Series:OSW Commentary

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Temporary stabilisation: Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal

Tymczasowa stabilizacja: porozumienie gazowe Rosja–Ukraina

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; gas transit; Russian-Ukrainian relations; negotiations; political protocol; international agreement;

Po czterodniowych rosyjsko-ukraińskich negocjacjach 30 grudnia br. podpisany został pięcioletni kontrakt na tranzyt rosyjskiego gazu przez Ukrainę (dotychczasowy kontrakt wygasa 1 stycznia 2020 r.). Zostało to poprzedzone wielomiesięcznymi negocjacjami między Moskwą a Kijowem przy udziale Komisji Europejskiej, zakończonymi 20 grudnia podpisaniem politycznego protokołu, który określił warunki porozumienia pakietowego. Kontrakt tranzytowy nakłada na Gazprom obowiązek przesyłu 65 mld m³ gazu w pierwszym roku i 40 mld m³ w kolejnych latach zgodnie z formułą ship-or-pay. Podpisano również cztery inne dokumenty: (1) porozumienie pomiędzy Naftohazem a Gazpromem w sprawie rezygnacji z wzajemnych roszczeń związanych z umowami gazowymi z 2009 r.; (2) umowę o współpracy międzyoperatorskiej między Gazpromem a spółką pn. Operator Systemu Gazociągów Transportowych Ukrainy (OGTSU); (3) ugodę między Gazpromem a Ministerstwem Sprawiedliwości Ukrainy; (4) umowę transportową między Naftohazem a OGTSU. Warunkiem zawarcia tych dokumentów było wypłacenie przez rosyjski koncern 2,92 mld dolarów odszkodowania zgodnie z wyrokiem Trybunału Arbitrażowego w Sztokholmie, co nastąpiło 27 grudnia.

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To serve the people – total power in Zelensky’s hands

Służyć narodowi – cała władza w rękach Zełenskiego

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Volodymyr Zelensky; presidential and parliamentary elections; Ukrainian politics; political experience; political reforms; political system; development of Ukrainian state;

Odnowienie klasy politycznej i wprowadzenie do polityki nieskompromitowanych i uczciwych fachowców było głównym hasłem Wołodymyra Zełenskiego i jego partii Sługa Narodu podczas kampanii wyborczych przed wyborami prezydenckimi i parlamentarnymi. Nowy prezydent nie miał żadnego doświadczenia politycznego, z kolei w wyniku wyborów do Rady Najwyższej około trzech czwartych jej składu stanowić będą osoby, które wcześniej nie zasiadały w parlamencie. Nowy parlament będzie charakteryzował się najniższą od 1991 r. średnią wieku deputowanych i największym odsetkiem kobiet (ok. 20%). Najwięcej nowych i młodych polityków wprowadziły do Rady Najwyższej partie Sługa Narodu i Głos. Wysoka wygrana partii Zełenskiego pozwala na samodzielne stworzenie rządu. Według słów prezydenta nowym premierem zostanie ekonomista „bez doświadczenia politycznego” i można przypuszczać, że zasada ta będzie dotyczyć także doboru większości nowych ministrów. Tym samym Ukraina, prowadząc wojnę z Rosją i zmagając się z niskim wzrostem gospodarczym, będzie rządzona przez osoby, które politykami dopiero się stają. Sytuacja ta, będąca wynikiem wielkich nadziei i oczekiwań społecznych na fundamentalną zmianę systemu, rodzi zarówno znaczący potencjał dla pozytywnych zmian, jak też ryzyka dla stabilności politycznej i dalszego rozwoju państwa ukraińskiego.

