Nietzsches Signaturen: Zur Grenze des Subjekts

Author(s): Maximilian Giuseppe Burkhart / Language(s): German Issue: 4/2015

In an ideal case a signature is completely invariant – it remains the same. It is based on the idealist concept of identity replication and in this function is the discovery of modernism. The letter becomes a key means for portraying this concept in literature. Nietzsche signs his “insane” letters as Ceasar, Dionysos or The Crucified. His signatures seem to be the last expression of a psychological break-down. The medical diagnosis of his illness was brain softening due to syphilis. However, as an explanation for the phenomenon of Nietzsche’s signatures purely medically based interpretations are insufficient. His entire work can be read as an attempt to overcome limits. The reasons for a dissociated subject manifested in his signatures can be found across his entire philosophical work. Nietzsche is positioned at the end of a development that begins somewhere with Descartes and that experiences its heyday in Kant’s Enlightenment, Fichte’s radical subjectivism and its prolongation in the early Romantics, especially Novalis. Medical interpretations at the same time ignore the fact that Nietzsche in his later “insane” letters in his own consistent way completed a complex philosophical project. Nietzsche’s project of the “Übermensch” essentially means a look into the fragile aesthetic construction of the modern subject. The genesis of the artistic subject completely moved into the area of madness and fiction. The subject, madness and aesthetics cannot be separated. In this same exact constellation can be found his aesthetics and philosophy. The theory of the subject runs like a red thread through his entire oeuvre. Nietzsche’s destruction of the logical and ethical basis of the Enlightenment criticism of rationality is a necessary stop on the way to the “Übermensch”. It is at the same time a consistent continuation of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, one consequence of which is also the indistinguishability of rationality and madness. In the destruction of the subject he penetrates into the depth of corporeality and the mind. As a subject it becomes something separate – an individual. Nietzsche probably knew this before his collapse and was aware of the significance of his awareness.

Кјеркегор о жени и еманципацији

Author(s): Bojan Blagojevic / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 1/2016

The feminist critique of Kierkegaard's philosophy usually refers to the same passages of his writing: the accounts of the feminine, ie. passive despair given in The Sickness unto Death, the differences between the feminine and masculine self in The Concept of Anxiety, the accounts of the types of passive existence through selected female literary characters in the first volume of Either/Or and the paternalistic positioning of the women in marriage in the second volume of Either/Or and Stages on Life's Way. However, there are significant dissents even within the feminist interpretations of the stated passages: they are seen as indubious signs of Kierkegaard's misoginy, as a part of an ironic tactics directed at the Church of Denmark and the position of woman it promoted, or as an incentive directed towards the woman, the female reader, to reflect her cultural and historical circumstances. However, the feminist critique overlooks the passages in which Kierkegaard speaks of specific individuals: his contemporaries Thomasine Gyllembourg and Johanne Heiberg, and the Virgin Mary. One can conclude from these passages that Kierkegaard's sexism stays limited to the typologies and his choice of metaphores, while his demand directed to female individuals stays as rigorous as his demand directed to individuals in general: to fight for their freedom, as well as for their authenticity, on their own, without blending into mass movements of any kind.

KİERKEGAARD’DAN BAUDRİLLARD’A BAŞTAN ÇIKARMA

Author(s): Ufuk Bircan / Language(s): Turkish Issue: 29/2016

The subject of this study is the evolution process and form of the meaning attributed tothe concept of seduction from Kierkegaard to Baudrillard. The first thing to be discussed related to seduction will be seduction in Kierkegaard and Charles. The main subject inKierkegaard’s work is love, but the things he voiced are inevitably the discourse of affinityand seduction. Taking into consideration the two philosophers together the different forms of this discourse when it voiced by men and women can be apparently seen. In Tolstoy’s sense of art seduction has a significant role when it comes to the subject of love, womanand sexuality. In Baudrillard it can be observed that how a follower of Kierkegaard he isand how he overcomes and expands his ideas about seduction by handling it from different perspectives.

Kritika i univerzalnost filozofije.

