Is the crisis over? The economic situation in Belarus after two years of recession

Is the crisis over? The economic situation in Belarus after two years of recession

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

Keywords: crisis; Belarus; recesion

In 2017, Belarus’s GDP went up 2.4%, the first positive result since 2014. This meant an exit from a two-year recession, further proof of which includes an upward trend in industrial production, low inflation and a relatively high level of currency reserves. It appears that Belarus has returned to the path of economic growth, above all as an effect of the improvement of the situation on the global fuel markets, resulting in increasing income from the sale of petroleum products, one of its main exports. The fact that the Belarusian-Russian dispute over the terms of oil and gas supplies from Russia, which had continued for more than a year, was resolved in April 2017 has also had a positive effect. Another important factor was the improvement of the economic situation in Russia, which is the key market for a significant section of Belarusian exports. In turn, the Belarusian government’s policy has only contributed to improving the country’s economic situation to a marginal extent, although the record-low inflation level last year is doubtless a merit of the central bank. Apart from this, moves aimed at preserving the ineffective economic system have prevailed. Heavy industry, most of which is ineffective, is still supported mainly due to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s fear of the social destabilisation that might be provoked by massive dismissals of personnel from decommissioned plants. The government is continuing its policy of administratively regulating pay rises for the same reason. The reforms launched, for example introduce facilitations for doing business (including the unprecedentedly liberal decree regulating the operation of the IT sector which has been rapidly developing over the past few years); but they will not lead to a comprehensive reconstruction of the inefficient economic model, nor lay the foundations for stable economic growth.

From vassalisation to emancipation. Ukrainian-Russian gas co-operation has been revised

From vassalisation to emancipation. Ukrainian-Russian gas co-operation has been revised

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine; Russia; gas supply; Naftogas;

The awards by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (further: the Arbitral Tribunal) concerning the contract on gas supplies to Naftohaz and the volume of Russian gas transit via Ukraine have radically changed the model of gas relations between the two countries as they have existed until now. Kyiv’s victory is its crowning achievement in the process of emancipation from Russian dominance in the energy sector which began after the Revolution of Dignity. This has also significantly strengthened Ukraine’s position with regard to Russia and the EU because Gazprom was found to have been in breach of the transit contract. The decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal mark a caesura in the gas co-operation between Ukraine and Russia, which has continued for almost three decades and become infected with corruption, lack of transparency and politically motivated decisions. Since the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine has been dependent on Russian gas supplies, and has been one of Gazprom’s key clients. As long as natural gas remained relatively cheap, this situation was satisfactory to contractors in Ukraine as well, as it offered great opportunities for a section of the Ukrainian political class to build up their fortunes illegally. However, during Vladimir Putin’s presidency (since 2000), Moscow has capitalised many times on Ukraine’s gas dependence to achieve its political goals. The Revolution of Dignity and the war with Russia were breakthrough moments in energy relations with Russia. The new government in Kyiv, unlike all its predecessors, took the risk of entering into a legal dispute with Gazprom.

A test of strength. The escalation of the crisis in Russian-American relations

A test of strength. The escalation of the crisis in Russian-American relations

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian-American relations

On 6 April, the Trump administration introduced additional, more severe sanctions against Russia, covering 24 people and 14 companies: Russian oligarchs, the businesses they run, senior government officials and heads of state corporations, and (again) the Russian state arms company Rosoboroneksport. The immediate consequence of the new sanctions has been a downturn on the Russian stock market and the weakening of the rouble, as well as financial problems for the companies sanctioned, especially those belonging to the oligarch Oleg Deripaska. In the longer term the Russian oligarchs and their companies which conduct extensive activity abroad will find that the sanctions hamper their operations, and as a result, their dependence on the Kremlin will increase. On the other hand, the Kremlin will have increasing difficulty in recouping the affected oligarchs’ losses, which will lead to an increase in tensions within the elite, as well as a rise in social discontent, which will make the functioning of Putin’s regime more costly. || The US sanctions represent the next stage of the crisis in Russian-American relations. They were imposed just after the expulsion from Russia of 60 American diplomats in retaliation for a similar decision by the US regarding Russian diplomats. The crisis may deepen further as a result of the military response which the US has announced in response to a chemical attack in Duma, Syria on 7 April, most likely by the Assad regime’s forces. An escalation of the crisis does not suit the Kremlin, which still seems to nurture hope that the recently announced further Putin-Trump meeting could initiate the process of normalisation of Russian-American relations. On the other hand, for reasons concerning its image, the Kremlin will probably undertake some kind of limited retaliation against the US, in order to demonstrate to Washington its potential to cause harm. All this means a long-lasting crisis in Russian-American relations.