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The S-400 for Turkey. The crisis in Turkish-American relations escalates

The S-400 for Turkey. The crisis in Turkish-American relations escalates

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota,Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Turkey; Russia; S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile system; military policy; Turkish-American relations; security and defense; NATO;

In late May and early June 2019, the contract for Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made missile launchers which make up the S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile system entered the final stage of its implementation. This has been confirmed by unequivocal statements from the Turkish leadership, the fact that the first group of servicemen (system operators) have undergone training in Russia, and the announced arrival in Turkey of the Russian technical personnel responsible for the system’s assembly. The first S-400 launchers are likely to be dispatched to Turkey as early as July (around six months sooner than the planned supply date). At the same time the US, which has blocked Turkey’s attempts to purchase anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia and China for years, is stepping up its pressure on Turkey; for example, it has announced that the unprecedented sanctions package prepared last year will be imposed if the Russian-Turkish deal is finalised. The crisis around the S-400 is a manifestation of the deep crisis in Turkish-American relations that has been mounting for several years. More broadly speaking, it is an element of the crisis in the relationship between Turkey and the West, and de facto amounts to a major aggravation of the situation. The absence of will to make concessions on both sides makes any compromise between Ankara and Washington unlikely. At stake are the cohesion of NATO, the present and future nature of the US’s leading role, and Turkey’s place in its relations with the West and Russia. To some degree, all this affects the position of Russia, which itself is interested in undermining the positions of NATO and the US.

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The S-400 for Turkey. The crisis in Turkish-American relations escalates

S-400 dla Turcji. Eskalacja kryzysu w stosunkach turecko-amerykańskich

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota,Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Turkey; Russia; S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile system; military policy; Turkish-American relations; security and defense; NATO;

Na przełomie maja i czerwca w finałowe stadium realizacji wszedł kontrakt na zakup przez Turcję rosyjskich zestawów rakietowych obrony powietrznej dalekiego zasięgu S-400. Potwierdzają to zarówno zdecydowane deklaracje władz tureckich, jak też przeszkolenie w Rosji pierwszej grupy wojskowych (operatorzy systemu) i zapowiedź przyjazdu do Turcji rosyjskiego personelu technicznego odpowiedzialnego za montaż. Pierwsze zestawy S-400 mogą trafić do Turcji już w lipcu (przyspieszenie realizacji o około pół roku). Jednocześnie USA – które od lat blokowały tureckie próby zakupu systemów obrony powietrznej w Rosji i Chinach – eskalują presję na Turcję, w tym zapowiadają uruchomienie bezprecedensowych sankcji przygotowanych w ostatnim roku na wypadek realizacji kontraktu rosyjsko-tureckiego. Spór wokół S-400 jest przejawem narastającego od lat głębokiego kryzysu w stosunkach turecko-amerykańskich, a szerzej turecko-zachodnich i de facto oznacza jego istotne pogłębienie. Obustronny brak woli do ustępstw sprawia, że osiągnięcie kompromisu między Ankarą i Waszyngtonem należy uznać za mało prawdopodobne. Stawką są spójność NATO, obecny i przyszły charakter przywództwa USA i miejsce Turcji w relacjach z Zachodem i Rosją – tym samym pozycja Rosji zainteresowanej osłabieniem NATO i USA.

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Ukrainians and their language. The Act on the State Language of Ukraine

Ukrainians and their language. The Act on the State Language of Ukraine

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine; Ukrainian language; state language; act; law; eliminating Russian language; politics; anti-Russian campaign; Ukrainization;

On 25 April, the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a law guaranteeing the role of the Ukrainian language as the state language. The act was passed with a significant majority (278 in favour, 38 against), and was signed into law by President Petro Poroshenko on 15 May. This is not an act on the state’s language policy, but the role of the official language in the life of the country. The act is clearly aimed at eliminating Russian from as many spheres of community life in Ukraine as possible, especially from education and the media. The other, equally important task is to ensure development, standardisation, and modernisation of the Ukrainian language where there are currently shortcomings. The act, which was originally intended to be an instrument in Petro Poroshenko’s presidential campaign, will be used in the campaign for the early parliamentary elections of 21 July by the former president’s party and other groupings that form the broad anti-Russian camp. Opponents of the new act will probably contest it before the Constitutional Court, but rulings cannot be expected before the election. For the moment, it is unclear what position President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will take on the new act. It is possible that he will wish to amend some provisions. On one hand, during the presidential campaign, he frequently stated that the rights of the Russian-speaking population had to be guaranteed, while on the other his supporters include a large number of proponents of radical Ukrainization, whose support will be important to Zelenskiy in the parliamentary election.

