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SIDELINING SLOBODAN: Getting rid of Europe's last dictator (ICG Balkans Report N°57)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Milosevic is giving every indication that he intends to stay in power well beyond 2001 as an elder statesman, and to govern by controlling the instruments of force. His intention appears to be that he will preside over a military dictatorship bereft of all opposition; he may even be willing to sacrifice territory, content to rule over the Pasalik (from Ottoman or Turkish administration, meaning a small administrative district or region) of Belgrade1. Any comprehensive analysis of opposition to the Milosevic regime must address his dealings not just with political parties but also with institutions and key individuals.

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UNIFYING THE KOSOVAR FACTIONS: The Way Forward (ICG Balkans Report N°58)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Kosovo peace talks, held at Rambouillet (France) under the auspices of the sixnation Contact Group, have been suspended until 15 March 1999 after a provisional agreement was reached on granting substantial autonomy for Kosovo. However, neither the Kosovo Albanians nor Serbian delegates have yet signed the draft peace accord, which calls for a NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, and in which the "final status" issue has been deliberately fudged. The immense complexities of the Kosovo question were dramatically illustrated at Rambouillet by the last-minute refusal of the Albanian delegation to sign the accord, due to pressure from a hardline faction of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which refused to attend the talks.

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KOSOVO: THE ROAD TO PEACE. Critical Implementation Issues and a "Who's Who" of Key Players

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

While last spring saw conflict erupt in Kosovo's central Drenica region when Serbian security forces attacked and killed residents of the villages of Prekaz and Likoshan, this spring brings the possibility of peace. The proposed deployment of a 28,000-strong international force for Kosovo will dramatically and immediately halt the sporadic low-intensity battles between Serbian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels that have displaced 300,000 people. This peace will allow refugees to return to their homes, and provide the day-to-day sense of security on the ground that will enable Kosovo's transition to self-government.

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MACEDONIA UPDATE: Challenges and Choices for the New Government (ICG Balkans Report N°60)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This latest ICG report on Macedonia was written during March, as the new humanitarian catastrophe in neighbouring Kosovo unfolded and reached a new scale. Because of the recent events in Kosovo and the region at large, parts of this report have been overtaken by new developments. In particular, this concerns issues relating to the amount of aid reaching Macedonia, actions taken to alleviate the refugee situation in Macedonia and, most importantly, the Government’s ability to deal with the increasing number of refugees. Indeed, events in the last few days may well have reached a point beyond the Government’s capacity to respond. On the whole however, the analysis and conclusions of this report are still valid and still merit consideration despite the fact that local and international attention is now focusing on developments in Kosovo and their effect on neighbouring countries

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WAR IN THE BALKANS: Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict and Future Options for Kosovo and the Region (ICG Balkans Report N° 61)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

NATO’s strategy in the war with Yugoslavia over Kosovo isn’t working. As the Alliance’s bombing campaign enters its fourth week, it is Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who is still winning the political game. Western governments have fallen into a humanitarian trap – concentrating on the hundreds of thousands of refugees expelled from Kosovo while failing to address the appalling human tragedy still going on inside the province. The present paper, prepared by International Crisis Group (ICG) analysts in Belgrade, Skopje, Tirana, Sarajevo, Washington DC, and Brussels, summarises the situation on the ground throughout the Balkans in the wake of recent events and examines the difficult choices facing Western leaders. It concludes with a comprehensive statement of policy recommendations designed to contribute both to a solution to the immediate crisis and to longerterm regional stability.

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REPUBLIKA SRPSKA – POPLASEN, BRCKO AND KOSOVO: Three Crises and Out? (ICG Balkans Report N° 62)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The early part of 1999 has been turbulent for Republika Srpska. Political life has been unsettled by three separate and hardly-related crises: the decision of the High Representative to remove from office the RS President Nikola Poplasen; the decision of International Arbitrator Roberts Owen to give the municipality of Brcko neither to RS nor to the Federation but to both as a condominium; and the NATO air-strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Either of the first two issues alone would have been ordinary daily business in the bad-tempered world of Bosnian politics. The two together could probably have been handled. But RS reactions to NATO action in FRY, coming on top of the excitement already created by previous events, have raised tensions to very high levels. Numerous peaceful demonstrations have turned violent, and international organisations – usually the target of the demonstrations – have withdrawn most of their personnel. There are still elements in RS ready and willing to use violence to promote political objectives, and the current climate offers them fertile soil. The beleaguered authorities in Belgrade have every reason to foster a diversion in Bosnia to give the international community another problem besides Kosovo to worry about. The present moment could be the most dangerous for the Dayton Peace Agreement since it was signed in 1995.

