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The relations of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union had in the field of culture, as well as in other fields, their most intensive phase in the first post-war years. Cultural contacts were realized through import of products of Soviet culture, and even on a larger scale through taking over and application of the Soviet model by Yugoslav Communists and artists close to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The practice of socialist realism in Yugoslavia was reflected in uncritical aping of artistic form of Soviet authors and in consistent adoption of tenets of official Stalin-type of art. Cultural cooperation was the corollary of the military and political support of the Soviet Party and the state for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the war and the first post-war years. Soviet cultural production was presented and promoted in Yugoslavia through art exhibitions, visits by artists, film production, publishing of translated literature and popularizing of Soviet music. In those years every cultural event of greater importance took the form of inter-state and interparty cooperation. Due to unequal cultural power, cultural cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR in the first post-war years marked in fact the pinnacle of the influence which was reaching Yugoslavia from USSR. Although a modicum of cooperation existed during the inter-war period, just as that cooperation existed during the second half of 20th century, it was never so intensive and multifaceted, nor was it ever so strongly and assiduously supported by the two states as was the case during the first five years after WWII.
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The renewed emergence in public of the question of respecting the tradition of the Anti-Fascist struggle and recognition of the allied (Soviet) contribution to the liberation of Belgrade in 1944 spurred the interest in reconsidering the practice of naming and renaming of streets which testify about that part of our common history. Although marking of monuments and maintenance of wartime graveyards, and even naming of streets after prominent personages are only part of the promotion of history of remembrance – since in our days it can be much more and stronger reflected in the media presence or in the form of schoolbook interpretations and attractive films or TV serials – we addressed this matter in capacity of a historian and an eyewitness. From a comparative survey of how marking of something which should represent lasting values was approached in various periods of history of Yugoslavia and now of Serbia, we glean that in our territory there was more ideology and „political correctness” than desire to measure with equal measure that which should always be esteemed – shedding of blood for the liberty of the country and the people, as well as the extended friendly hand in the hour of the direst necessity. Following the need of the moment, the town authorities in the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia named a street after the King’s general Petar Živković, in the very year the King imposed his dictatorship. It was renamed by his former oponent Milan Nedić in 1943. Overshadowed by Živković remained many fallen heroes or those whom he condamned or with whom he did away at the trial of Thessaloniki. Thus, the city did injustice to its defender colonel Tufegdžić and took away his name from a street in 1940. During the war, under occupation, streets were deprived of the names of former Serbian wartime and political allies. After the war ideological purges of „incorrect” or „uninteresting” local and allied names followed. In only few cases names deleted by the occupying and collaborationist administration were given back. Streetnames after Russian or Soviet wartime allies were no exception, only perhaps a more dramatic illustration of the change of „remembrance” in keeping with the changed political circumstances. After 1948 the names of streets and boulevards given after Russian great men, the Red Army and toponyms made famous during WWII started to disappear. After less than ten years, they started to return, as a sign of goodwill within the framework of improvement of bilateral relations. After the tragic incident in which a Soviet marshal and several generals, liberators of Belgrade were killed at Avala, the city renamed streets which had once born their names, after them again, and even added some new ones. During the transition of 1990, there was rush to repair all former „iniquities”. However, not even the newly proclaimed criteria were observed. Generals and marshals and the Red Army were once again the target of the reform. In accordance with our own insight and engagement we showed the history behind the scene, how the personality of marshal Biryuzov and the street bearing his name was saved from oblivion in 2004.
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Српски народ се определио за Европу 1804. године када је започео борбу за ослобођење од турске власти и повратак у цивилизацијски круг којем припада а од којег је неколико векова раније насилно одвојен. Историја Србије у 19. веку у многим сегментима више је саставни део историје Европе него што није. Шта је то што је у том веку Србију спајало са Европом? То, свакако, нису апстрактна залагања за европску будућност. Уз помоћ и у сарадњи са појединим европским државама Србија је повела и довршила борбу за национално ослобођење. Од 1804. развијала је дипломатију, изграђивала институције, ударала темеље модерне државности, изборила државну независност и добила међународно признање. Из једног „празног простора“ или „безвременог света“, како историчари називају период српске историје под турском влашћу због тога што се о њему недовољно зна, Србија је постала део европског политичког, културног, економског и цивилизацијског простора. Политичке везе са европским дворовима и успешна дипломатија донеле су Србији 19. века историјски резултат – признање државне независности. [...]