Rebuilding Germany’s air defence capabilities: on the eve of crucial decisions

Rebuilding Germany’s air defence capabilities: on the eve of crucial decisions

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

Keywords: Germany’s air defence

As NATO has returned its focus to collective defence since 2014, very short, short-range and medium-range surface-based air defence has become a desirable capability. Germany, which has been recalibrating the Bundeswehr to resume participation in conventional military conflicts, is in the process of re-creating air defence capabilities. In 2018–2019, the German Defence Ministry is expected to take decisions regarding two crucial air defence programmes: the NNbS and the TLVS. || The very short and short-range air defence capabilities have effectively been dismantled within the German Army over the last decade. The Bundeswehr plans to rebuild them in the NNbS programme in order to meet its commitments within the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). The contract for the NNbS is expected to be signed in 2019. However, the plans to quickly rebuild capabilities in this area may stumble on technical, financial and personnel challenges. || As Germany has committed to deploy a fully modernised brigade for NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) duty in 2023, Berlin is also seeking alternative solutions, such as co-operation with The Netherlands, or smaller purchases outside the NNbS programme. In late 2018 or early 2019, the German Defence Ministry is also planning to sign the contract for the medium-range air defence programme, TLVS, three years after it decided to use the results of the MEADS programme that was completed in 2014. The TLVS system will replace the Patriot batteries that have been in use since the late 1980s and have been successively upgraded. Time will tell as to whether the lengthy negotiations will enable the Defence Ministry to avoid delays and financial and technical problems in the complex TLVS programme, of which Germany is going to be the sole user for now.

Poroshenko stands alone. Ukraine politics in a pre-election year

Poroshenko stands alone. Ukraine politics in a pre-election year

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Poroshenko; Ukraine

The year 2019 will be an election year in Ukraine, with a presidential election in the spring and a parliamentary election in the autumn. The short timeframe and the order in which these two elections will be held increase the chances of the winner of the presidential election forming the largest faction in parliament. The first phase of election campaigning has already begun, with Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko as the main contenders, but opinion polls are inconclusive. The atmosphere surrounding the campaign is one of mistrust on the part of voters in the authorities and the political class. Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution created expectations politicians could not fulfil.

On the way to creating the ‘Donbas people’. Identity policy in the self-proclaimed Republics in East Ukraine

On the way to creating the ‘Donbas people’. Identity policy in the self-proclaimed Republics in East Ukraine

Author(s): Yulia Abibok / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine

Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these ‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly rejected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine remains in a condition of smouldering war.Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these ‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly rejected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine remains in a condition of smouldering war.In this situation of uncertainty, the Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ are continuing to make efforts to legitimize and strengthen their ‘statehood’, most notably by means of a new historical policy. Both para-states are trying to revise the assessments of historical events which have been established during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Serious efforts are being made in the area of the ‘patriotic education’ of children, both in school and during extra-curricular activities; there are new ‘state’ holidays, cults, and a large-scale campaign honouring and perpetuating the memories of the new ‘rebel’ heroes and of civilians who have died at the hands of the Kyiv ’murderers’ is being conducted.Moreover the events of the war of 1941–5 are being reinterpreted, compared to the current military actions ‘against the fascists’. The new ‘state’ cult is being built on just such a parallel, which not only imparts significance to the current events, but also helps to contrast the ‘republics’ to today’s Ukraine. The intended effect of the DPR and LPR’s historical policies is the creation of a new Donbas community which is hostile towards ‘nationalist’ Ukraine.

“An independent state needs an independent Church“. The fight for canonical independence for Ukrainian Orthodoxy

“An independent state needs an independent Church“. The fight for canonical independence for Ukrainian Orthodoxy

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukrainian Orthodoxy

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) have submitted a request to the Ecumenical Patriarch (i.e. the patriarch of Constantinople, the supreme head of all Orthodox Churches) to grant autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodoxy. On 19 April the Ukrainian parliament, at the request of President Petro Poroshenko, expressed its support for this measure. The President himself expressed his support on 22 April. There are numerous indications that a positive decision regarding this issue has already been made, and a relevant thomos (patriarch’s decree) will be announced any time this year Proclamation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Particular Orthodox Church (Ukrayinska Pomisna Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva, UAPOC) will likely trigger a new wave of confessional conflicts across Ukraine, including a likely schism in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which recognizes the primacy of the patriarch of Moscow (UOC). It is beyond any doubt that a certain portion of believers and clergy, which today is difficult to estimate, will remain loyal to Moscow and that the Moscow Patriarchate will make every effort to support Ukrainian structures of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The government of Ukraine, for its part, will try to prevent the development of these structures.

