ФИЛОСОФИЯ ВАСИЛИЯ СЕЗЕМАНА: НЕОКАНТИАНСТВО, ИНТУИТИВИЗМ И ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ

Author(s): Dalius Jonkus / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2017

Vasily Sesemann’s philosophy is still insufficiently investigated, especially its relationship withphenomenology. Modern researchers often classify Sesemann’s philosophy as neo-Kantianism,although they also admit its relationship with phenomenology. Sesemann often defined his positionas critical realism. He emphasised the difference between his philosophy, the logical idealism ofneo-Kantianism and the transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology. It should also beemphasised that an understanding of critical realism in Sesemann’s philosophy is intertwinedwith the concept of intuition in Russian intuitivism and phenomenological philosophy. Sesemanncriticizes neo-Kantian idealism, because this philosophical construction is based on scientificknowledge and rejects the immediate givenness of reality. The article discusses Sesemann’sphilosophy in the context of neo-Kantianism, intuitivism and phenomenology. The purpose of thisarticle is to show that Sesemann criticises neo-Kantian epistemology resorting to a phenomenologicalidea of direct knowledge. Sesemann understands intuition as a direct access to the things themselves,as a practical understanding of the world, which is the basis of logical and scientific knowledge.Sesemann transforms the concept of intuition from the theoretical into practical and establishesa relationship between the act of cognition and intuition of values. Although Sesemann’s evaluationof phenomenology remains ambivalent: firstly, he understands Husserl’s phenomenology as anintuition, i.e. as a direct approach to the things themselves, and, secondly, phenomenology for himis a return to the idealistic tradition with which she fought.

АНОНС МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ «ПРОБЛЕМАТИКА ПРИРОДЫ У ОЙГЕНА ФИНКА» 7–9 октября, Прага, Чешская Республика

Author(s): The Editorial Board HORIZON / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2015

An interpretation of Evil’s perception in the Freedom essay of Friedrich Schelling

Author(s): Georgios KARAKASIS / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2017

The aim of this paper is to bring into light the significance of Schelling’s Freedom Essay for our understanding of how evil is to be perceived and which its nature is. More specifically, in the first part we will start by presenting the distinction made by the German philosopher between the ground and the existence of God so as to show the way human being rises as pure potentiality from the ground of God. In the second part we will examine how what was a pure potentiality and blind will, namely the human being in the ground, enlightened by the rays of the understanding, of the Word as universal will, gets to know itself and become aware of its own willing as such. Once what was a blind will in the ground gets touched by the light of understanding, it is shone forth by the latter’s spirit. Hence, we witness the becoming of the human being from a mere selfhood to a personality; a radical change accompanied by the self-aware human being’s will to will either his subordination to what has made his self-awareness feasible or his decision to make himself the centre of all existence. Thus, the - firstly ground - grounded blind will becomes a powerful will able to freely will something, even though this something is evil. In the last part we will examine the challenges the evil sets in modern society and we will highlight the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach towards our understanding of what evil and its relation with modern society’s human being is.

NEW WAYS TO TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: WHY EPISTEMOLOGY MUST BE A DESCRIPTIVE AND EIDETIC STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Author(s): Philipp Berghofer / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2018

Husserl has spilled much ink motivating the transcendental reduction that is supposed to pave the way for the ultimate, subjective science, i.e., transcendental phenomenology. However, Husserl’s original ways to the transcendental reduction are problematic. One such issue concerns the (in)fallibility of apodictic evidence. If apodictic evidence must be infallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology seems to be unattainable. However, if apodictic evidence is fallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology is not as well-motivated as seemingly implied by Husserl’s Cartesian way. In the present paper, I put forward new ways to transcendental phenomenology that are based on arguments in current analytic epistemology. I show that the new evil demon problem, Laurence BonJour’s example of clairvoyance, and the phenomenon of blindsight can not only be used to make a case against reliabilism, but also to motivate the core ideas of transcendental phenomenology. The underlying conviction of this paper is that any argument or line of reasoning that, for epistemological reasons, motivates the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic fashion can be considered a way to transcendental phenomenology. The thesis of this paper is that one such way to transcendental phenomenology can be found by engaging in current epistemological debates. I exemplify this new way to the reduction by discussing concrete problems, putting particular emphasis on the new evil demon problem as it allows us to motivate a phenomenological version of epistemic internalism, according to which two experiences that are phenomenologically identical are also justificationally identical, which means that they justify the same beliefs to the same degree.