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After the February (March) events of 1917 in Russia; Serbian government was left without Russian support in negotiations with the Entente, regarding the future of Southeastern Europe. The provisional government neither wanted nor was able to have its own opinion on the future of the Balkans. The relations between the two countries have become even more tense after the outbreak of the Bolshevik (October) Revolution. The Bolshevik regime was jeopardizing diplomatic position of Serbia by declassifying and publishing top-secret diplomatic documents which included arrangements for future annexations and negotiations on a separate peace. After the Serbian diplomatic missions and military personnel were withdrawn to the Russian territory controlled by the Entente, some of the Serbian officers and soldiers became involved in the Civil War on both sides, although the offi cial Serbian att itude was, in spite of negative stance towards the Bolsheviks, “not to permit the use of Serbian army against the Russians.” During the interwar period there were two active social phenomena connected with former Russia - the political influence of the Comintern and the Russian emigration. Conservative circles gathered around Serbian King Aleksandar and Patriarch Varnava, who represented the most important patrons of Russian emigration in interwar Yugoslavia, were directly opposed to any relationship with the Bolsheviks. Yet in 1930s a new generation of Serbian politicians grew up which was culturally oriented towards France while politically it was inclined towards the United Kingdom; this generation of Yugoslav politicians was active in Soviet era and they had no recollections of imperial Russian era. On the other hand, the right-wing, anticommunist majority of Russian emigration, traditionally close to the Russian-German cultural ties, even though unable to understand the imperial nature of Nazism, was sympathetic to the Nazi Germany. In fact, it was a tragic discord between the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia and a signifi cant part of the Serbian people. The interwar activities of Comintern, KPJ and VKP (b) had an obvious anti-government impact, which accelerated the deterioration of Serbian-Russian relations. The infl uence of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet experience was quite obvious in the future actions of Yugoslav Bolsheviks. The Yugoslav political emigration in interwar Soviet Union was also aff ected by strong impressions of Stalinist repression. On the other hand, many Russian emigrants and exponents of Soviet policy took part in the Second World War in Yugoslavia, which strengthened the spirit of civil war and resistance. As the war ended, Russian society overcame the most of mental divisions caused by the civil war, while the situation in Yugoslavia and Serbia was quite the opposite. The liberation of eastern Yugoslav territories from the German armed forces, achieved by both partisan (cca. 40 thousand members of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia) and Soviet (300 thousand troops and Red Army) troops was followed by installation of a brutal one-party dictatorship of Soviet model. After the world wars era the ideological closeness between the most of Serbian and Russian people became more appreciable as the new period of ideological emanations from Russia was devoid of former ideological concepts. In this dramatic period, Serbs and Russians have established closer relations than ever before.
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У чланку се анализирају шири и ужи историјски токови и догађања који су били основа за мапирање пејзажа сећања и изградњу историјске културе Топличког краја и који су учествовали у обликовању јединствене традиције ослободилачких ратова. Представљени су споменици јунацима из ослободилачких ратова 1912–1918, борцима из Народноослободилачког рата и револуције 1941–1945. и споменик Зорану Ђинђићу, као одређени изрази идејних и политичких система, онако како данас постоје и шта данас представљају. Дат је и аналитички приказ унутрашњег садржаја и спољашњег положаја изложбе о Народноослободилачком рату 1941–1945, која се налази у Народном музеју Топлице у Прокупљу.
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Die Instrumentalisierung des Titoismus ist die Asymmetrie der verschiedenen Perspektiven und hegemonialen Erinnerungsrahmen Thema. In gewisser Weise ist Tito die Signatur des postjugoslawischen Raums geblieben. Im schon zu Lebzeiten kontroversen Machthaber sieht Author eine „vielschichtige Figur" die aus drei unterschiedlichen Perspektiven betrachtet werden kann: Aus der heute vorherrschenden „Froschperspektive" erscheint Tito als der große, unantastbare, totalitäre Herrscher. Dazu gehören die Nationalisten, die davon überzeugt sind, der Titoismus sei von außen in die Nationalgemeinschaft hineingetragen worden. Die „Vogelperspektive" zeigt hingegen, dass Jugoslawien unter dem autoritären Herrscher Tito einen außerordentlichen Modernisierungs- und Mobilitätsschub erlebte. Die „Flugzeugperspektive" legt eine SichtaufTito als den„letzte Habsburger des Balkans" nahe - wobei Habsburg hier als „Metapher für den Herrscher in einem multinationalen Staat" gilt. Hier werden die Grundmerkmale der postkommunistischen Erinnerungskulturen der postjugoslawischen Staaten rekapituliert Einen differenzierten Blick auf den Titoismus, der dem Balkan fast fünfzig Jahre des Friedens ermöglichte, so lautet das Zwischenfazit, gibt es bisher nicht. Stattdessen dominiert eine einseitig dämonisierende Form der Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Das führte zu einer sehr selektiven Geschichtsauffassung.