For justice and compensation. Ukraine takes Russia to the international courts

For justice and compensation. Ukraine takes Russia to the international courts

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine; Russia; international courts

On 2 May, the Permanent Court of Arbitration based in The Hague passed a ruling in a case brought by a group of Ukrainian companies and one individual against the Russian Federation. It unanimously granted their claims to the assets lost as a consequence of the annexation of Crimea and imposed an obligation on the Russian side to pay US$159 million in compensation. This verdict is the first to have been delivered in a number of cases brought by Ukrainian private companies and the Ukrainian state to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights linked to the Russian occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and Russian military operation in eastern Ukraine.After the ruling passed in February this year by the Stockholm Arbitration Court in the dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom, that of the Hague Court is another success attained by the Ukrainian side in international courts. It proves that the legal measures taken by Ukraine are successful and will become an instrument to be employed in Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policy, especially in the face of subsequent rulings expected to be favourable to Kyiv. However, since the Russian Federation has refused to recognise the court decisions, enforcing the payment of the compensation will be a long and complicated process. Therefore, Ukrainian companies will make efforts to take over assets owned by the Russian state located in Ukraine.

Nord Stream 2 divides the West

Nord Stream 2 divides the West

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota,Rafał Bajczuk,Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Keywords: Nord Stream 2

In recent weeks the US has stepped up its campaign against the Nord Stream 2 project. Washington is putting pressure on Berlin to withdraw its support for the project, and is threatening to use increasingly powerful measures, including sanctions on European companies involved in the gas pipeline’s implementation. The growing dispute between the US and Germany over Nord Stream 2 has become an element of the broader controversy surrounding the project in the EU and is leading to deeper divisions between the member states. It has brought to the fore the differences in approaches to gas cooperation with Russia as well as approaches to the development of Russia’s strategic gas pipeline projects. While Germany, but also Austria, the Netherlands and a number of other countries, limit their approach to commercial issues, Poland, the Baltic States, Denmark and the US also see it as having security implications which do not only relate to energy. The conflict over Nord Stream 2 is also part of the game concerning the future shape of the gas market in Europe, and the roles played by individual external suppliers (mainly Russia, but also to an increasing extent the US) and companies such as Gazprom and its European partners. The Nord Stream 2 case has become a major challenge of the EU’s cohesion and its relations with the US and Russia.

(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarus’ foreign policy

The continuing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, together with the increased tension in relations between Russia and the West, have led the Belarusian authorities to attempt to redefine their country’s foreign policy by stressing neutrality towards the two sides in the conflict. As a result, over the last year or so Belarus has clearly adopted a non-committal stance. Minsk is trying to play the part of a neutral mediator in the hope that this will safeguard it in the event of escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, which is seen as the greatest threat to the country’s security at the present time. Thus Minsk is returning to the notion, discussed in the early 1990s, of Belarus striving for neutrality. Officially, the goal of neutrality is still stated in the Belarusian Constitution. However there are serious limitations to the effectiveness of this new strategy, due to Minsk’s close military alliance with Moscow, and therefore Belarus will not be entirely credible on the international stage as a country that wishes to remain neutral.

Expansion at the state’s expense: Novatek as a driving engine of the Russian LNG sector

Expansion at the state’s expense: Novatek as a driving engine of the Russian LNG sector

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian LNG sector

A deal for France’s Total to acquire a 10% stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project for US$2.55 billion was struck on 24 May during the International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg. This project envisages the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant on the Gydan Peninsula and is being implemented by Novatek, Russia’s largest private natural gas producer. In December 2017, the company launched the first production line of an LNG terminal on the Yamal Peninsula – the Yamal LNG project. In addition to this, Gazprom and Rosneft have confirmed their intention to implement their own LNG projects.

Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military

Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): English

Keywords: Turkey; military

Over the last two years, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) have been subject to transformations with no precedent in the history of Turkey as a republic. The process of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) subordinating the army to civilian government has accelerated following the failed coup that took place on 15 July 2016. The government has managed to take away the autonomy of the armed forces which, while retaining their enormous significance within the state apparatus, ceased to be the main element consolidating the old Kemalist elites. However, the unprecedented scale of the purges and the introduction of formal civilian control of the military are merely a prelude to a much more profound change intended to create a brand new military, one that would serve the authorities and be composed of a new type of personnel – individuals from outside the army’s traditional power base. This reflects the reshuffle of the elites that happened during AKP’s rule.