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Ukrainians and their language. The Act on the State Language of Ukraine

Ukraińcy nie gęsi… Ustawa o języku państwowym Ukrainy

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Ukraine; Ukrainian language; state language; act; law; eliminating Russian language; politics; anti-Russian campaign; Ukrainization;

25 kwietnia Rada Najwyższa Ukrainy znaczną większością głosów (278 za, 38 przeciw) przyjęła ustawę o zapewnieniu funkcjonowania języka ukraińskiego jako państwowego, którą prezydent Petro Poroszenko podpisał 15 maja. Nie jest to ustawa o polityce językowej państwa, lecz o roli języka urzędowego w życiu państwa. Oczywistym celem ustawy jest wyeliminowanie języka rosyjskiego z możliwie licznych sfer życia społecznego Ukrainy, zwłaszcza ze szkolnictwa i mediów. Drugim, równorzędnym zadaniem jest zapewnienie rozwoju, standaryzacji i modernizacji języka ukraińskiego w tych zakresach, w których są one niedostateczne. Ustawa, która w pierwotnym zamyśle miała być instrumentem kampanii prezydenckiej Petra Poroszenki, będzie wykorzystana w kampanii przed przyspieszonymi wyborami parlamentarnymi 21 lipca przez ugrupowanie byłego prezydenta oraz inne, zaliczające się do szeroko rozumianego obozu antyrosyjskiego. Przeciwnicy nowej ustawy prawdopodobnie zaskarżą jej postanowienia do Sądu Konstytucyjnego, jednak jego wyroków nie należy oczekiwać przed wyborami. Stosunek prezydenta Wołodymyra Zełenskiego do nowej ustawy nie jest na razie jasny; niewykluczone, że zechce on znowelizować niektóre jej postanowienia. Z jednej strony podczas kampanii wyborczej wiele mówił o konieczności zagwarantowania praw ludności rosyjskojęzycznej, z drugiej wśród jego wyborców są liczni zwolennicy radykalnej ukrainizacji, których poparcie w wyborach parlamentarnych jest dla Zełenskiego istotne.

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A stalemate in the US–China trade negotiations: the tariff war and technology sanctions

Impas w negocjacjach handlowych USA–Chiny: wojna celna i sankcje technologiczne

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Michał Bogusz / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: United States of America; China; American-Chinese relations; trade negotiations; tariff war; technology sanctions; bilateral trade; economic conflict; embargo on Huawei; global economy;

W pierwszej połowie maja 2019 roku doszło do znaczącej eskalacji chińsko-amerykańskiego sporu handlowego, m.in. wprowadzenia dodatkowych ceł na ok. 40% handlu dwustronnego, a także nałożenia przez USA embarga na chińską spółkę technologiczną Huawei. Nowa odsłona konfliktu gospodarczego Chin i USA przerywa okres pięciu miesięcy relatywnej deeskalacji oraz intensywnych negocjacji nad całościowym porozumieniem handlowym, zapoczątkowanych na spotkaniu Donalda Trumpa i Xi Jinpinga na szczycie G20 w Buenos Aires w grudniu ub.r. W odróżnieniu od poprzedniego załamania negocjacji z maja 2018 roku, skutkującego zamrożeniem kontaktów, obie strony zakomunikowały wolę kontynuowania rozmów o porozumieniu handlowym. Dalsza eskalacja sporu (m.in. w kwestii Huawei) prowadzi jednak do sukcesywnego zaostrzania retoryki obu stron, a także utwardzania stanowisk co do warunków wznowienia rozmów. Obecna odsłona konfliktu ujawniła głębokie rozbieżności z kwestiach fundamentalnych dla przyszłości negocjowanego porozumienia, m.in. mechanizmów gwarantujących jego wdrożenie, a także okoliczności i daty zniesienia obowiązujących obecnie karnych ceł. Przedłużający się impas w negocjacjach może doprowadzić do powrotu USA do taktyki sukcesywnego zwiększenia nacisku na Chiny, co przełoży się na osłabienie światowej koniunktury gospodarczej, a także zwiększoną presję polityczną Waszyngtonu na amerykańskich sojuszników w sprawie współpracy z Chinami.

