Series:OSW Studies

A captive island: Kaliningrad between Moscow and the EU

Wyspa na uwięzi: Kaliningrad między Moskwą a UE

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża,Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga,Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Kaliningrad; sytuacja polityczna w Rosji; Rosja-UE; system polityczny Rosji

Obwód kaliningradzki może być nazwany swoistą „wyspą na uwięzi”. Ze względu na jego szczególne położenie geopolityczne charakteryzuje go przynależność do rosyjskiej przestrzeni prawnej, politycznej i gospodarczej, a jednocześnie specyfika wynikająca z oderwania od pozostałej części Federacji Rosyjskiej, w tym szczególna otwartość obwodu na sąsiedztwo unijne.Moskwa stara się rekompensować obwodowi jego oderwanie, oferując mu wsparcie finansowe i przywileje ekonomiczne. Równocześnie jednak wykazuje wrażliwość na kwestie związane z wyzwaniami dla integralności terytorialnej Rosji – a dążenie centrum do kontroli nad regionem niekiedy ogranicza jego potencjał współpracy i rozwój wewnętrzny. Raport przedstawia sytuację w obwodzie i ma służyć wypracowaniu modelu skutecznej współpracy regionu z unijnymi sąsiadami.

Greater Europe. Putin's Vision of the European (Dis)integration

Wielka Europa. Putinowska wizja (dez)integracji europejskiej

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Vladimir Putin;Russian - the European Union relations;Russia;Eurasian Economic Union;

Idea Wielkiej Europy: stworzenia częściowo zintegrowanej wspólnej przestrzeni obejmującej głównie Rosję i obszar UE, podnoszona przez Władimira Putina od 2001 roku, nigdy nie przybrała charakteru szczegółowego programu politycznego. Mimo iż realizowana pod hasłem budowy jednolitej Europy bez linii podziałów, idea ta miałaby prowadzić w praktyce do trwałego podziału Europy na dwa obszary geopolityczne: zachodni, obejmujący Unię Europejską, z dominującą pozycją Niemiec oraz wschodni, obejmujący tworzącą się Unię Eurazjatycką, z hegemoniczną pozycją Rosji. Rosja podejmowała w ostatnich kilkunastu latach szereg inicjatyw mających na celu realizację elementów tej idei, jednak większość z nich nie doczekała się urzeczywistnienia. W tej sytuacji należy oczekiwać, iż Rosja w swej polityce skupiać się będzie na priorytetowym projekcie integracji eurazjatyckiej, opartej na strukturach Unii Celnej / Unii Eurazjatyckiej. Natomiast realizacja projektu Wielkiej Europy zostanie odłożona do czasu, gdy, jak wierzy Moskwa, osłabiona UE będzie gotowa wyjść naprzeciw rosyjskim postulatom.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Keywords: European gas market; Gazprom; Russian gas;Russia and the West;

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. // Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia

Author(s): Katarzyna Chawryło (Jarzyńska) / Language(s): English

Keywords: The Russian Orthodox Church;Moscow Patriarchate;Russia;Russian domestic politics;Russian foreign policy;

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. // Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia

Sojusz ołtarza z tronem. Rosyjski Kościół Prawosławny a władza w Rosji

Author(s): Katarzyna Chawryło (Jarzyńska) / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: The Russian Orthodox Church;Moscow Patriarchate;Russia;Russian domestic politics;Russian foreign policy;

Rosyjski Kościół Prawosławny Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego (RKP), największa wspólnota wyznaniowa w Rosji, odgrywa istotną rolę w procesie samoidentyfikacji kulturowej i państwowej narodu rosyjskiego. Jako instytucja społeczno-polityczna z wielowiekową historią dysponuje dużym kapitałem symbolicznym i cieszy się autorytetem społecznym, co jest wykorzystywane dla celów politycznych. // Po powrocie Władimira Putina na urząd prezydenta w 2012 roku Kreml dla wzmocnienia reżimu politycznego zaczął szeroko odwoływać się do ideologii konserwatywnej oraz promować tradycyjne wartości moralno-obyczajowe, za których strażniczkę uważa się Cerkiew. Pociągnęło to za sobą zacieśnienie stosunków pomiędzy władzą państwową i RKP oraz skutkowało większym zaangażowaniem hierarchów i struktur cerkiewnych w kwestie dotyczące polityki wewnętrznej oraz zagranicznej. Taka sytuacja naraża RKP na krytykę z powodu zbytniego upolitycznienia oraz w dłuższej perspektywie na ryzyka związane z potencjalną destabilizacją systemu władzy w Rosji.

