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Result 315721-315740 of 319905
A breakthrough year in relations between Turkey and the European Union – an attempt to take stock
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A breakthrough year in relations between Turkey and the European Union – an attempt to take stock

A breakthrough year in relations between Turkey and the European Union – an attempt to take stock

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak,Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English

Keywords: Turkey; European Union; Eu; international relations; Turkey-EU relations

September 2016 marks the passing of one year has passed since the outbreak of the EU migration crisis which became the basis of unprecedented co-operation between Turkey and the EU. Paradoxically, although this co-operation in containing the crisis has proven surprisingly effective, the climate of Turkish-EU relations has significantly deteriorated. This situation comes in part as a result of internal tensions in Turkey (and within the EU). However, genuine changes in the power relations between Turkey and the EU have occurred and Turkey feels that issues it attaches importance to are not being appropriately addressed by the EU—the frustration this causes has been even more instrumental in the deterioration of relations. This shift in relations between Turkey and the EU also stems from Turkey’s aspirations to emancipate itself in its relations with the West; there has been an upward trend in this regard for years. The instruments the EU has so far been employing in order to put Turkey under pressure (above all the EU integration process) are losing their effectiveness, which is in stark contrast with Turkey’s emancipation and assertiveness. However, irrespective of the present and future inevitable tensions in Turkish-EU relations, Turkey’s aim is not to break off with the EU but to develop a new model of strategic relations which better serves its own interests. Despite the recent rapprochement with Russia, Ankara seems to be aware of a lack of alternatives to strategic co-operation with the EU and, more broadly, with the West.

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The Nordic countries on Nord Stream 2: between scepticism and neutrality
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The Nordic countries on Nord Stream 2: between scepticism and neutrality

The Nordic countries on Nord Stream 2: between scepticism and neutrality

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska,Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Sweden; Finland; Denmark; Nord Stream; energy

Sweden, Finland and Denmark have seen a revival of the debate on the Nord Stream 2 project in recent months. As the planned gas pipeline will run through these countries’ exclusive economic zones and/or territorial waters, the governments in Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen will have to take a decision on NS2 construction soon. They find themselves in a difficult situation. On one hand, the Russian-Ukrainian war and the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region have resulted in more distance towards Russian economic projects in these countries. All of them have also come under increasing pressure from the United States, the CEE countries, and domestic opposition parties, which have been demanding the project’s suspension. On the other hand, neither Stockholm, Helsinki nor Copenhagen wants to use their national laws or the Law of the Sea to block Nord Stream 2, which enjoys support from Germany.Sweden, Finland and Denmark are therefore unlikely to block or slow down the procedures of issuing national approvals for the pipeline’s construction. However, they expect the European Commission to assess the compliance of Nord Stream 2 with the EU’s Third Energy Package. In addition, Stockholm and Copenhagen in particular want the EU to take a common political stance on the project, based on the assessment of Nord Stream 2’s conformity with the objectives of EU energy and climate policy as well as the EU’s security interests.

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In the clutches of the Kremlin. Azerbaijan’s security policy

In the clutches of the Kremlin. Azerbaijan’s security policy

In the clutches of the Kremlin. Azerbaijan’s security policy

Author(s): Aleksandra Jarosiewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Kremlin; Azerbaijan; security policy

The changes which have been taking place over the past few years in Azerbaijan’s international environment and the growing concern about internal stability have led to President Ilham Aliyev’s regime to thoroughly revise the country’s security policy by establishing closer relations with Russia and opening up to co-operation with Iran. One consequence of this move was Azerbaijan’s victory in the so-called Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh in April this year – a symbolic success in military terms which nevertheless brought about a real political breakthrough. Baku has chosen the political rapprochement with Russia because it has no other alternative. Over the past three years, Azerbaijan has revised its risk assessment and has reached the conclusion that the West cannot guarantee its security, Turkey’s policy is unpredictable, and the strengthening position of its traditional enemy, Iran, generates threats to Azerbaijan. The rapprochement with Russia is a tactical solution intended at helping maintain internal stability and to weather the unfavourable geopolitical, economic and social conditions. The co-operation with the Kremlin has brought tangible benefits: a new dynamic in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (beneficial to Azerbaijan); and a strengthening of the regime’s stability, which is necessary during a continuing economic slump. In strategic terms, closer relations with Russia in fact mean a withdrawal from the previous vision of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy based on co-operation with the West and Turkey. The consequences of this turn towards Russia will include a further bolstering of the authoritarian regime, restricting Azerbaijan’s political subjectivity and making it part of the geopolitical bloc being built by Russia in the post-Soviet area, for example, as part of the Eurasian Economic Union. The situation in Azerbaijan will also depend on the emerging anti-Western Russian-Iranian-Turkish concert of powers which Baku may also join.