BEYOND THE GENESIS, TOWARD THE ABSOLUTE. EUGEN FINK’S ARCHITECTONIC FOUNDATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY BETWEEN A META-CRITIC OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE AND HIS OWN PROJECT OF A DIALECTICAL MEONTIC

Author(s): Giovanni Jan Giubilato / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2018

While Eugen Fink was working on the revision of Husserl’s five Cartesian Meditations and preparing them for publication as a magnum opus for the German public, which – as Husserl itself claimed – required a truly phenomenological counterweight to Heidegger’s Being and Time, he not only sought a presentation of the vivid and most actual insights that guided the phenomenological philosophy but also stressed the urgent need to integrate their achievements in order to overcome their philosophical naiveté. This was due to the initial (and inevitable) exclusion of the deepest issues concerning phenomenology as a whole transcendental system, and particularly those regarding the total reach of evidence toward the transcendental field of experience. This sort of incompleteness had to be overcome by a solid “critic of the transcendental reason”. But, whereas for Husserl the task of self-criticism was directed at an examination of the evidences acquired in the transcendental attitude, for Fink it turned out to be a totally different challenge that ended up in an innovative vertical displacement of the horizontal structure of Husserl’s phenomenology. From the very beginning, Fink truly worked on a large-scale system of phenomenological philosophy and on an architectonic conception of the different stages of the pure phenomenology, in which the regressive phenomenology (transcendental aesthetic and analytic) was followed by a new progressive phenomenology (transcendental dialectic) endowed with a “constructive” method. The following article explores the emergence and relates the main topics of such constructive integration of phenomenology, whose conceptuality was only briefly foreshadowed in the famous VI Cartesian Meditation and, nonetheless, systematically developed in the large amount of Fink’s private notes that constitute his own meontic philosophy.

BÉATRICE LONGUENESSE “I, ME, MINE. BACK TO KANT, AND BACK AGAIN” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-966576-1

Author(s): Claudia Serban / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2018

The review provides an outline of Béatrice Longuenesse’s latest book: I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again (Oxford University Press, 2017), which attempts to offer “a more systematic exploration of Kant’s account of self-consciousness”, with a particular focus on “its relation to contemporary analyses of self-consciousness” (Longuenesse). Longuenesse’s recent analyses have indeed the major interest of orchestrating a fecund dialogue between Kant’s comprehension of the I and several key interlocutors, from Wittgenstein to Freud and including Sartre, Anscombe, Evans and others. Thus, the first section of the book originates in twentieth-century debates and challenges the claim that bodily self-consciousness is the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness. The second section of I, Me, Mine provides a thorough discussion of Kant’s view on the “I think”, on self-consciousness and personhood, and continues to plead for a genuine form of self-consciousness independent from the consciousness of one’s body. Yet, a more general objective of the book progressively emerges: that of a “naturalization of the notion of person”, by showing that “Kant’s criticism of the paralogism of personhood opens the way to substituting for the rationalist concept a rich and complex concept of a person as a spatiotemporal, living entity endowed with unity of apperception and with the capacity for autonomous self-determination” (Longuenesse). This naturalization of the Kantian concept of subjectivity is set in motion, within the last section of the book, with the unexpected assistance of Freud’s account on the ego and the super-ego.