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WHY WILL NO ONE INVEST IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA? An Overview of Impediments to Investment and Self Sustaining Economic Growth in the Post Dayton Era (ICG Balkans Report N° 64)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The donor countries hoped the governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina would use the promised $ 5.1 Billion post-war reconstruction aid to undertake the structural changes necessary to transition from communism to capitalism. As donor-aid diminished, private investment would replace it, stimulated by structural reforms. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Indeed, interviews with Bosnian and foreign businessmen show a common reluctance to invest in BiH. The current economic and political structures in all three ethnic sections of BiH maintain the failed communist-era policies that contributed to former Yugoslavia’s economic downturn and eventual break-up. These policies discourage business activity and investment. The continued existence and implementation of these failed economic policies and structures means that donor aid, no matter how wisely targeted or spent, will prove ineffective in creating long-term, sustainable economic development.

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MILOŠEVIĆ’S AIMS IN WAR AND DIPLOMACY (ICG Balkans Report N° 65)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report, prepared by ICG’s Belgrade-based analyst, looks back on an extraordinary two months of war and diplomacy in the Balkans. It argues that Milosevic, while not actively willing NATO bombing, was prepared for that eventuality3 and examines how he has used it to his advantage. The start of NATO’s air campaign on 24 March 1999 provided Milosevic with the cover to unleash his own ground war within Kosovo. Within hours of the first NATO missiles being fired, Yugoslav forces, including paramilitaries, embarked on the most vicious and extensive campaign of ethnic cleansing seen in Europe since World War II. An estimated 88 percent of the Kosovo population have been driven from their homes, the bulk forced to seek refuge outside of Yugoslavia. For the first three weeks of NATO air strikes, Milosevic sought to shore up his position at home, assuming sweeping war-time powers, refusing to countenance any concessions to NATO’s demands and riding a wave of nationalist resentment directed against the West. During this phase of the conflict, Milosevic strove to emphasise that the Serbs was not alone in the world, holding out the prospect of Serbia’s allies, in particular Russia, intervening militarily to protect the country from attack. Much play was made of remarks by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and members of the Russian legislature that NATO’s action risked triggering a new world war.

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KOSOVO: LET’S LEARN FROM BOSNIA. Models and Methods of International Administration (ICG Balkans Report N° 66)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

After almost three and a half years working in Bosnia to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement, the international community will soon face the prospect of establishing a presence in Kosovo. The model proposed at Rambouillet was very similar to that set up at Dayton, but the situation now is very different. This report examines the international effort in Bosnia to see whether lessons can be drawn for Kosovo and other possible future international administrations. At Dayton it was assumed that military implementation would be harder than civilian, so the two were kept rigidly separate, and the role allotted to civilian implementation was to give a ‘helping hand’ to the Bosnian authorities, who were assumed to want to co-operate with implementation. The Rambouillet agreement preserved the same division between civilian and military implementation as Dayton. Yet experience in Bosnia has shown that a helping hand has not been enough since the Bosnian parties have not in fact co-operated among themselves or with the internationals. In response, the High Representative in Bosnia has gradually taken on extra powers, but his ability to use them effectively is limited because he still has no force at his disposal to back him up. However many powers he appears to have, he will always face this problem, even if a so-called ‘protectorate’ is established. Currently, influence over aid is his only real power.