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The EU on granting China market economy status: a compromise or a dodge?
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The EU on granting China market economy status: a compromise or a dodge?

The EU on granting China market economy status: a compromise or a dodge?

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

Keywords: China; WTO; World Trade Organisation; MES

China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 as an economy which was undergoing transformation and did not yet have market economy status (MES). This enabled other WTO members, including the European Union, to be more flexible in imposing anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese exporters. China’s accession protocol provides for the elimination of one of the anti-dumping procedures after 15 years, i.e. in December 2016. The upcoming changes have fuelled a dispute in Europe regarding the interpretation of the conditions of China’s accession to the WTO and the future of trade relations between the EU and China.

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Green economy or coal ‘counter-revolution’? Challenges to China’s economic reform process
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Green economy or coal ‘counter-revolution’? Challenges to China’s economic reform process

Green economy or coal ‘counter-revolution’? Challenges to China’s economic reform process

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski / Language(s): English

Keywords: China; green energy; reform; economy

The so-called ‘energy revolution’ has been one of the priority reforms in the agenda of President Xi Jinping. It is one part of the deep restructuring of the Chinese economy, and represents a move away from the investment-based model. The slowdown of economic growth and the rising importance of the problem of environmental pollution have led to a redefinition of the role of coal in Chinese economic policy. The share of coal in energy consumption is expected to decrease gradually, and coal-fired power plants are expected to lose importance and give ground to renewable and nuclear energy. This trend is expected to be boosted by the restructuring and reduction of heavy industry which the government intends to carry out. The situation of the Chinese coal sector will also change as a result of the ongoing price reform, which aims to reduce the level of energy intensity and increase the efficiency of the sector’s operations by introducing deregulation in the field of electricity distribution and transmission.

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Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: adaptation instead of competition
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Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: adaptation instead of competition

Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: adaptation instead of competition

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski,Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; China; economy; international relations

The argument that a crisis in Russian-Chinese relations is unavoidable has been repeatedly referred to by analysts since the 1990s. The reason for this crisis would be geopolitical competition between the two powers in Central Asia. In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the concept of the New Silk Road (referred to by the Chinese side as ‘One Belt, One Road’). At the same time, Moscow announced its efforts to build its own integration project in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union. These two developments seemed to confirm that the initial argument was correct and that the two projects were apparently fated to compete. Meanwhile, in May 2015, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, a joint declaration was issued calling for combining the two projects and creating a formal mechanism for their coordination in the form of a joint task force. The vision of “a great Eurasian partnership” announced by President Vladimir Putin during the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg on 16–17 June 2016 – which he also referred to as the Greater Eurasia project – is a signal that Moscow has ultimately opted for the strategy of joining a stronger partner (bandwagoning) instead of choosing the strategy of counterbalancing the rising power of China. At the same time, Moscow is trying to conceal the growing asymmetry in Russian-Chinese relations.

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High on reassurance, low on deterrence – Germany’s stance on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank
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High on reassurance, low on deterrence – Germany’s stance on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank

High on reassurance, low on deterrence – Germany’s stance on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

Keywords: Germany; NATO; OTAN; Baltic States

Germany’s stance on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank has evolved over the last two years. Berlin agreed to make collective defence a priority for NATO once again and consented to a greater allied presence in Poland and the Baltic states. Germany continues however to express reservations and is attempting to limit the scope of NATO’s engagement. The overall change in Germany’s policy was due to several reasons. In the last two years Germany has ceased to perceive Russia as a partner and begun instead to view it as a challenge to the security of Europe. Germany has also been pressed hard by its allies – the USA, Poland and the Baltic states - to change its position within NATO and to increase its military engagement on the eastern flank. Berlin has thus gradually expanded its military presence in the region – also in part so it may maintain its credibility within the alliance. However, Germany still eyes its military involvement on the eastern flank more along the lines of reassuring its allies than of deterring Russia.

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Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank
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Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank

Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank

Author(s): Piotr Woyke / Language(s): English

Keywords: US military engagement; NATO’s eastern flank; NATO; OTAN;

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.