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The state’s weakened immunity The causes of the measles outbreak in Ukraine

The state’s weakened immunity The causes of the measles outbreak in Ukraine

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

Keywords: measles virus infections in Ukraine; Ukrainian health-care;

According to data compiled by the World Health Organization, since 2018 Ukraine has had the world’s second highest number of measles virus infections. A major increase in the number of individuals infected with measles has been recorded since 2017, when 4,782 cases of measles were diagnosed (in 2016 the corresponding number was a mere 90). In 2018, more than 54,000 infections were recorded, which accounted for more than 64% of all measles cases diagnosed across Europe. In 2019, the situation deteriorated even further. Ukraine’s Ministry of Health estimates that between January and November 2019 more than 57,000 individuals contracted measles. Altogether, in 2017–2019 in Ukraine more than 115,000 individuals caught measles and 41 of them died (including 25 children). || The main reason behind the rapid surge in the incidence rate is the low measles vaccination rate resulting from the crisis in the Ukrainian healthcare sector and from the spread of disinformation regarding the alleged adverse effects of vaccines and their ineffectiveness. This has caused the proportion of infants vaccinated against measles to fall to 42% in 2016, with the corresponding proportion recorded for children aged six and younger being 31%; these were among the world’s lowest vaccination rates. Measures taken by the Ministry of Health have resulted in a major increase in the vaccination rate in Ukrainian society and a reduction in the related epidemiological threat. A major problem continues to be posed by the illegal trade in fake vaccination certificates, which emerged as a result of a powerful anti-vaccination campaign on the Internet and of citizens’ distrust of state healthcare institutions. As a consequence, measles continues to be one of the biggest challenges faced by the state’s health policy.

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Defying America. Russia’s policy towards Iran

Defying America. Russia’s policy towards Iran

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Persian Gulf; Russia-Iran-relations; Southern Caucasus; JCPOA;

Russia’s relations with Iran are almost entirely based on geopolitical considerations. The Russian elite perceives Iran as an essential, albeit difficult partner, with whom it shares a number of interests; a partner who understands the language of power politics, and has demonstrated a willingness to seek pragmatic compromises where the interests of Moscow and Tehran diverge. The foundation of the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership is both countries’ common interest in reducing American power and influence, both in the Middle East and globally. The partnership with Iran is also important for Russia because it helps to stabilise the geopolitical situation in the south of the post-Soviet area (the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia) and minimise the influence of Western countries in the region. Since the Russian Federation began its military intervention in Syria (September 2015), Iran has become its de facto ally in its war against the armed anti-Assad opposition. Since the United States withdrew from the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) in 2018, Russia has become a major advocate of maintaining it, and has undertaken active diplomatic efforts to persuade its Western European signatories to resume economic relations with Iran – in defiance of the American sanctions. In response to the escalation in the conflict between Iran and the United States and its Arab allies in summer 2019, Russia has provided diplomatic and propaganda support for Iran. It has also undertaken initiatives aimed at easing tensions in the region and creating a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf, based on the logic of a concert of powers and limiting the importance of bilateral relations in the security sphere between the US and the region’s Arab monarchies.