The twilight of the oil Eldorado. How the activity of Russian oil companies on the EU market has evolved

Zmierzch naftowego Eldorado. Ewolucja aktywności rosyjskich firm naftowych na rynku UE

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Russian oil companies;oil market;crude oil; petroleum products; the EU market; export;Russia;

Unia Europejska stanowi tradycyjnie najważniejszy rynek zbytu dla rosyjskiego eksportu naftowego. W okresie 2011–2014 można było zaobserwować systematyczny spadek dostaw ropy surowej do UE, przy jednoczesnym wzroście eksportu produktów ropopochodnych. Trudno jest obecnie mówić o spójnej strategii naftowej Rosji wobec UE. Ostateczny kształt rosyjskiej aktywności jest bardziej wypadkową interesów biznesowych poszczególnych firm niż efektem działań koordynowanych przez państwo. // O ile w perspektywie krótkoterminowej (do 2020 roku) negatywny trend w eksporcie ropy surowej do UE może zostać zatrzymany (co potwierdzają dane za 2015 rok), o tyle długoterminowe perspektywy rosyjskiej pozycji na unijnym rynku są pesymistyczne. Rośnie bowiem znaczenie czynników dla Rosji negatywnych, takich jak: spadek konsumpcji ropy w UE, wzrost konkurencji wśród eksporterów na unijny rynek oraz pogorszenie klimatu do współpracy Rosja–UE w kontekście antyrosyjskich sankcji czy niejasne perspektywy rozwoju sektora wydobywczego w Rosji.

The unfinished state. 25 years of independent Moldova

The unfinished state. 25 years of independent Moldova

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

Keywords: Moldova;Moldovan politics;Moldovan identity;Vlad Plahotniuc;oligarchy;

The Republic of Moldova is an exceptional state. It was the only Soviet republic to proclaim independence, on 27 August 1991, in order to become part of another state, i.e. Romania, rather than building its own independent political future. After the civil war, the break-up of the common state and the de facto collapse of the unification project, the newly established Moldova found itself in an ideological vacuum. With no experience of statehood, no coherent historical narrative or responsible political elites, and with a nation that was unsure of its identity, it set off on a long march in search of an idea that could define the shape of its statehood and the direction of its future development. // Twenty-five years on, the social and political project called the Republic of Moldova is experiencing a grave crisis. The Moldovan statehood remains fragile and seemingly impermanent. The country’s successive governments have not been able to build effective state institutions or create adequate conditions for economic development. After years of structural and economic weakness, today’s Moldova as led by Vlad Plahotniuc, the country’s most powerful politician and businessman, is a typical post-Soviet oligarchy ruled by a narrow clique interested mainly in protecting its own political and business interests.

Between co-operation and membership. Sweden and Finland’s relations with NATO

Współpraca czy członkostwo? Szwecja i Finlandia wobec NATO

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska,Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: NATO;security;defence policy;Sweden;Finland;baltic sea region;

Przystąpienie Szwecji i Finlandii do NATO długofalowo podniosłoby poziom bezpieczeństwa w regionie Morza Bałtyckiego, zmieniając polityczno-wojskową nierównowagę korzystną obecnie dla Moskwy. Jest jednak mało prawdopodobne, aby w najbliższych latach szwedzka i fińska polityka bezaliansowości uległa rewizji. Obecnie NATO prowadzi z oboma państwami najbardziej zaawansowaną współpracę wśród wszystkich państw partnerskich. Znaczenie tej współpracy dla Szwecji i Finlandii rośnie wraz z coraz większą niepewnością w regionie. Dalsze jej zacieśnianie będzie jednak ograniczane brakiem członkostwa obu państw w Sojuszu. Mimo pozytywnego wpływu na bezpieczeństwo regionu współpraca ma też negatywne implikacje. Nie eliminuje niepewności co do zakresu współpracy obu krajów z Sojuszem w przypadku konfliktu militarnego. Sztokholmowi daje złudne poczucie bezpieczeństwa, hamując wzrost wydatków na obronność. A w Helsinkach jest traktowana jako element polityki odstraszania wobec Rosji, a nie realnie rozważana alternatywa.

The aftermath of the crisis. An overhaul of Ukraine’s banking sector

The aftermath of the crisis. An overhaul of Ukraine’s banking sector

Author(s): Rafał Sadowski / Language(s): English

In 2014–2016, Ukraine’s banking sector was affected by what has proven to be the most serious crisis in its modern history. Almost half of the banks went bankrupt and the losses incurred by the state and banking sector clients was in excess of US$ 20 billion. With considerable support and under major pressure from the West, Ukraine’s government has managed to stabilise the situation in the sector. Despite tangible improvement, it is too early to determine whether the reform programme has been successfully implemented and if the improvement is sustainable. The crisis has made it necessary for major changes to be implemented in the functioning and structure of the banking sector. These changes have far-reaching consequences not only for Ukraine’s economy, but also for its political system.