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From apathy to nationalist mobilisation: politics makes a comeback in Armenia
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From apathy to nationalist mobilisation: politics makes a comeback in Armenia

From apathy to nationalist mobilisation: politics makes a comeback in Armenia

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Armenia; international relations; nationalism

In the military dimension, the Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh (2–5 April 2016) changed little in the conflict zone. It has, however, had a significant impact on the situation in Armenia. The country was shocked out of the political malaise that had been the dominant mood in the last few years, and the Karabakh question, which used to animate political life in the late 1980s and early 1990s, once again became a driving force behind developments. In the internal dimension, the renewed fighting galvanised the political scene, triggered a rise in nationalist sentiments, mobilised the public and consolidated it around the Karabakh question, overshadowing the frustrations caused by the country’s difficult economic situation. In the external dimension, the war, which was viewed as Moscow-endorsed Azerbaijani aggression, undermined people’s trust in Russia and the Armenian-Russian alliance. It also made it clear for Armenians how uncertain the Russian security guarantees were and exacerbated their feelings of vulnerability and isolation on the international stage.

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Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations
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Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations

Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations

Author(s): Marta Szpala / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbian-Kosovar relations; dialogue; international relations

In March 2011, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia started a dialogue that was intended to lead to the normalisation of mutual relations. This process, launched under the pressure of the EU, was aimed at building up confidence between the parties and resolving the everyday problems of the Serbian and Albanian communities, and as a consequence, reducing tension in the Western Balkans. The start of talks between representatives of the antagonist countries was the breakthrough that led to the Kosovo government gaining control over the whole of its territory, the establishment of a border (or ‘administrative boundary line’, as Belgrade calls it), and the start of the process of subordinating the Kosovo Serbian institutions to the authorities in Prishtina. Serbia also lifted its trade blockade on Kosovo, and allowed Prishtina to join the regional organisations. As a result, progress has been made in the process of integration of both states with the EU: Serbia has started accession negotiations, and Kosovo has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

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A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey
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A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): English

Keywords: Erdoğan; Turkey

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

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Iraqi Kurdistan – the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East?
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Iraqi Kurdistan – the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East?

Iraqi Kurdistan – the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East?

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota,Józef Lang / Language(s): English

Keywords: Islamic State (IS); Iraqi Kurdistan; Middle East

Against the backdrop of the ongoing dismantling of Islamic State (IS) and the preparations for the independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan scheduled for 25 September, Iraq as a whole is facing a new conflict which is likely to result in a thorough revision of the present balance of power in this part of the Middle East. A serious risk has emerged that the conflict may rapidly escalate, and its consequences may be more serious for the Middle East and Europe than the fight against Islamic State.

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Elections to the Bundestag: make or break for the liberal party
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Elections to the Bundestag: make or break for the liberal party

Elections to the Bundestag: make or break for the liberal party

Author(s): Artur Ciechanowicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Elections to the Bundestag; liberal party

Many commentators viewed the FDP’s defeat in the 2013 Bundestag elections, when the party failed to cross the 5% electoral threshold, as the end of the German liberal party. This view was further confirmed by another local election which the FDP lost, and by the dwindling number of party members. The FDP became a symbol of the maladies affecting German political life, and of politicians’ faults: clientelism, opportunism, a lack of direction and greed. The party had been present in the Bundestag for 64 subsequent years, and had been a member of government coalitions for 45 years. It also served as the power base for two presidents of Germany, as well as for Hans-Dietrich Genscher, for many years Germany’s foreign minister. However, during a period of just four years (2009–2013), when it co-ruled the country alongside the CDU/CSU, the FDP became unelectable.Regardless of the fact that the party has no representation in the Bundestag and that many prominent activists have left its ranks, the FDP’s new leader, Christian Lindner, has managed to regain the attention of the national media and radically change the party’s image. Back in October 2014, the FDP had deputies in six local parliaments and was not a member of any coalition; at present, however, the FDP has representatives in nine out of 16 local parliaments and is a member of ruling coalitions in Rhineland-Palatinate, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. If the elections to the Bundestag had been held on Sunday, 27 August 2017, the party would have garnered around 8% of the votes. It could also have hoped to form a ruling coalition with the Christian Democrats. A political alliance with the SPD would be less likely. However, should the FDP lose approval in the final weeks of the campaign and fail to bring its representatives into parliament again, it will be extremely difficult for the party to survive for another four years.