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MACEDONIA: TOWARDS DESTABILISATION? The Kosovo crisis takes its toll on Macedonia (ICG Report N° 67)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Since NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began on 24 March 1999, Macedonia has been in an extremely vulnerable frontline position, facing an unmanageable influx of refugees from Kosovo, the prospect of economic collapse and volatile domestic interethnic relations. This report, prepared by ICG’s field analyst in Skopje, gives a candid assessment of the current situation in Macedonia and pinpoints the threats to the country’s stability that have arisen out of the Kosovo conflict.

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THE BALKAN REFUGEE CRISIS: Regional and long-term Perspectives. (ICG Balkans Report N° 68)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report argues in favour of providing temporary protection2 for refugees in the region, with the aim of them returning home at the earliest opportunity. Temporary protection is necessary to maintain pressure on Belgrade and demonstrate our commitment to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing. But this report argues for more realism in relation to the length of time it will take to reverse the present refugee flow. Lessons from Croatia and Bosnia have demonstrated that there is no such thing as fast voluntary return in the wake of war and ethnic cleansing3. Perhaps induced, but most likely not voluntary. Non-voluntary return of refugees is a very sensitive issue. The international community can only try to circumvent it by striving to put in place the necessary conditions that would make return acceptable to Kosovo refugees. This report discusses these key conditions and calls for the establishment of a comprehensive repatriation plan. Strong regional management structures must be established by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to develop, co-ordinate and implement the strategy for the return process.

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THE NEW KOSOVO PROTECTORATE (ICG Balkans Report N°69)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The ICG Balkans Report N°66, “Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia”, of 17 May 1999 looked at how experience in Bosnia could be useful in Kosovo, and also at the extent to which the Rambouillet agreement of 23 February 1999 resembled the Dayton agreement of 21 November 1995. Now, following the campaign of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, a new framework of military and civilian involvement in Kosovo has been established by means of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. This mechanism ensures the legality of the operation and contents the Russians and Chinese. It has also left the UN in charge of civilian implementation.

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BACK TO THE FUTURE: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo (ICG Balkans Report N°70)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Milosevic managed to survive the recent NATO onslaught in part by parlaying resentment against NATO into a wave of public support for his dictatorship. Adept at manipulating popular culture, the regime used such fortuitous events as the timing of the NATO action, coming only weeks before the anniversary of the Nazi bombing of Belgrade in the Second World War, to link the Western alliance with fascism in the public mind. Television programming gave prominence to heroic tales of WW2 partisan fighters, suggesting to the public how they might interpret NATO action. Any Western popular culture, from film to music to television, that degraded Western values or painted the West in a negative light also received wide play, and was clearly aimed at showing the decadence of the Alliance. Now with the war over, Milosevic continues to use the media to his advantage. While the rest of the world learns about the appalling atrocities committed in Kosovo against ethnic Albanians and recoils at images of torture dungeons and mass graves, the Serbian media continue to play up stories claiming that the Serbs were the real victims, brutalised as they were by both NATO aggression and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) terrorism.

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REPUBLIKA SRPSKA IN THE POST-KOSOVO ERA: Collateral Damage and Transformation (ICG Report N° 71)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Repercussions from Kosovo continue to shake Republika Srpska (RS), and may prove a catalyst for further transformation and reform. The war’s collateral damage included severance of trade ties with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); a dramatic rise in unemployment; a sharp drop in production and state revenues; and a tide of Serbian refugees from FRY into RS. Despite this the security situation, which looked dangerous at the beginning of April, did not deteriorate out of control, and the government in Banja Luka was able to stabilise its position and survive. The government itself deserves credit for keeping its head throughout the crisis. The international community, especially OHR and the US government, did good work behind the scenes keeping the ruling Sloga coalition together. And a generally well-judged and lowkey response by SFOR managed to strike a balance between preserving security and not provoking incidents by its own actions. As Republika Srpska enters the post-Kosovo era it faces a crossroads, both economically and politically. RS now can move forward towards an integrated European future as part of BiH. Or it can move backwards, towards economic, social and political misery.