Author(s): Nevena Jevtić / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 2/2017

In this article the author investigates Hegel’s concept of philosophical critique against the background of his philosophical development in Jena. Naturally, the focal point of this investigation is the text with the title of “On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism”, but this interpretation relies also on other Hegel’s important early writings. However, this text sets up the framework of the whole interpretation, because it explicitly puts forward the fundamental relation between critique and the idea of a universal philosophy which is the topic of this article. In order to understand Hegel’s concept of philosophical critique correctly, it is of greatest importance to see it acting as a consciousness of the philosopher’s epoch. Concretely, philosophical critique reflects upon educational, scientific, cultural and ideological horizon of one’s time. Regarding Hegel’s time, this horizon was fundamentally derived from the intellectual and ideological edifice of critical philosophy, which was made transparent through the principle of subjectivism as its dominant trend. Therefore, the task of philosophical critique is to understand philosophy historically, to account for its historical reality and given experiences expressed in the form of the philosophy of subjectivism. It is clear in what way Hegel’s notion of philosophical critique differs from Kant’s concept of critique of pure mind. One of the main characteristics of the different philosophical system of that time lies in their shared misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical cognition. This misunderstanding was brought forth by the Kantian philosophical project and it basically interprets the problem of cognition as a principally unsolvable dualism between the subject and the object. For Hegel, this standpoint is a symptom of a wrong understanding of the nature of philosophical thinking and its relation to the absolute. The subjective principle, upon which many of his contemporaries build their philosophical system, represents just one limited step in the historical development of philosophy. This is why the most important task of philosophical critique, according to Hegel, is to subject to its criticism the whole scope of limitations of philosophy.

Hegel Európáról

Author(s): Erzsébet Rózsa / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 08/2019

Hegel’s conception of Europe is one of the lesser-known aspects of his philosophy. However, one of the main pillars of the Hegelian theory of history consists in his views regarding the special place and role of Europe, with a strong interconnection between modernity and Europe as one of the basic ideas of his theory. According to Hegel’s methodological starting point, the philosophy of history views history from the perspective of the Weltgeist (“world spirit”), which is different from the viewpoint of history. An important criterion for distinguishing between nations and historical periods lies in their way of communicating with other cultures. Hegel distinguishes between four types of this contact: the “liberal principle”, the “principle of exclusion”, “unity” as the principle of acceptance and integration, and finally “exclusion”; arguing that the basis of modernity is to be found not in economy or politics, but in the “European spirit”, i.e. in the cultural community of European nations, which consists of both normative and historical components. His conception of a strong Europe and European consciousness provides relevant inspiration for our current times.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER’S MIRROR: THE WILL, THE SUFFERING, THE COMPASSION AS PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES

Author(s): Ana Bazac / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2019

Arthur Schopenhauer’s Mirror: the Will, the Suffering, the Compassion as Philosophical Challenges. In philosophy, the celebration of Arthur Schopenhauer has already ended. Only the last year was anniversary (of his birth and of the publication of the first volume of The World as Will and Representation), but the importance of this non-conformist creator is never superfluous to highlight.In this article, there is, certainly, a very limited/selective focus on the thinking of Schopenhauer, and no biographical approach: the goal is only to stress two aspects of his philosophy in their logic. Schopenhauer was an enthusiastic Kantian: first of all, by taking over his maestro’s seminal paradigm, the constructivism (that does not pertain only to the ‘theory of knowledge’, but marks the entire existence analysed at different philosophical levels). Secondly, by the ethical focus and accent, continuing Kant’s exceptional emphasis of the ultimate reason of the tableau of the world, the human reason and its power to treat the others in moral manner. And certainly, Schopenhauer was not an epigone, but a creator, using and at the same time giving other content to the Kantian form of ethical revolution.Schopenhauer had, obviously, contradictory ideas – as that between his constructivism and his metaphysical treatment of the will, i. e. as the only principle explaining the world – and also with disputable significance, including for the actual life and thinking. But he had a “bad publicity” from the dominant philosophy – namely, some of his ideas (as that of the moral of compassion) were, and still are, absolutely ignored, while other ones were simplified or transformed in the “conception of Schopenhauer”, reducing this one to some ideas out of context – and even nowadays this tradition is dominant. And it’s pity, because Schopenhauer’s philosophy was and represented a dramatic moment in the history of the 19th century thinking and culture: as it is a strange mirror for the present much graver situation.In order to critique the present it’s not necessary to do it from Schopenhauer’s perspective. However, just his contradictory ideas and pathetic accent on compassion show better than ever that neither philosophy – as theoretical position – nor the urging for moral activism are more than vox clamantis in deserto: if the historical facts, which include this urging and the spring of thinking but are not confined to them, are missing.

