning, accountable democracy is the regular possibility for the alternation of power, as citizens vote out, and vote in, different leaders and parties that offer different platforms for the future. Voters should be able to use the election system to force politicians to deliver and to be accountable. Nothing is standing in the way of BiH’s path to a more prosperous, reform-oriented, Euro-Atlantic future other than citizens voting for new leaders who can bring this vision to reality. However, based on the experience of the past 18 years, is this a realistic approach to politics in a post-Dayton, pre-EU BiH? This paper considers whether there are incentives in the BiH electoral and political system that promote a relationship based on accountability between the electorate and the elected, and whether it is likely that a country that purports to be hungry for reform and progress, and tired of the same old faces in politics, can or will demonstrate this interest through their choices in the general elections in October. Why does it seem like every election in BiH is meant to be “pivotal,” while in reality little seems to change?

DPC POLICY NOTE 01: Requirements and Reforms, Cause and Effect: A Review of the European Union Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria.

DPC POLICY NOTE 01: Requirements and Reforms, Cause and Effect: A Review of the European Union Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria.

Author(s): Patrick Dick / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; reforms; reuirements; EU membership; progress report; Copenhagen criteria; agriculture; constitution; judicial system; education; minorities; rights;

The purpose of this report is to review the European Union’s (EU) evolving approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in assessing fulfillment of EU membership conditions. In particular, this report is concerned with the following questions: • How have EU requirements for BiH changed over time, if at all?, and; • Have priorities evolved, and, if so, how? The European Commission “has drawn detailed conclusions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina… based on the technical analysis contained in… the annual EU Progress Reports for accession-bound countries.” These Progress Reports are technical in nature, but are nonetheless collective assessments generated by a committee of diagnostic evaluators. Apart from the political and economic situation, the Progress Reports “review Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capacity to implement European standards, that is, to gradually make legislation in key policy areas more compatible with European legislation and standards”. As such, they are a useful barometer of progress made not only in reform, but also expectations and requirements. They provide a useful annual baseline to consider both the status of the country in question in its reform and accession preparations, as well as the EU’s expectations for the country in question. In an effort to answer the above questions, the author has analyzed the annual EU Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005 – 2012. These reports break down EU requirements by topic and sector. They are published with a nearly identical structure year after year, which facilitates comparison. The following five areas are examined: Agriculture, the Constitution, the Judicial System, Education and Minority Rights and Protection. These sections were chosen for their link to constitutional reform issues—specifically those identified as crucial for EU accession (justice, agriculture, constitution)—as well as broader human rights issues related to BiH as a post-war, transition state (education, minority rights). Several preliminary conclusions may be drawn from this exercise. First, there has been a significant shift in the agriculture sector, as the frequency of use of imperative language has plummeted, despite the absence of systematic agricultural reform. Second, though there was a slight rebound in 2012, there was a notable drop in the use of imperative language in 2010 and 2011 on the issue of judicial system reform and constitutional reform in spite of the fact that there has been no systematic reform in these two critical aspects of the rule of law. This is particularly interesting considering that 2010, the year after the failed Butmir peace process, is a down year in general. Third, when compared with the reports issued during Slovakia’s accession process (1998 – 2003), the BiH reports are quite stagnant in terms of their content and the tone of criticism. While this may quite fairly reflect the lack of reform in BiH, the lack of firmer and more frequent imperative language to unequivocally demonstrate the need for reform is evident, particularly since 2010. Additionally, while a thorough analytical overlay of the political situation from 2005 – 2012 on the content and tone of reports is beyond the scope of this exercise, a few signposts provide useful context. The reports are issued in the autumn of each year. Key events to bear in mind when reviewing the reports include: the failure of the “April package” in spring 2006; the domestic “Prud process” from November 2008 – January 2009; the Butmir constitutional reform exercise in late 2009; and the visit of EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton to BiH in May 2011. Finally, regardless of the extent of imperative language used, the progress reports take an increasingly critical tone when discussing most policy areas. This is helpful in identifying the remaining reform obstacles and problems areas. The reduction of imperative language, however, is less easy to explain. In the absence of implemented reform, one would expect the use of imperative language to remain stable at a minimum, if not increase, as the reform environment stagnates or worsens, and as criticism continues or increases. However, the EU has drawn few firm lines in BiH, and local officials with an interest in whittling down EU expectations have, not surprisingly, come to see conditionality as something negotiable.

DPC POLICY NOTE 03: The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review.

DPC POLICY NOTE 03: The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Basic Review.