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The Zapad-2017 exercises: the information war (for now)
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The Zapad-2017 exercises: the information war (for now)

The Zapad-2017 exercises: the information war (for now)

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Zapad; Russia; Belarus; NATO

The Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2017 (West-2017) exercises, scheduled for 14–20 September, have for many months been the core of an information war between Russia and NATO, in which Ukraine and Belarus have also participated. The media have presented these exercises as allegedly the biggest military undertaking carried out in recent years by the armed forces of the Russian Federation (together with its Belarusian ally) in the immediate vicinity of the borders of NATO states, which could form the basis for the annexation of Belarus and/or a strike at Ukraine. And although it is hard to dispute the scale and breadth of these exercises, they are only a small part of Russia’s preparation for a potential military showdown with NATO. The real engagement of troops in these exercises will not be the largest, in terms of the scale and the force employed, or the most important in the Russian army’s preparation to carry out its plans during wartime in (from its perspective) the western strategic direction. The training exercises reported in the media, which have mainly been carried out on Russian training grounds from May to August this year, have not been an essential element of these preparations in 2017. These exercises, held jointly with the Belarusian component (in operational terms the Belarusian army should be considered as an integral part of the Russian armed forces in the western strategic direction), were nominally merely a preparatory stage to the Zapad-2017 exercises. The exercises involving Russian troops alone should be considered as more important, especially those checking the combat readiness of the units which have been newly created or expanded in the last three years. Compared to the period in which the previous exercises (Zapad-2013) were held, Russia’s military potential in the western strategic direction, especially its land forces, has doubled in size.

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Stalin in contemporary Russia: admired and required
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Stalin in contemporary Russia: admired and required

Stalin in contemporary Russia: admired and required

Author(s): Katarzyna Chawryło (Jarzyńska) / Language(s): English

Keywords: Stalin; contemporary Russia

Despite the fact that more than 60 years have passed since the death of Joseph Stalin, the leader of the USSR from 1922 to 1953, the memory of him remains alive. For several years running Stalin has topped the ranking of the most remarkable figures in Russia’s history. Portraits of him appear at political demonstrations and religious events; new monuments to the dictator are erected. The Kremlin’s official rhetoric increasingly refers to the positive aspects of the Soviet era, in particular to the victory in World War II. Representatives of the state’s administration and the Orthodox Church have been making favourable comments about Stalin.

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Soft Belarusianisation. The ideology of Belarus in the era of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
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Soft Belarusianisation. The ideology of Belarus in the era of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Soft Belarusianisation. The ideology of Belarus in the era of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Author(s): Piotr Rudkouski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarusianisation; Belarus; Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Over the past three years, a distinct change has become visible in the ideological discourse of the government of Belarus. To an increasing degree, the state ideology is focusing on strengthening national identity, emphasising the divergence of Belarus’s interests from those of Russia, and re-examining the historical narration in a direction which emphasises the distinctiveness of the history of Belarus from that of Russia. Above all, the government has changed its attitude towards the Belarusian language and culture. A campaign promoting the Belarusian language is being carried out on a large scale – under the auspices of state ideologues. The government has also become involved in the promotion of vyshyvanki, traditional, embroidered Belarusian clothes and their ornamentation. This allows us to talk about a process of ‘soft Belarusianisation’. Articles criticising Kremlin policy have begun to appear fairly regularly in the government media. Official representatives of the authorities, while not going so far as to promote the idea of friendship with the West, no longer refer to it using the rhetoric of the ‘enemy’, as was previously the case. This modification of ideological discourse probably means that the regime is looking for new ways to arrange its relationships, both with its own society and with the countries of the West. This does not mean, however, that the authorities are ready for systemic changes. The role of the President and the concept of the state remain unaltered in ideological discourse; there is still no tripartite division of power, and civil society’s room for manoeuvre remains narrow.