CONTRIBUȚIILE ȘTIINȚIFICE ALE LUI BOGDAN PETRICEICU HASDEU ÎN CULTURA ROMÂNĂ

Author(s): Vlad Bilevsky / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 3/2020

This paper tries to illustrate the value that B. P. Hasdeu had in the Romanian culture throughout the XIXth century, along with a short exposition of his actual theoretical linguistics contributions. Most of the aspects discussed in the article have usually been seen from a political point of view, and almost never from a philosophical or scientific perspective. Some aspects – like his ethnological questionaries – were omitted, as they were already discussed in other works, already well-known by now. But the actual scientific contributions that he had in our culture, his firm position on the latin origin of our language and his principle of the circulation of words deserve a more relevant place in the study of contemporary Romanian philosophy and linguistics. Today, Hasdeu is widely recognized as one of the founders of folklore in Romania, but we have tried – through our small efforts and a modest research – to show that his real interests, as well as his real contributions lie elsewhere, without trying to diminish the importance of his ethnological ideas. In fact, Hasdeu was an encyclopedist, and he should be taken as such.

TRADUCEREA CA RESTITUIRE VALORICĂ ȘI EVENIMENT CULTURAL

Author(s): Alexandru Boboc / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 3/2020

A filozófia Felső-Magyarországon

Author(s): András Mészáros / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 3/2020

The study lists the methodological changes that have modified the historiographical approach in the history of Hungarian philosophy in the last 30 years. Based on these, it formulates the hypothesis that the history of Hungarian philosophy can be reconstructed and presented not within the framework of a single narrative, but along discourses that exist side by side and one after the other. One such form of discourse is local discourse, such as Upper Hungarian philosophy. The determining form of this was the school philosophy, which developed along the Catholic–Lutheran dichotomy. School philosophy lost its decisive role here only during the 19th century, and besides it appeared the so-called public philosophy, and one of its forms of discourse, national philosophy. However, this was mainly characteristic of the emerging Slovak philosophy.

Începuturile criticismului în România. O reconsiderare

Author(s): Bogdan Rusu / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 6/2021

The beginnings of the critical philosophy in Romania have been traditionally connected with the activity of some Transylvanian scholars, most importantly with the teaching activity of Gheorghe Lazăr in the Saint Sabbas College of Bucharest (1818–1822). However, a fresh new look at the facts suggests that this received view is rather groundless. The first thinker positively influenced by Kant and who disseminated Kantian ideas in print was Eufrosin Poteca, who taught philosophy in the Saint Sabbas College after Lazăr’s departure and death (1825–1832). Poteca compiled the first general exposition of Kant’s philosophy in Romanian and defended a Kantian conception of morality, nevertheless subordinated to an eudaemonist ethics of virtues. The sources, previously undiscovered, of his knowledge of the Kantian doctrines were Tennemann’s handbook of the history of philosophy and Krug’s system of practical philosophy, which Poteca read in K. Koumas’ Greek translations.

A metafizika lebontása a test révén. Nietzsche radikális testfilozófiája

Author(s): Tamás Ullmann / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 4/2021

The problem of embodied mind is one of the central topics of contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. Nevertheless, the concept of “embodied mind” suggests itself an implicit Cartesian dualism: the mind is the first and embodiment is only an external characteristic of the mind. There have been two traditions that questioned consequently the Cartesian dualism concerning the body: Nietzschean philosophy and phenomenology. The present article analyses Nietzsche’s radical philosophy of body, his radically new picture of the body and the consequences of such a philosophical approach. Nietzsche’s radicalised philosophy of body leads his thinking to deconstruct the whole tradition of metaphysics.