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European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany’s stance on French initiatives

European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany’s stance on French initiatives

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

Keywords: Emmanuel Macron; European autonomy; Europe’s collective security; NATO;

In February this year, at the École de Guerre in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference, France’s President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated the need to strengthen European autonomy in foreign and security policy and presented yet another proposal in this area. This time he offered to launch a strategic dialogue on the role of the French nuclear deterrence in Europe’s collective security. Although the proposal is addressed to all of France’s European partners, the most important response will come from Germany. Official reactions in Berlin have so far been consistent with the German approach to French defence initiatives – Germany declared it is ready for such a dialogue but remains cautious about ist goals. Berlin does see the need to boost Europe’s role in foreign and security policy and recognises Paris as its most important partner in this field. However, Germany’s approach differs considerably from that of France. Berlin prefers to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership. At the same time it does not necessarily have the required political will and military means to back up its own rhetoric. || With regard to nuclear deterrence Germany’s stance on the French proposal might not be the most important challenge Berlin is currently facing. The upcoming decision on the replacement of the aged German Tornado combat aircraft, able to carry nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, might be much more significant for the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

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“Everlasting Putin” and the reform of the Russian Constitution

“Everlasting Putin” and the reform of the Russian Constitution

Author(s): Maria Domańska / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian Constitution; Putin's constitution; State Duma; Putin's term of office;

On 10–11 March, the State Duma passed, in the second and third reading, the constitutional amendments bill, thereby concluding the next step in the constitutional reform announced by Vladimir Putin on 15 January. The most important amendment, announced at the last minute, was a ‘reset’ of the President’s terms of office (under the current Constitution, Putin could not run for president in 2024). The constitutional amendments are expected to take effect once they are approved by a ‘nationwide vote’ in April 2020. || The reform comes at a time of long-term economic stagnation, turbulent global markets, relatively low public support for the President, and growing disquiet among the elite about how the political situation will play out in the next few years. In this context, the haste in work on the reform, as well as violation of the procedures required under the Constitution, is indicative. There were also quite significant developments in the wording of the amendments in the period between 15 January, when Putin made his address to parliament, and 10 March, when the second reading of the bill was held in the State Duma. The finalised version suggests consolidation of the ‘super-presidential’ system and formal dismantling of the tripartite system of distribution of power. The reform is clearly one of the crucial elements of the succession in Russia; however, the wording of the bill still does not determine definitively which political scenario the Kremlin will eventually choose.

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How the COVID-19 pandemic will develop in Ukraine

How the COVID-19 pandemic will develop in Ukraine

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański,Sławomir Matuszak,Piotr Żochowski,Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

Keywords: Covid 19 in Ukraine; Ukraine's health-care;

According to data compiled by Ukraine’s Ministry of Health, by 27 March more than 200 cases of COVID-19 were confirmed nationwide, with five fatalities. However, there is a risk of the epidemic soon developing on a much larger scale. This is due to the high daily increase in the number of in¬fections diagnosed, the unpreparedness and inefficiency of the healthcare sector, the shortage of medical equipment, the ongoing dispute in the Ministry of Health, and the organisational and financial weakness of the Ukrainian state combined with of the ruling elite’s limited experience of governance. At the present stage, the possible consequences of the pandemic are difficult to forecast. However, it is certain that Ukraine will see a deep recession (the most optimistic forecasts spell a 5% drop in Ukraine’s GDP in 2020).

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A pseudo-multi-vector policy. Moldova under the Socialists

A pseudo-multi-vector policy. Moldova under the Socialists

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ion Chicu; Igor Dodon; Moldawian government 2020; corruption;

In November 2019 a new government took power in Moldova under Ion Chicu as prime minister. Formally non-partisan, the new cabinet is in fact controlled by President Igor Dodon and the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). The establishment of this government brought an end to the five-month political experiment of Maia Sandu's coalition government, which was composed of the pro-Western ACUM bloc and the Socialists. In essence, the takeover of power by the latter means a halt to any real reforms, a worsening of relations with the West, and a far smaller chance that the legal proceedings currently underway into the country's biggest corruption scandals will have a positive outcome. Also, the multi-vector foreign policy declared by the government and President Dodon, which is aimed at maintaining good relations with both Russia and the EU, will in practice increase the Kremlin's influence in Moldova.Although President Dodon has gathered quite a significant amount of power, his situation remains uncertain. He does not control the parliamentary majority, and is forced to rely on the support of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), which has been weakened by the crisis. The main challenge for Dodon is the presidential election which is scheduled for the end of this year. However, the weak and increasingly fragmented pro-European opposition plays into the hands of Dodon and his group.