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Dark clouds over the Ukrainian gas market reform
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Dark clouds over the Ukrainian gas market reform

Dark clouds over the Ukrainian gas market reform

Author(s): Wojciech Konończuk,Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukrainian gas market; gas market; energy

In September, three out of five members of the supervisory board of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s largest gas company, announced their resignation and accused the government of stepping up political interference in the company’s activity and blocking measures aimed at reforming the company. This represents yet another instance of the fight for control over Naftogaz and its profit-making subsidiaries, Ukrgazvydobuvannya (which extracts over 70% of Ukraine’s gas) and Ukrtransgaz (the transit pipeline and gas storage facilities operator), which has been gaining momentum in recent months. On one side of the dispute lies what is broadly understood as the ruling camp (the surrounding of the president and the prime minister), while the other side is the pro-reform management of Naftogaz, headed by Andriy Kobolev and backed by Western institutions. // It seems that the government’s goal is to regain control over Naftogaz, including over financial flows between its subsidiaries. The mounting conflict has resulted in a cessation of the gas sector reform, which has been ongoing for over a year. Reforming the gas market had hitherto been viewed as one of the biggest successes of the state modernisation programme that was launched after the Maidan Revolution. Moreover, this halting of the reform process poses the risk that it may subsequently be abandoned entirely.

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Beijing’s mistaken offer: the ‘16+1’ and China’s policy towards the European Union
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Beijing’s mistaken offer: the ‘16+1’ and China’s policy towards the European Union

Beijing’s mistaken offer: the ‘16+1’ and China’s policy towards the European Union

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Beijing; China; 16+1; European Union

Despite China’s growing political and economic involvement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Beijing has not succeeded in making an attractive offer to the region’s EU member states – who make up the majority of the participants in the ‘16+1’ format. The financing model proposed by China, based on loans and favouritism towards Chinese companies, has proved to be unsuitable to local conditions. Therefore, the much-discussed infrastructure cooperation has not even started. Consequently, Beijing has failed to obtain the political tools which could have weakened policy coherence at the European level, or even divided the EU. In this context, the allegations appearing in the public debate that the countries of the ‘16+1’ have been fostering divisions within the EU seem to be substantially incorrect. As long as Central and Eastern Europe remains capable of pursuing its economic and developmental interests within the architecture of the European Union, the political risks coming from China’s capital inflow will remain limited. At the same time, the EU has room to facilitate constructive economic relationships between China and the Central European region. For example, it could reduce Beijing’s political pressure on CEE to use the specific, Chinese model for financing and building infrastructure. Cooperation at the EU level could also help to adapt the Chinese offer to the European business and regulatory environment.

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Russian nationalism three years after the annexation of Crimea
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Russian nationalism three years after the annexation of Crimea

Russian nationalism three years after the annexation of Crimea

Author(s): Jan Strzelecki / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian nationalism; annexation of Crimea

The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military action in the Donbas in 2014 have revealed a major potential for a revival of nationalist sentiments in Russian society. The wave of ‘patriotic’ attitudes that swept through the country back then has enabled the government to co-opt the rhetoric that is typical of nationalist groups. The Kremlin has used this period to shore up its legitimacy among the public and step up control of specific organisations. This has resulted in changes to the structure of the nationalist movement. A weakening was recorded mainly in relation to nationalist organisations that are independent from the government and those organisations which had been involved in the fighting in the Donbas in the initial stage of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.For the Kremlin, nationalist ideology and nationalist organisations that are unable to act independently are a handy political instrument. They are mainly being used to build support for the government and to consolidate power in Russia. At the same time, the fear that independent nationalist movements may become empowered and organisations that are dependent on the authorities may become emancipated poses a potential threat to the country’s internal stability. This makes the Kremlin strive for greater control of those nationalist groups that still remain somewhat independent.

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The beginning of the celebrations of the centenary of Ukraine’s independence
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The beginning of the celebrations of the centenary of Ukraine’s independence

The beginning of the celebrations of the centenary of Ukraine’s independence

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine’s independence

January 2018 saw the first celebrations commemorating the centenary of Ukraine’s fight for independence (1917–1921). The first two of these events, commemorating the declaration of independence (22 January 1918) and the battle of Kruty (29 January 1918), were surprisingly small-scale, especially with regard to the participation of Ukraine’s leadership in them. This may mean that the ruling elite has no concept of how to use the centenary to solidify its political position, also in the context of the presidential and parliamentary elections planned for 2019. At the same time, a profound shift in the narrative regarding the fight from a century ago has been evident in the media reports and educational materials published by the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance (UINP). The emphasis is no longer placed on the armed struggle and the continuation of the leftist tradition of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic; instead, priority is given to the efforts to build a state and create its institutions, including professional armed forces. The anarchist-revolutionary traditions are criticised, and the importance of order and discipline is highlighted.

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Result 315721-315740 of 319905
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