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RULE OVER LAW: Obstacles to the Development of an Independent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Bosnia Legal Project Report N° 1)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The BiH judiciary is in transition. In the former SFRJ system, the judiciary ceded much control to the police to determine guilt in the field of criminal justice investigation, thus reducing elements of their authority in the legal process. Furthermore, Communist Party officials often interfered in the justice system. This interference has continued and even increased under the multi-party system. Two separate legal systems in BiH exist, with only ceremonial and appeals institutions and functions at the State level, in spite of the BiH Constitution which allows for the formation of more State court institutions. Within the Federation, loopholes in the legislation on the Supreme Court allow Croat-majority cantons to refuse to recognise the authority and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, thus containing all court functions within the jurisdiction of that Canton. Weak roles for Public Prosecutors, plus anomalies in the legislation which make it hard for strong, Federation-level judges to try cross-cantonal crimes, leave highly autonomous Cantonal Courts open to political influence from ruling parties.

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PREVENTING MINORITY RETURN IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: The Anatomy of Hate and Fear (ICG Report N° 73)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This paper examines the motives driving the attitude of Bosnian authorities, ranging from simple racism to the genuine need to protect displaced people already occupying the property of potential returnees. It then looks at the factors underlying the decision of the individual prospective returnee whether to go back or not. It goes on to examine the record in several locations in Bosnia and suggests which factors have been at work in these cases. The report concludes that many of the arguments used by Bosnian authorities to obstruct return appear reasonable to the authorities themselves but may conceal less reasonable arguments which are actually more important. It would be better to remove these ‘justifiable’ reasons from the argument altogether. Against this background the report examines the policy responses available to the international community, and advocates an approach based on treating return not as a separate problem but as an aspect of the more general question of rule of law throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report suggests that, without sacrificing successful elements of the existing policy, this might change the terms of the debate, making opposition to return much more difficult to defend with reasonable-looking arguments, since rule of law is an ideal endorsed (in public) by all forces in BiH, and accepted as a necessary condition of entry into the Western family of nations and, in due course, the European Union

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THE POLICING GAP: Law and Order in the New Kosovo (ICG Balkans Report N° 74)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

During June and July 1999 international military and civilian organisations entered a territory from which every form of administration and authority had become suddenly absent. Their job was to provide all forms of government while preparing the people of Kosovo to take over that responsibility. // Such a difficult and unprecedented task, the imposition of a foreign administration on a society technically in anarchy, is bound to encounter problems. This report examines the issue of law and order, a natural priority in a society so recently subject to fundamental upheaval. It attempts to assess whether permanent damage is being suffered in this difficult early period, when policing is being carried out by KFOR soldiers pending the deployment of the UN Civilian Police. It concludes by suggesting how the risk of damage can be minimised.

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TRANSFORMING SERBIA: The Key to Long-term Balkan Stability (ICG Report N° 75)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This paper furnishes an overview of the economic and political situation in Serbia and examines in detail the effect of recent events on the linchpins of Milosevic’s power - his political network and its tentacle-like infrastructure, his circle of cronies, the military and police. The paper also looks closely at the ambiguous roles of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the ultra-nationalist right and at the state of the opposition and the movement to remove him from office. An appendix offers essential background and analysis of key opposition figures and groups.

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WHO'S WHO IN KOSOVO (ICG Balkans Report N°76)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This paper offers a brief guide to the leading indigenous political organisations and personalities in Kosovo/Kosova. The authority of the international civil and military presence in Kosovo rests on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. Under international law no other authority enjoys any legitimacy until the UN administration grants it. Specifically, the international civil presence is tasked with: “Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement…” The UN, as a step towards fulfillment of this task, has created an advisory and consultative Transitional Council, composed of representatives of Kosovar Albanian political parties and leaders from minority communities. It has had a shaky start, meeting only once in July and twice in August, though meetings are now planned weekly.

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MACEDONIA: Gearing up for Presidential Elections (ICG Balkans Report N°77)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Six candidates will contest the 1999 presidential elections, all of them backed by political parties. A number of independents who earlier declared their intention to run in the elections either failed to gather the necessary signatures or withdrew before submitting the necessary documentation to the State Electoral Commission. Plans by the ruling coalition to field a common candidate fell apart, and all three coalition parties nominated their own candidates. The opposition also failed to agree on a joint candidate, as did the two major Albanian parties (one of which is in the government, the other in opposition).

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