Author(s): Valery Perry / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; 2013; census; review; law on cesus; European integration; politicization;

Following a delay of several years and much heated debate, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) conducted a long-overdue census between 1 - 15 October 2013, the first in 22 years. This census is of crucial importance to both BiH and the international community, as many of the Dayton-era power-sharing arrangements between the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) are based on the 1991 census. The new census results will reflect the significant demographic changes caused by wartime ethnic cleansing and displacement. Given the continuing downward spiral of BiH’s current political dynamic, there should be little doubt that census results will be extremely controversial. On 3 February 2012, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Parliamentary Assembly adopted a law for a census to be conducted in April 2013. The delay in adopting the law meant that BiH did not hold a census in 2011, the year that all European Union (EU) member states (as well as other former Yugoslav countries) held theirs. Additional political haggling delayed the census from April to October 2013. Even though the process of knocking on doors has finished and many are already exhausted from the politicization of the process, the issue is far from over. The aggregation, analysis, and most importantly, the use of the data will remain open questions during 2014 – a general election year. This brief provides an overview of the key issues surrounding the census in BiH and identifies a number of potential policy and political implications that will continue to both shape and reflect the politics of numbers.

DPC POLICY NOTE 05: Negotiating Conditionality: An Updated Review of the European Union Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DPC POLICY NOTE 05: Negotiating Conditionality: An Updated Review of the European Union Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Author(s): Patrick Dick / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; EU membership; progress report; agriculture; constitution; judicial system; minorities; rights; Slovakia;

The purpose of this updated report is to review the European Union’s (EU) evolving approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in assessing fulfillment of EU membership conditions. In particular, this report is concerned with the following questions: How have EU requirements for BiH changed over time, if at all?, and; Have priorities evolved, and, if so, how? The European Commission “has drawn detailed conclusions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina… based on the technical analysis contained in… the annual EU Progress Reports for accession-bound countries.” These Progress Reports are technical in nature, but are nonetheless collective assessments generated by a committee of diagnostic evaluators. Apart from the political and economic situation, the Progress Reports “review Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capacity to implement European standards, that is, to gradually make legislation in key policy areas more compatible with European legislation and standards.” As such, they are a useful barometer of progress made not only in reform, but also expectations and requirements.3 They provide a useful annual baseline to consider both the status of the country in question in its reform and accession preparations, as well as the EU’s expectations for the country in question. In an effort to answer the above questions, the author has analyzed the annual EU Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005 – 2013. These reports break down EU requirements by topic and sector. They are published with a nearly identical structure year after year, which facilitates comparison. The following five areas are examined: Agriculture, the Constitution, the Judicial System, Education, and Minority Rights and Protection. These sections were chosen for their link to constitutional reform issues—specifically those identified as crucial for EU accession (justice, agriculture, constitution)—as well as broader human rights issues related to BiH as a post-war, transition state (education, minority rights).

DPC POLICY NOTE 06: The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity: Similarities and Differences.

DPC POLICY NOTE 06: The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity: Similarities and Differences.

Author(s): Iryna Chupryna / Language(s): English

Keywords: Orange Revolution; Kyiv; protests; police forces; Revolution of Dignity; Ukraine;

“Compared with today's events in Kyiv, the Orange Revolution seems a children's party” – a foreign media outlet wrote when violent clashes on Hrushevskoho Street in Kyiv erupted between protesters and police and when the first blood was shed. And it's hard to disagree ... While the Orange Revolution of 2004 was a kind of joyful “festival of democracy” with songs, dances, humor, and blossoming of folk art, the "Revolution of Dignity" of 2013-2014, as it is now called, included tragic events of the kind that had never happened in the independent Ukraine. These two impressive popular revolutions in Ukraine do have a number of elements in common. They both started on November 21 (nine years apart), on the day of the Archangel Michael, the official patron saint of Kyiv and the head of the “heavenly army.” People often spoke about the mystical underpinnings of the protests, asserting that heavenly forces led by the Archangel Michael inspired people to fight against the regime. It is not surprising that the more than one hundred activists killed on the Maidan were promptly dubbed the “Heavenly Hundred.”

DPC POLICY NOTE 14: Constitutions on Ice: Iceland’s Stalled Reform Effort and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Nonexistent One.

DPC POLICY NOTE 14: Constitutions on Ice: Iceland’s Stalled Reform Effort and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Nonexistent One.

Author(s): Hannah Fillmore-Patrick / Language(s): English

Keywords: Iceland; BiH; reform; constitution; parliamentary elections; national referendum; political elites; consensus;

As angry Icelandic citizens prepare for early parliamentary elections this autumn, a bill to adopt the world’s first crowd sourced constitution sits on ice in Reykjavik. The bill, already approved by national referendum, has lain dormant since parliamentary elections ousted its sponsor parties back in 2013. The six-year history of Iceland’s constitutional bill, with all its twists and turns, is a practical case study for Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH). Not only does Iceland provide workable models for the drafting phase, it, realistically, confronts the political setbacks inevitable in any constitutional reform effort. Both Iceland and BiH adopted their existing constitutions in wartime (World War II and the Bosnian War, respectively). While these wars and the constitutions of Iceland and BiH differ vastly, the political environment in which Icelandic lawmakers adopted their constitution, the constitution’s durability thereafter, and the country’s bottom-up reform process hold valuable lessons for BiH.