Sapere aude! Povodom jednog »opreznog, agnostičkog« stava

Author(s): Dušan Travar / Language(s): Bosnian Issue: 01+02/1988

In der vorliegenden Arbeit betrachtet man den agnostischen Standpunkt, den der Verfasser in bezug auf die methodologisch-philosophische Thematisierung der Religion aus der perspektive der Philosophie der Religion, der Soziologie der Religion und der Theologie, die, Seiner Meinung nach, alle drei Religionstheorien sind, vertritt. Es wird festgestellt, daß das vom Gesichtspunkt der drei angeführten Religionstheorien ausgehende Heranrücken an die drei Religionstheorien selbst noch so manches zu wünschen übrig läßt, um einen meta-theoretischen Blick auf und über die beschriebenen Betrachtungsmethoden der Disziplin »Religion« und des Religionsphänomens erhalten zu können. Trotzdzm läßt der Autor den Agnostizismus aus extradoktrinären und methodologischen Gründen gelten wegen und hinsichtlich der Coexistenz und der Toleranz der verschiedenen Existenzarten des menschlichen Seins.

Refleksivnost i izvanjskost u Hegelovoj logici

Author(s): Pierre Livet / Language(s): Bosnian Issue: 03+04/1984

The hegelian Logic is like phenomenology of self-reference (i. e. of the several possible results and presentations of the self-application of a thought process). Hegel inaugurates that new kind of problem, but he prefers returning to the principle of unity inhereted from the concept of subjectivity. Therefore, he discusses the problem of plurality in connection with the problem of exteriority. The hegelian turning over of exteriority into exteriorisation betrays the hegelian ambiguity between the new problematic of conceptual reflexivities and the kantian problematic of the subjectivity.

Kantova kritika praktického rozumu a praktického usudzovania

Author(s): VÁCLAV ČERNÍK / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 3/1998

The paper is a critical analysis of Kant´s concept of practical reasoning. It is based upon an analysis of Kant´s understanding of a man as a sensual-oversensual human being. The author focuses in an analysis of lawmaking of a practical reason. He concerns in Kant´s differentiation of cathegorical and hypothetivcal imperatives, or pure (autonomic) and ordinary will, respectively. Based on this analysis he consequently reconstructs Kantś understanding of a practical reasoning. He characterizes its basic types based on a technical imperative and pragmatic advice, on cathegorical and hypothetical imperative

Ljudevit Fran Ježić: Razvoj Fichteova jenskoga sustava transcendentalne filozofije u kontekstu pokantovskih rasprava

Author(s): Vanja Borš / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 02/150/2018

Review of: Ljudevit Fran Ježić, Razvoj Fichteova jenskoga sustava transcendentalne filozofije u kontekstu pokantovskih rasprava, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, Zagreb 2016.

Bitak – prostor – duša. Hegelova tematizacija prostora kao apstraktne općenitosti

Author(s): Mina Đikanović / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 01/149/2018

Hellenic philosophers were not familiar with the phenomenon of space as an abstraction, but only of place as a completely occupied space. Newton’s thematization and Modern philosophy had for the very first time allowed the abstract determination of space and time. In Kant’s philosophy, self-evident objectivity of Newtonian space is transformed into a priori subjectivity of space as pure form of intuition. For Hegel, space is a pure abstraction, the very first determination of nature. The author examines Hegel’s understanding of space in analogy to being as the first moment of science of logic and soul as the first moment of philosophy of spirit. Being, space and soul designate first abstractions which – by the paradigm of pure necessity – contain the whole categoriality of freedom. Philosophy of nature begins with concept of space and ends in process of the genus, discovering the freedom as its very substrate. That allows for pure abstractness of space as res extensa to develop into concreteness of res cogitans.

War and Peace in Kant’s and Hegel’s Consideration

Author(s): Vadym Tytarenko / Language(s): English Issue: 22/2019

This paper touches upon the selected issues of Kant’s and Hegel’s political philosophy, namely “war”, “revolution” and “peace”. The reason why the certain authors were chosen is that Kant and Hegel appear to be the most significant and influential within and beyond German Classical Idealistic paradigm. The author conducts the rational reconstruction of the Kant’s and Hegel’s consideration of mentioned concepts in the field of History of Philosophy. Reconsideration of mentioned political reflections, in the author’s honest opinion, might productively contribute to the composition of the anti-crisis strategy of the development of contemporary Ukrainian society. The author came to the conclusion, that Kant and Hegel have a common negative attitude to the phenomenon of revolution because in their common opinion it inevitably leads to the anarchy, violence and collapse of any constitutional order. In contrast, their attitude to the phenomenon of war has nothing in common. Kant states that nothing can be more harmful to the development of mankind then war. Hegel claims a war to be a highly significant condition of the national unity, spirit and freedom. When it comes to the concept of peace, Kant holds an optimistic and romantic position and proclaims the possibility of an idea of perpetual peace. Hegel looks at the idea of perpetual peace from the sceptical perspective, considering it to be too abstract and impossible in real life.