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Josip Broz Tito founded and ruled socialist-era Yugoslavia for 35 years. His personal cult was a part of a more complex system of myths, symbols and rituals for legitimating the nation and the regime that this article calls civil religion of titoism. This civil religion consisted of a number of elements such the Tito personal cult, the „Peoples' Heroes" cult, the Myth of the Partisans Antifascist War, etc. The article discovers and analyzes comparatively the Tito personal cult against the peoples' Heroes cult i.e. the cult of the fighters in World War II that liberated and founded the nation but most of them sacrificed their lives in that struggle.. It discovers a striking contradiction between the traditional Balkan, i.e. Eastern pattern of ascetic-puritan and self-sacrificing hero-martyr of the Peoples' hero versus Tito's cult based on his personal charisma and nonascetic or „western" lifestyle. However, Tito’s cult acquires the missing martyr dimension at the end of his life during his illness and death.
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The Museum of May 25 was erected at Dedinje in 1962 and it was the first public building in this, until then exclusive Belgrade neighborhood. As the center of the ritualization of the Day of Youth and spacing of the ideology of the Yugoslav socialism, the museum was just a part of an ambitiously designed whole. In ideological and performing cooperation with the Stadium of the Yugoslav People’s Army nearby, surrounding parks and free space, as well as with the residential complex where Josip Broz Tito lived, the Museum of May 25 was an extremely functional narrative of the new ideological matrix in the old area of Dedinje and Topčider marked by the removed seat of the ruler. However, despite the multiple connections to the traditional pattern of representing political power - concerning the topos, architecture and iconography – the Museum of May 25 re-marked the Dedinje and Topčider area and partly democratized them for the first time in history. After Tito’s death the process of opening and popularization of this area started losing its importance. However, during the last two decades, the new political and ideological context brought about not only the change of the name, the purpose and the importance of the museum compound, but also triggered off a reversible process of repeated closing and fencing-off of Dedinje. The area preserved and fortified the meaning of a removed ruler’s center and of representation of power, but notits populist and democratic character.
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Article addresses controversies of Tito’s musical persona in public discourse by examining two dominant narratives lines: the representations in the socalled Yugoslav folklore - the most important official genre for creating his mythical image and the representations of Tito as multisided musical persona particularly in the realm of popular music. Based on the analysis of songbooks from the period of World War II and those published after it, the paper deals with the ways in which the Tito’s public persona is created in accordance with the dominant narratives about the new socialist popular culture. Through analysis of their textual and musical content, it examines the ambivalent narratives in the creation of his public image: while the „institutionalized folklore" was seen as a appropriate genre for his representation in the public sphere, its commercial version, newly-composed folk music is not Tito's image of the classless, timeless and mythical figure is also used as a link between the mediating figure which provides the desired harmony between „new" and „old", tradition and modernization, but still strongly associated with the „elite" genres and established artists.
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Avant-gard on exhibitions, on theatrical stages, on cinema screens and in concert halls was one of the specific features of the art scene in socialist Yugoslavia. The cream of the world avant-gard started arriving in Yugoslavia already in the 1950s and Yugoslav artists started creating works in the spirit of modernism and avant-garde. The presence of avant-garde sent into the world an image of an extremely modern, liberal and free country in which the avantgarde became the mainstream, in a way. However, the presence of the avantgarde in Yugoslavia doesn't present the true picture of artistic life. Exactly the time when avant-garde was on the ascent in Yugoslavia, was the time of court bans and pressure on artists. Films were banned, criticized or disappeared from cinema repertoirs (The Town, The Return, The Trap, A Man from the Oak Forest, Morning...), and consorship hit theater too, where only in 1968/69 plays Hats Down, As Pumpkins Bloomed and The Second Door to the Left were taken off the repertoir. Similar pressure was visible in the case of the journals Književne novine or Student who suffered governemnt blows in the late 1960s. Openness for fredom of the form, but not openness for critical examination of reality were characteristics of artistic life in SFRY.