A második természet kinevelése. Az önmagaság és az ösztönösség összefüggései Nietzsche művelődéskoncepciójában

Author(s): Péter Tánczos / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 4/2021

The notion of “second nature” plays an important, but ambiguous role in the oeuvres of Friedrich Nietzsche. At first, the German philosopher interprets this conception having huge philosophical tradition as habit or rigid manner, since the term second nature has negative connotations for him. In my paper I argue that Nietzsche can only affirm the second nature as one of his own notions, when it could be interconnected with the concept of self, drive, and instinct. In the late works of Nietzsche, the second nature will be an integral part of his philosophy in the sense of instinctive knowledge, and it will be the conceptual foundation of creating the self.

Nicolai Hartmann and José Ortega y Gasset: An overview of an intellectual relationship based on the correspondence of two philosophers from 1907–1912

Author(s): Dorota Leszczyna / Language(s): English Issue: 75/2023

This article is of both a historical and philosophical nature. It aims to present the intellectual relationship between the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and one of the most influential German thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century, Nicolai Hartmann. It is based on hitherto unknown and unpublished correspondence that the philosophers conducted intermittently between 1907 and 1912. The correspondence was found in the archives of the José Ortega y Gasset – Gregorio Marañón Foundation in Madrid along with other letters that show the relationship between the Spanish author and representatives of the neo-Kantian Marburg School, including its founder Hermann Cohen, as well as Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, and Heinz Heimsoeth.

CIERPIENIE – NAMIĘTNOŚĆ – PASJA DO FILOZOFOWANIA. OSOBISTY WYMIAR FILOZOFII FRYDERYKA NIETZSCHEGO

Author(s): Tomasz Lerka / Language(s): Polish Issue: 26/2020

The aim of this paper is to indicate the two expressions of the approach that I propose – “passion to philosophizing” – in the life and work of Friedrich Nietzsche: its personal dimension and the desire to change oneself. The methodology of this work is based on using the notion of “passion to philosophizing” as an interpretational tool of Nietzsche’s life and philosophy, which includes analysis of his works and letters and biographical material. First, the term “passion” is defined, with indication of its connections with the phenomena of “suffering”. Next, the phenomenon of “passion to philosophizing” is defined. Then the issue of the personal dimension of Nietzsche’s passion to philosophizing is discussed. The last part discusses Nietzsche’s passion to change himself, with reference to Safranski’s and Deleuze’s interpretations.

Nietzsche și autenticitatea ca reinventare de sine

Author(s): Daniel Nica / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 5/2022

In contemporary philosophy, there is a widespread distinction between authenticity as self-discovery (which is an essentialist model, inspired by Rousseau, Herder and the Romantic tradition) and authenticity as self-creation (an existentialist model, inspired mainly by Kierkegaard and Sartre). In this paper, I would like to propose a threefold classification, which adds another model of authenticity, irreducible to any of the previous two. This third model is authenticity as self-reinvention, which could be reconstructed from Nietzsche’s philosophy. The self-reinvention model rests on three different, yet interrelated, ideas: 1) Vitalism: The authentic individual wholeheartedly embraces every aspect of his existence, even pain and sufferings, thus proving he truly owns himself. 2) Perspectivism: The authentic individual is able to reinterpret his mental states in the utmost personal manner, through the transvaluation of values (Umwertung aller Werte) and the spiritualization (Vergeistingung) of his drives. 3) Experimentalism: Authenticity is an incessant play, a constant process of identity formation, which corresponds to Nietzsche’s hypothesis of “the subject as multiplicity” and to his ideal of existence as a work of art or of becoming the poet of your life.

Kierkegaard maszkjai (I.)