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Conjuring Reality: Belarus and the COVID-19 pandemic

Zaklinanie rzeczywistości: Białoruś w obliczu pandemii COVID-19

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński,Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Covid-19; pandemic in Belarus;

According to the data of the Belarusian Ministry of Health of April 3, 351 infections were recorded in the country SARS-CoV-2 virus, four deaths have also been confirmed. So far has been carried out over 30 thousand tests. Belarus is currently the only country outside Sweden in Europe that does not introduced comprehensive restrictions for citizens and did not stop the functioning of educational institutions, universities or offices. The borders have not been closed, despite such actions by all neighboring countries. The authorities are focusing on hospitalization of the infected and quarantine people who had contact with them, as well as those who came from abroad. Still, with some slight restrictions, there are shops, service points, restaurants, entertainment venues, cinemas and theaters. Takes place also some mass events, including football and hockey matches with the president's personal participation.

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Russia's new Energy Strategy - Optimistic Plans in uncertain Times

Nowa strategia energetyczna Rosji – optymistyczne plany w niepewnych czasach

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: energy supply in Russia; energy production in Russia;

On April 2, the Russian government adopted the Russian Federation's Energy Strategy until 2035. Is this is the third edition of the document adopted in the last two decades and at the same time the most synthetic. On the one hand, subsequent versions were intended to present the condition of the Russian the energy sector and its main challenges and, on the other hand, were a political signal for foreign partners, encouraging them to develop energy cooperation with Russia. The latest energy strategy was approved with a delay of six years, for which were influenced by both economic factors - dynamic changes in the energy markets - as well as political - Russia's conflict with the West in connection with the aggression against Ukraine or the growing instability in the Middle East. The new strategy articulates the challenges more clearly than the previous ones internal and external facing the national energy sector. It is also new a closer alignment of energy policy objectives with the priorities set by Vladimir Putin under the so-called May decrees, adopted after the 2018 presidential election The document is also an illustration of the current balance of power in the Russian energy sector, he points out on the growing importance of Novatek and the LNG projects developed by the concern, while at the same time maintaining Gazprom's privileges (maintaining a monopoly on gas exports via the pipeline system). At the same time, the document indicates the limited possibilities of strengthening the position of others, less influential market participants. Although the assumptions of the new strategy are more realistic than the indicators projected in its previous version, however, they still have very ambitious shape (especially in relation to exports of coal, oil and gas). So there are serious ones doubts as to whether, in the face of the dynamically changing situation on the energy markets, no they will become obsolete in the next few months.

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Turbulent Waters - The European Gas Market during a Pandemic

Wzburzone wody – Europejski rynek gazu w czasie pandemii

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Covid-19 impact on energy markets; NLG;

The pandemic and measures to limit its spread are changing drastically worldwide and the European economic situation. While their final effects are unknown, they are already bouncing back on the functioning of energy markets. Demand for gas is declining - in Italy, France and Germany in the second half of March by a dozen to over 20%. At the same time, the oversupply of raw material is growing, which is what is as a result of the accelerated production in the world and increasing LNG export, and in Europe also a derivative reduced imports of Asian recipients due to the pandemic. In March, LNG deliveries to Europe reached a record volume - approx. 15 billion m3. As a result, the prices of raw materials on the stock exchanges drop to exceptionally low levels. The situation on the market is hitting exporters and will have an impact on investments and supply of raw material. LNG suppliers, including those from the USA, are primarily affected. The crisis is not however, it bypasses traditional exporters to the European market (Russia, Norway), and low oil prices will translate the fall (with a delay) of the related gas prices in long-term contracts.