DPC POLICY NOTE 15: Reflections on Efforts to Prevent and Counter Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the Balkans

DPC POLICY NOTE 15: Reflections on Efforts to Prevent and Counter Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the Balkans

Author(s): Valery Perry / Language(s): English

Keywords: violent extremism; unrest in Bosnia;

This essay considers the “new” efforts aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism and argues that they are quite often the same kind of actions taken to establish the basic elements of democratic, resilient societies. Efforts aimed at post-war democratic consolidation or European enlargement support - ranging from strengthening local communities, working with youth, improving education systems, strengthening the independence of the police and justice sector and more – are becoming more overtly securitized. While such efforts in support of democratic reform have been viewed as a laudable goal in their own right for two decades, now they are linked to terror prevention. After an introduction on efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism, specific nuances in the Balkan region are explored. Three sets of challenges that limit genuine reform in the region – identity politics, the state of civic values and civil politics, and pervasive broken governance systems – are examined as both byproducts and drivers of unresolved conflicts.

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 05: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism

AI-DPC BiH SECURITY ANALYSIS POLICY NOTE 05: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism

Author(s): Vlado Azinović / Language(s): English

Keywords: Syrian War; Muslim foreign fighters; Salafism;

BiH was the first country in the region to amend its criminal code to prohibit joining “foreign paramilitary and para-police formations” which it did in June 2014 and it has since joined the international coalition against ISIL. Operation Damask, undertaken by the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the BiH Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA), and the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in late 2014 through early 2015, targeted those suspected of recruiting or financing BiH citizens to go to Syria and Iraq. The BiH Prosecutor’s Office for its part formed a new task force to deal specifically with these types of cases. The entities have created specialized police bodies to counter terrorism and extremism. But, as is well known and has been demonstrated previously, most visibly during the February 2014 protests, cooperation and coordination among these various structures is ad hoc and sporadic at best – not based on any institutionalized mechanisms, but rather often dependent on personalities and individual initiative.

DPC POLICY NOTE 02: The Iceland Experiment (2009-2013). A Participatory Approach to Constitutional Reform

DPC POLICY NOTE 02: The Iceland Experiment (2009-2013). A Participatory Approach to Constitutional Reform

Author(s): Hannah Fillmore-Patrick / Language(s): English

DPC POLICY NOTE 04: Legal Misunderstandings, False normative Hopes and the Ignorance of Political Reality. A Commentary on the recent ESI Report “Lost in the Bosnian Labyrinth”

DPC POLICY NOTE 04: Legal Misunderstandings, False normative Hopes and the Ignorance of Political Reality. A Commentary on the recent ESI Report “Lost in the Bosnian Labyrinth”

Author(s): Soeren Keil / Language(s): English

The European Stability Initiative recently published a troubling report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) called “Lost in the Bosnian Labyrinth - Why the Sejdić-Finci case should not block an EU application.”1 ESI argues that “non-implementation of the Sejdić-Finci decision cannot justify blocking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership,” noting that the reforms the EU expects from Bosnia have not been required of other EU applicants, much less its own member states.2 ESI argues that a ground-breaking legal ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)3 should not impede Bosnia’s integration into the EU, but instead the EU should quickly give BiH candidate status and expect the constitutional revisions demanded by the ECHR to take place while BiH negotiates with the EU about membership. The paper justifies this with the claim that other countries (including EU member states) include de facto discriminatory provisions in their constitutions and are not sanctioned by the EU or the Council of Europe. // As will be shown in this text, that argument is not only highly flawed, but also demonstrates a troublingly lack of understanding of the fundamentals of BiH politics, as well as constitutional power-sharing arrangements in the member states of the EU. As such, the paper appears to be an effort to provide an ideological framework for the EU to move beyond its continuing failures in BiH that have enabled local politicians to undo many of the highly-touted reforms put in place prior to 2006, when the EU assumed policy leadership. If Brussels uses the ESI paper as ideological justification for dropping conditionality, it would enable the Brussels bureaucracy to move ahead with its “one size fits all” cookie-cutter enlargement policy and pretend that “progress” is occurring, when at best a standstill can be observed, and at worst, previous achievements are slowly being reversed by local party elites.

DPC – EUROTHINK POLICY NOTE: Macedonia Had an Electoral Sea Change – Now for the Hard Part

DPC – EUROTHINK POLICY NOTE: Macedonia Had an Electoral Sea Change – Now for the Hard Part

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,Ljupcho Petkovski,Andreja Stojkovski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Zoran Zaev; Nikola Gruevski; VMRO-DPMNE; SDSM;

It is difficult to overstate the scale of the electoral sweep of Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) party in the October 15th municipal elections. Former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), lost power at the local level across the country. Zaev’s victory, and that of his SDSM, following the June assembly of the coalition which included all ethnic Albanian parties, will reinforce the Zaev government’s control – and political responsibility. What Does This Mean? – The Chance for a. Democratic Reset