Author(s): András Nagy / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 01/2024

Why did Kierkegaard prefer to write his masterpieces under different pseudonyms and what was the theatrical logic behind the constant playfulness of an author otherwise doomed to melancholy? What were the reasons of his ongoing philosophical, theological and aesthetic hide-and-seek that he did not want to finish until the very last, nearly tragic phase of his authorship? How much inspiration did Kierkegaard receive from theatrical performances, from playwrights and even from actors and actresses of 19th-century Copenhagen, which seemed to be sometimes stronger than the influence exercised on him by his professors, masters and theologians of Denmark’s “Golden Age”? Can the difference between direct and indirect communication that basically characterized Kierkegaard’s oeuvre be described in theatrical terms or even to approach it as an ongoing dramatic dialogue? Should we rather call it a “polylogue” as different actors are present throughout the texts that were often polemic with each other, simultaneously reflecting certain issues from different angles and finally Kierkegaard denying that any of those were written by him? Could his own name be a pseudonym, as his brother suggested when giving the eulogy on the prodigal son, who learned to doubt from Socrates and from Descartes, yet could not give up his intention to question even the final axioms of human existence? The author tries to find answers to these questions by reconstructing the very special Kierkegaardian method, so familiar from the stage, in the spiritual, cultural and theatrical context of Kierkegaard’s Denmark.

Kierkegaard maszkjai (II.)

Author(s): András Nagy / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 02/2024

Why did Kierkegaard prefer to write his masterpieces under different pseudonyms and what was the theatrical logic behind the constant playfulness of an author otherwise doomed to melancholy? What were the reasons of his ongoing philosophical, theological and aesthetic hide-and-seek that he did not want to finish until the very last, nearly tragic phase of his authorship? How much inspiration did Kierkegaard receive from theatrical performances, from playwrights and even from actors and actresses of 19th-century Copenhagen, which seemed to be sometimes stronger than the influence exercised on him by his professors, masters and theologians of Denmark’s “Golden Age”? Can the difference between direct and indirect communication that basically characterized Kierkegaard’s oeuvre be described in theatrical terms or even to approach it as an ongoing dramatic dialogue? Should we rather call it a “polylogue” as different actors are present throughout the texts that were often polemic with each other, simultaneously reflecting certain issues from different angles and finally Kierkegaard denying that any of those were written by him? Could his own name be a pseudonym, as his brother suggested when giving the eulogy on the prodigal son, who learned to doubt from Socrates and from Descartes, yet could not give up his intention to question even the final axioms of human existence? The author tries to find answers to these questions by reconstructing the very special Kierkegaardian method, so familiar from the stage, in the spiritual, cultural and theatrical context of Kierkegaard’s Denmark.

Dziedzictwo Juliana Ochorowicza (1850-1917) na Śląsku Cieszyńskim

Author(s): Renata Czyż / Language(s): Polish Issue: 1/2023

The little known legacy of Julian Ochorowicz in Cieszyn Silesia is discussed in this article. This is the region where the controversial philosopher and psychologist spent several years. The scientist conducted his research on mediumists in Wisła, where he engaged in social and scientific activities and gathered a large collection of books. The author discusses the fate of his material legacy and the endeavours of the heirs of his scientific theories. Julian Ochorowicz’s scientific achievements and thought were propagated by the people he had met personally, such as Jan Pilch and Jan Wantuła or by those associated with the esoteric centre that developed in Wisla in the interwar years (Andrzej Podżorski, Józef Chobot, Jan Hadyna). As it turns out, Julian Ochorowicz had a significant influence on teachers of folk schools who were also publishers of magazines and esoteric books in the multi-denominational Cieszyn Silesia.

CLASSIFYING JOHN STUART MILL’S RELIGIOUS BELIEFS –WAS MILL A RELIGIOUS SCEPTIC?

Author(s): Adrijano Brišček / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2024

This paper seeks to provide context in the effort to accurately classify the religious views of John Stuart Mill. The philosopher, not commonly known for his thoughts on religion, has nevertheless contributed to this topic with his three posthumously published essays, titled Three Essays on Religion, which have sparked some controversy and prompted various interpretations since they were first published in 1874. Mill’s many interpreters have used differing terms in order to describe him in respect to his religious thinking. He has been described as a militant apostle, as an atheist, a theistic humanist, an agnostic, while Mill himself, in his writing, has provided an alternative, by speaking about religious scepticism as the most pertinent attitude for a rational thinker. Each of these terms is discussed separately in this paper, as the merits and suitability of using any of these terms is considered, with reference to the wider context of interpretative texts, Mill’s own writings, and correspondences.