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The paper tries to depict Tito as a lover, a user, an object and a manipulator of popular culture. Based primarily on surviving testimonies of contemporary personages from the world of show-business, it is both a contribution to the study of Tito's personality and to the study of the Yugoslav socialist society. The conclusion is that Tito, as a conoseur, enjoyed the products of popular culture - particularly music and films - but that he also used them to enhance his own popularity. After the collapse of socialism, his person also began to be turned into an icon of popular culture.
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This text should provide a sort of sketch for a film portrait of Josip Broz Tito. Partisan war epics were taken as examples for Tito’s cinematic image. Among the selected films, attention is particularly focused on those about seven military operations of German army and its allies against Yugoslav partisans during the World War Two. Those battles became very significant (in real and symbolic sense) for ideological discourse of Yugoslav communists, while the films about them were an important segment of the socialistic Yugoslav cinematography and popular culture in general. The modes of film construction of Tito's image will be observed through these films. Also, partially will be considered the role of the J. B. Tito in production of these films. In a broader sense, this kind of analysis should provide insights in mechanisms of visual ideologization and ideologization the popular culture in socialism, in which the partisan film was a kind of brand, and Tito's charisma formula that could not fail.
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The article deals with a relatively marginal topic which is part of a much larger framework that shapes the Tito-Stalin conflict after the Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia - namely the cartoon propaganda which took place in Bulgaria. The accent is put on the cartoons dedicated to the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in particular and Yugoslavia in general. This problem is discussed on the background of the dynamical and controversial Bulgarian-Yugoslav and Bulgarian-Serbian relations. The author tries to examine whether Bulgarian cartoons after 1948 used the older Bulgarian stereotypes regarding Serbs and Yugoslavs and whether there were new messages which under the influence of communist ideology departed from traditional images attached to the Bulgaria’s western neighbors.
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Tito's cult was created during the partisan days and broken in 1989. It was „alive and kicking" during all the days of the socialist Yugoslavia and every attack on the image of Tito was oppressed by the police.
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The Yugoslav political system was an attempt to create a new reality in virtue of the principles of „communist philosophy of history" (scientific socialism), shaping it and managing it The one-party power of CPY/UCY was the result, but also Tito’s personal power. His cult in Serbia was part of the political identity and no-one questioned itutil mid 1980s when political processes that would lead to the break-up of Yugoslavia started. A historical phenomenon occurred in Serbia at that time where the ruling political oligarchy still respected the „person and the work" of Josip Broz, but transformed it in keeping with its political tenets, using only those elements of the cult that were useful at a given moment. At the end of that process, Tito’s cult in Serbia was completely abandoned but Serbia still remained a typical ideocratic state, because the ideology of class was substituted for the ideology of nation.
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The paper discusses the ideological obstacles to the research of Tito's era, characteristics of the cult in the self-managing socialism and its special features in the Army, as well as characteristics and manifestations in the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The author concludes that Tito's course towards liberalization of socialism in the form of self-management, as well as the results achieved in the modernization of the country, reduced the leeway for a broader use of the cult as an ideological instrument, especially in comparison with the countries of the former Eastern Block. Simultaneously with that, the historical science was rearranged and Tito became the creator of the theory and practice of socialism in Yugoslavia. With the YPA personnel loyalty was secured through selection (participation in WWW, social background, ideological background of parents), Party control and planned and systematic indoctrination. Having been coupled with the process of training, including the Army into peacekeeping operations and military-industrial activities and also having been to a larger degree under the influence of self-management due to the concept of General People's Defense, the cult in YPA hadn't the typical traits of a rigid personality cult. The break-up of Yugoslavia proved that Tito's cult wasn't of long duration. It was replaced by the cult of the nation and its new leaders.
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The article discusses the creation and shaping of the personality cult of Marshal Tito in the Yugoslav Army during the first post-war decade. The author points out to the characteristics and the genesis of the myth, making a parallel with Stalin’s cult. It is pointed out that the Tito cult was very similar to Stalin’s one in the 1945-1948 period, but that many special features of Tito’s cult appeared after their split in 1948, that were particularly promoted by the Army. Tito’s cult was shaped and fortified through his visits to Army units and vice versa, through slogans, oaths and other manifestations, among which the ceremony of carrying the relay baton was specially emphasized. All in all, the military environment was very important for the development of his cult in the society, but his appearances in public attierd in Army uniform was a kind of demonstration of mutual relation between Tito and the Army, particularly in critical moments when military component of Tito’s power was stressed and a signal sent to domestic and foreign policy and public.
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