The unfinished reform. An assessment of the energy transformation in Germany

The unfinished reform. An assessment of the energy transformation in Germany

Author(s): Rafał Bajczuk / Language(s): English

Keywords: energy; Germany

In its time in power, which is shortly to end, the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition introduced key legislative changes enabling a further transformation of the energy sector. Due to a reduction in the amount of subsidies offered to renewable energy sources (RES), further rises in electricity prices could be brought to a halt. To date, this increase in electricity costs has been the major problem associated with the energy transformation. Despite this, many other problems surrounding the energy policy remain unresolved. This mainly concerns the overly slow pace of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the future of the coal energy sector, the energy transformation in the transport sector and the extension of electricity networks, which is of key importance for the development of RES. For the new German government, the energy transformation will continue to pose a major challenge. Moreover, Germany will need to redefine its role in the international arena. At the beginning of this decade, Germany was a leader in both the field of climate policy promotion and in low emission technologies. In spite of this early advantage, other countries – China in particular – are now equal competitors in the fight for leadership of international climate policy. For German companies, these new entrants represent a genuine threat across an increasing number of markets.

With Russia right across the border. Finland’s security policy

With Russia right across the border. Finland’s security policy

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Finland’s security policy

Finland sees Russia as a source of opportunities and threats. On the one hand, Russia is an important trade partner and Finland believes that intensive political contacts with Russia provide a boost for its international profile as a militarily non-aligned broker between the West and Russia. On the other hand, Finland is concerned by the Russian vision of the international order based on great powers’ spheres of influence, and by Russia’s increasing military capabilities. This is why Finland’s strategy towards Russia is a combination of economic and political co-operation, aimed at reducing the risk of bilateral tensions, and military deterrence. Finland is a country situated on the periphery of its civilisational base (the West) and whose border with Russia is over 1,300 km long. Thus, its armed forces are primarily focused on territorial defence. Finland maintains general conscription and a large trained reserve force, which raises the costs of possible aggression. Finland has also intensified its defence co-operation with Sweden, the USA, NATO and within the EU in response to Russia’s military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.

The ‘Tribal Areas’ of the Caucasus. The North Caucasus – an enclave of ‘alien civilisation’ within the Russian Federation

The ‘Tribal Areas’ of the Caucasus. The North Caucasus – an enclave of ‘alien civilisation’ within the Russian Federation

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Caucasus; Russian Federation

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

Changes in the political elite, economy and society of Belarus. Appearances and reality

ZMIANY W BIAŁORUSKICH ELITACH POLITYCZNYCH, GOSPODARCE I SPOŁECZEŃSTWIE. Pozory i rzeczywistość

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński,Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga / Language(s): English,Polish

In late 2006 and early 2007, relations between Russia and Belarus were hit by the most serious crisis in many years. In a setting of heightened tension, the Belarusian authorities decided to gradually modify their economic policy and thoroughly restructure the ruling class. The new situation created new, much more difficult challenges for the Belarusian opposition. // The processes initiated by the authorities were not intended to bring about either the democratisation of public and political life or full economic liberalisation; their only purpose was to enable the regime to tackle new challenges and survive in the changing international context. Nevertheless, modernisation has been initiated in Belarus' authoritarian system of power, which until now was considered to be completely incapable of reform. This puts the country's main political and economic partners, including the European Union, in a new situation.

The Russian Economy under Putin. Growth Factors and Impediments to Economic Development

The Russian Economy under Putin. Growth Factors and Impediments to Economic Development

Author(s): Ewa Paszyc,Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English,Polish

Keywords: Russia; Economy; Putin

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. // Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. // In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