Forma věty a jednota pojmu. K systematickému kontextu teorie predikace a spekulativní věty v předmluvě k Fenomenologii ducha

Author(s): Jindřich Karásek / Language(s): Czech Issue: 55/2018

One of the most difficult parts of Hegel’s logic is his doctrine of the speculative sentence. Its roots can be found already in the preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, namely in the passage considered as the most challenging in the entire preface. The aim of the article is to analyse Hegel’s assertions in the pertinent systematic context. We affirm that this systematic context is Hegel’s confrontation with Kant’s transcendental logic. Hegel’s aim is, firstly, to confirm the Kantian critic of the rationalist metaphysics and, subsequently, to surmount it in order to put forward a new form of metaphysics. This metaphysics would be determined by the concept of mind as the identity of substance and subject and can be formulated only by means of the speculative sentence.

Fichte

Author(s): Ferenc L. Lendvai / Language(s): Hungarian Issue: 08/2019

For Fichte, philosophy must be scientific and its organisation must resemble science too: it must be the Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre). Hence, first and foremost, it should be a system, and as a scientific system it should develop from one or a few doctrines (from presumed axioms that cannot be proven). The first, starting theorem of the Theory of Science sounds like this: “The I begins by an absolute positing of its own existence.” The I for Fichte, just as for Kant, is in a dual relationship with reality: not only in a theoretical (cognitive) but also in a practical (active) relationship. In its activity, through perception, representation and understanding (Verstand) it reaches reason (Vernunft), that is, real self-consciousness which captures the self according to its true essence. Its true essence is freedom, and the moral instinct requires the realisation of freedom. History, in Fichte’s conception, is the progress of human communities, of humanity towards freedom; however, this process has a tortuous and contradictory nature, it appears as a process that goes through pitfalls and even alienation from its original goal.

Kant-Hegel: “Potreba i zadatak filozofije”

Author(s): Milan Kangrga / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 9/2008

In a specific way of lecturing, using discourse that bears all the characteristics of erudition, philosophical profundity and the charm of a great university, intellectual and humanistic career, the author once again examines the essence of the speculative abstract position of the philosophy of German idealism from the ground up. Light is shed on the essence of that position in this text from the problematization of Kant’s philosophy and the construction the speculative standpoint in Hegel’s early text On Differences. This problematization allows the author to, once again sharpen his own understanding, to radical abstract consequences, of the possibilities of the confrontation of philosophy and speculation.

Psihoanaliza: volja za promjenom

Author(s): Štefanija Kožić / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 01/153/2019

The paper examines psychoanalysis in the context of German idealism and science, the position of free will and determinism. It deals with further consequences of psychoanalysis concerning determinism as its component, and its position regarding philosophy. The ways and possibilities of the change of subject are discussed, i.e. how the subject, according to psychoanalysis, does not want to change but maintains the state of previous pleasure. The goal of therapy is to direct a subject to their unconscious, which leads to self-reflection. This knowledge, which subject receives by reflection, is always in the phase of reconstruction and can never come to an end and lead to absolute knowledge. Knowledge and the whole personality are in a constant change within the subject, but also dialectically related to the outside world. From the position of classical German idealism, the moment of will is considered as a possible starting point of freedom in the change of subject, thus far not taken into account by the psychoanalysis.