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Russia on the Training Ground. Unprecedented Training Activity in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Rosja na poligonie. Bezprecedensowa aktywność szkoleniowa Sił Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: 2020 maneuvers of Russian Army; Russian military;

In 2020, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation much earlier than in previous years activated their training activities. The COVID-19 epidemic developing in Russia did not slow down military activity, but only expanded the training issues to include issues related to counteracting the spread of SARS-CoV-2, and contributed to an increase in the scale and number of projects aimed at securing operations of the armed forces under conditions of the use of mass weapons destruction. While in the first weeks of this year the increased activity could be seen in opposition to the Defender Europe 2020 exercises, the largest since the end of the Cold War (under the US leadership and with the participation of other NATO countries) planned in the spring, while during the coronavirus pandemic they can be treated as a demonstration of Russia's resilience, especially its component military, for threats related to COVID-19, as well as readiness for regular armed clashes regardless of the epidemiological situation. The observed exercises do not introduce a new quality in this respect, but only provide further evidence that the Russian army is preparing, in the first place, for offensive operations.

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NATO and the European Union facing of hybrid Threats

NATO i Unia Europejska wobec zagrożeń hybrydowych

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: hybrid threats; hybrid warfare;

In recent years, the importance of NATO and the European Union in countering hybrid threats from states and non-state actors has grown. This category covers a wide spectrum of military and non-military operations - from the use of special forces and subversive groups to disinformation and cyber attacks. NATO and the EU are committed to coordinating international cooperation in combating hybrid threats, as well as protecting their own structures against them. In this way, both organizations support activities at the national level, as it is individual countries that bear the main responsibility for responding to such challenges. However, the effectiveness of NATO and the EU is limited by insufficient financial resources to counter hybrid threats. It is also adversely affected by the lack of will of the Member States to increase the exchange of sensitive information, such as the protection of critical infrastructure or cybersecurity. The example of the intensification of disinformation campaigns against the West in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic proves that NATO and the EU should pay even more attention to the problem of hybrid threats

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Nord Stream 2 - Russian-German game for Exclusion from EU Law

Nord Stream 2 – rosyjsko-niemiecka gra o wyłączenie spod prawa unijnego

Author(s): Ryszarda Formuszewicz,Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Nord Stream 2; German-Russian coooperation; German anergy policy;

The upcoming settlement in the case of NS2 will be an important test for the EU energy law. From the outset, Germany was reluctant to amend the gas directive, which would allow the Baltic gas pipeline from Russia to be covered by the regulations of the third energy package. When implementing its provisions into German law at the end of 2019, they allowed for a broad interpretation of the condition for completing the investment. On the other hand, Russia has not only consistently criticized all EU law regulations restricting Gazprom's ability to operate on the European market, but has also taken political, propaganda and legal actions aimed at neutralizing EU restrictions. The Russian side, through Nord Stream 2 AG, also appealed against the amendment to the gas directive before the Court of Justice of the European Union and initiated arbitration proceedings, accusing EU institutions that the adopted regulations violate the Energy Charter Treaty. At the same time, the Nord Stream 2 project was the subject of regular consultations between Moscow and Berlin. There are also many indications that a possible positive decision by the German regulator may be the result of a broader German-Russian political agreement, including not only bilateral energy cooperation, but also the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine.

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Hydrogen - The Hope of German Climate and Industrial Policy

Wodór – nadzieja niemieckiej polityki klimatycznej i przemysłowej

Author(s): Michał Kędzierski / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: hydrogen technology; hydrogen; hydrogen in energy supply; hydrogen as industiral energy source;

Germany is looking for alternatives to fossil fuels in all sectors of the economy. They intend to rely on hydrogen, which, due to its potentially wide application, is treated as a key element of the «Energiewende» and an instrument for achieving emission neutrality. The broadly understood hydrogen economy, including production, transport, storage and use of this fuel, is currently in the conceptual stage. On the other hand, hydrogen technologies are already used, albeit only on a small scale, or are being tested in pilot projects. Their market development is blocked, among others, by high costs of obtaining and using hydrogen, as well as the lack of transport and distribution infrastructure through which it could reach potential recipients. The development of hydrogen technologies in Germany will, however, accelerate, as it is seen not only as an opportunity to meet the goals of climate policy, but also as a new expansion opportunity for the local industry. Germany wants to become a world leader in the production and export of hydrogen technologies.

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