Tajikistan: the trial period

Tajikistan: the trial period

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English,Polish

Keywords: Tajikistan

1. Tajikistan in its present state has been built on the civil war experiences and provisions of the peace accords signed in 1997. These have had a great impact on the present form of the state, its political scene and power mechanisms. President Emomali Rakhmonov is the central figure in the state. The political system, which he has cocreated, is based on - unique in this region - political pluralism (the existence of the Islamic party), decentralisation (far-going independence of the regions and relatively limited potential of the central structures) and compromise as the basic way of resolving conflicts. Such a system has so far guaranteed stabilisation and normalisation of the country.2. Since 2002, gradual erosion of the system, which is due to the president's political offensive and occurrence of new threats (new forms of Muslim fundamentalism) has been visible. The president's attempts to unilaterally challenge the existing order may rekindle the old conflicts. The system's evolution and reform is necessary, a good occasion for which should be the 2005 parliamentary elections.3. 11th September 2001 and the consequences thereof, i.e. actions of the antiterrorist coalition in the region and Tajikistan's participation in them has meant a real breakthrough for the country. Those events have removed the greatest threats (the Taliban Afghanistan), made the country really open to the world and cooperation with other countries that CIS members, raised its prestige and reinforced its position in the international arena. Although they have not broken the Russian domination in the region - especially felt in Tajikistan - still, they have challenged its monopolist position in the fields of security, regional policy, economic activity and domination in terms of civilisation in the broad meaning of the word.4. Reinforcement of the country's internal stability (inter alia through adaptation of some democratic mechanisms) and skilful usage of the interest the powerful states show in Tajikistan is a unique opportunity for this country's development.

Ukraine's Parliamentary System after the Elections

Ukraine's Parliamentary System after the Elections

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English,Polish

Keywords: Ukraine; parliamentary system; elections

The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign.In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them /// The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian republic?

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them /// The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian republic?

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański,Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga / Language(s): English,Polish

In search of new routes. Ukraine’s foreign trade after the Revolution of Dignity

W poszukiwaniu nowych szlaków. Handel zagraniczny Ukrainy po rewolucji godności

Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Ukraine; foreign trade; international relations; economic policy; cooperation with Russia; economic relations with European Union;

Prowadzona przez Ukrainę od uzyskania niepodległości polityka wielowektorowości, czyli manewrowania między Zachodem i Rosją bez angażowania się w projekty integracyjne którejkolwiek ze stron, miała też swój wymiar gospodarczy. Dla Kijowa jednakowo ważna, choć z różnych przyczyn, była wymiana handlowa z Rosją i innymi państwami poradzieckimi, Unią Europejską oraz resztą świata. Niechęć Ukrainy do podjęcia wiążących decyzji co do kierunku zacieśniania współpracy z Rosją bądź z UE wynikała w dużej mierze z obawy przed negatywnymi konsekwencjami takiego kroku dla stosunków gospodarczych z pozostałymi obszarami. Także ukraińscy oligarchowie, będący głównymi beneficjentami dochodów z eksportu, nie zajmowali wspólnego stanowiska wobec procesów integracyjnych w regionie, zadowalając się stanem zawieszenia, w którym znajdowała się Ukraina.

With Russia right across the border. Finland’s security policy

Z Rosją za miedzą. Polityka bezpieczeństwa Finlandii

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Finland; Russia; trade partners; international relations; security policy; economic cooperation; political cooperation; territorial defence; armed forces;

W wyniku rosyjskiej aneksji Krymu w regionie nordycko-bałtyckim nastąpił powrót do myślenia o bezpieczeństwie w kategoriach zdolności do obrony własnego terytorium. Doprowadziło to do wzrostu zainteresowania fińskim modelem obronnym opartym na powszechnym poborze, dużym potencjale rozwinięcia mobilizacyjnego i obronie terytorialnej. Przybyło też rozważań o potencjalnym członkostwie Finlandii w NATO i fińskiej percepcji Rosji. Warto więc przyjrzeć się bliżej polityce bezpieczeństwa i siłom zbrojnym Finlandii, biorąc pod uwagę specyfikę stosunków fińsko-rosyjskich.

The best army Ukraine has ever had. Changes in Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian aggression

The best army Ukraine has ever had. Changes in Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian aggression

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine; Ukrainian army; military reforms; armed forces; Russian aggression; defending the state; territorial integrity;

In the spring and summer of 2014, for the first time in its history, the Ukrainian army faced the necessity of military involvement to defend its state. After initially failing to engage in action with the enemy – in the form of irregular armed formations, sent from the territory of Russia, which rapidly took over Crimea – and faced with the threat of Ukraine losing the entire eastern and southern part of the country and real, direct aggression from Russia, it launched military action against the so-called separatists. Initially, the Ukrainian armed forces’ actions in the Donbas were carried out on a small scale and were irregular in nature, based on reacting to the enemy’s activity. Along with the systematic increase in the separatists’ potential (thanks to Russia), as well as the direct involvement of the Russian Federation’s armed forces at a critical period in August 2014, the Ukrainian army’s operations took on a regular character, and the entire military potential of Ukraine was involved in defending the territorial integrity of the state. The military activity in the Donbas carried out at that time, and to varying degrees of intensity in the following months, highlighted the Ukrainian army’s weaknesses, as well as its total inability to implement its constitutional duties. This forced the government in Kyiv to take real action to clean up the country’s armed forces.