ГЕГЕЛЬ И ПРОБЛЕМА РЕАЛЬНОЙ ДИАЛЕКТИКИ

Author(s): Nicolai Hartmann / Language(s): Russian Issue: 2/2019

The article by German philosopher of first half of XX century N. Hartmann gives an idea about his position in the contra-opposition of leading realistic philosophic projects of both XIX and XX centuries. Brought up in neokantinean tradition of Marburg’s school N. Hartmann yet in his early works (Über das Seinsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie vor Plato and Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgründe der Mathematik) showed his interest by ontology problematic and chose the hard way of polemic and even contra-opposition towards the school which had brought him up. The reasons for such his position were explained in his works published in 1920-1930. The project of “new ontology” polemically targeted not only gnoseologism of neokantian tradition, but also viewed development of phenomenological philosophy in a different way. As one of early strong points of this conception Hartmann chose contra-opposition of logical and ontological reality. Later to this he jointed his interest for cathegorial analysis and to apriorism. That is why categories of ontology turned out to be most primordial points of proclaimed theory. His article “Gegel and the Problem of Real Dialectic” published for the first time in 1935 in Blatter für Deutsche Philosophie allowed N. Hatmann settled his reasons for critic of Hegel’s philosophy, first of all, of Hegel’s dialectic. His called Hegel’s philosophy like phenomenology and this his point of view was naturally argued by Hegel’s interest towards “Phenomenology of Spirit,” but dialectical component of Hegel’s philosophy, as well as interest for categorial analysis allowed Hartmann advance hypothesis about a special significance of “Science of Logic” for giving ground for a realistic ontology. Significantly for that work, as one of opponents of his philosophic program Hartmann chose marxist explanation of Hegel’s philosophy. The latter was also considered by Hartmann as realistic philosophy. This polemics with marxism let go beyond the philosophy of nature into the area of social and follow up a succession of prerequisites advanced by Hartmann in conformity with of different parts of being.

Miejsce krytycznej filozofii Immanuela Kanta i neokantyzmu Hermanna Cohena w refleksji Stanisława Leopolda Brzozowskiego

Author(s): Anna Musioł / Language(s): Polish Issue: 40/2018

In the article I want to describe the place of Immanuel Kant and Hermann Cohen’s Neo-Kantianism in thought of Stanisław L. Brzozowski philosophy. So the critical image of philosophy is showing the project of Kant, so concept of Cohen is — how Brzozowski thinks — with expression of truly independent reflection. In the system of Cohen, author Legenda Młodej Polski…, a tendency to intellectual initiative free from positivist and modernist restrictions notices. How the history of philosophy is showing, both favoured German classics of transcendental method, freedoms treat the criticism as contemporary concept and innovative original thought. Meanwhile for Brzozowski, criticism is an opportunity for including the philosophy of Kant into the form of the summons to the creative bravery, and it all at the same time is also Marburg doctrine, in accordance which is an existence missing apart from becoming eternal and ceaseless (eternal fieri).

Kant on Just War and International Order

Author(s): Nenad Miličić / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2021

Kant’s legal and political philosophy is essential for understanding and advancing international order. The article aims to posit arguments that confront the claims that Kant was just war theorist. Since that is the most opposed part of Kant’s political philosophy, mostly due to the misleading interpretation of his argumentation, the author presents Kant’s standpoint on the matters of just war and international order and discusses potential ambiguities between Kant’s and his critics’ theories. Furthermore, the consequences of opponents’ arguments considering states of states, world republic and cosmopolitan democracy in contemporary political philosophy are debated. Finally, the possibility of consent between the three model solutions which are arising from the contemporary international order theory and Kant’s position are compared and analysed.

Fichte und Hegel. Der Standpunkt zweier Philosophen zu Napoleon I. Bonaparte

Author(s): Julien Sita / Language(s): German Issue: 02/2020

Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are considered to be the main representatives of German idealism. This philosophical period coincides with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era. Hence, it might be interesting to learn why and how a personage in history could be hated or loved by their contemporaries at the time. During the subjugation of the German states by Emperor Napoleon, the above-mentioned philosophers took various positions on the French general and statesman. Therefore, the central question of this treatise will be: "What position did the philosophers Fichte and Hegel take towards Napoleon and for what reasons?" First, the historical context around Napoleon is briefly explained in more detail. Subsequently, the relationships between the idealistic philosophers and Napoleon will be presented and the reasons for their positioning will be explained.