The US–China trade dispute: phase two

The US–China trade dispute: phase two

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski / Language(s): English

Donald Trump has pursued his strategy of stepping up pressure on Beijing by threatening it with a tariff war since March 2018. The aim of this strategy is to resolve the problems in US–China economic relations that have been mounting for years. These problems include China’s constant trade surplus with the US, the limitations regarding access to the Chinese market, and the cases of technology theft or forced transfer from US companies. The tariffs imposed so far are of negligible significance for trade exchange, although on 6 July Washington plans to announce a 25% tariff on the import of high-technology goods from China, worth US$34 billion (this amount could be increased to US$50 billion). Should China introduce its announced retaliatory measures, the tariff dispute could cover goods worth around US$95 billion, or around 15% of US–China trade exchange (see Appendix). President Trump has already announced that goods imported from China worth another US$200 billion would be covered by tariffs, should China fail to make concessions.In contrast to the previous phases of negotiations, the US’s present demands focus on long-term structural problems rather than specific benefits for American business. Thereby, the formula of talks based on seeking spectacular agreements (‘deals’) that Trump had initially adopted is losing ground. This heralds a launch of another phase of negotiations, this time more comprehensive and more difficult for China. Until recently, Beijing had tried to contain the dispute by making minor concessions. At the same time, it is communicating its readiness to offer a symmetrical response to the American strikes. China is also trying to take advantage of its dispute with the US by applying diplomatic measures to position itself as a defender of globalisation and multilateral trade rules. The tools the US is using may disrupt global supply chains in the high-technology sector, which in turn may impact the economic condition of America’s allies in the European Union and in East Asia.

Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev

Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev

Author(s): Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Uzbekistan; President Mirziyoyev

It has been almost two years since the death of the long-serving leader of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, and since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took up power (September 2016). The change has had spectacular results, including signs of liberalisation of the previous, extremely authoritarian system of rule, and economic reform, for instance with regard to stimulating growth of small-scale business, and in fact activation of Uzbekistan on the international stage and normalisation of relations with neighbours. Meanwhile, certainly the most important process under way in Uzbekistan is that of consolidation of power by the new president, and a key element of this is dismantling the might enjoyed to date by the National Security Service. The curbing of the position of the National Security Service, which has been successful so far, entails internal restructuring of the state apparatus. The limited liberalisation and opening up to the world are mainly a result of this process.Mirziyoyev has created a new dynamic both internally and in the region. The effects will only become clear in the long term. The outcome of this new situation is uncertain; consolidation of the new president’s power and the ensuing reforms are accompanied by constantly recurring crises which were frozen during Karimov’s rule. There are also external threats – a possibility of return to custodianship of Russia, a country which is fortifying its position, China’s increasing economic dominance, and growing strength of radicals among the Uzbek minority in northern Afghanistan. The emerging processes are therefore proceeding fast, and thus it is hard to determine whether the new Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev will prove to be a stable country in which the liberal reforms will continue.

A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian–Ukrainian tensions; Sea of Azov

The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territory of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the operation of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually.Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambitions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of strategic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.

Ukraine–Hungary: the intensifying dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights

Ukraine–Hungary: the intensifying dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański,Andrzej Sadecki / Language(s): English

Keywords: Ukraine–Hungary; Hungarian minority’s rights

For nearly one year relations between Hungary and Ukraine have been plunged in the worst crisis since the collapse of the USSR. The main cause of the tension has been the Education Act passed by the Ukrainian parliament in September 2017 which envisages a comprehensive reform of the education system and at the same time imposes serious restrictions on the use of the languages of national minorities, including Hungarian, in school education. In response to this, Budapest severely criticised Kyiv and took measures to block the establishment of closer relations between Ukraine and NATO, insisting that the act be changed. In turn, Ukraine took steps to soften Budapest’s stance and asked the Venice Commission to evaluate the act and then declared that it would follow the recommendations provided in the evaluation. The deficit of trust which has existed for years and the fact that neither of the parties had taken real steps to reach a compromise prevented them from reaching an agreement that had seemed close in May and June this year. The conflict was escalated further when the Hungarian government appointed a ministerial commissioner for the development of Zakarpattia Oblast (in Ukraine), which met with a harsh reaction from Kyiv and was interpreted as interfering with Ukraine’s internal affairs.The dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights in Ukraine is about historical and identity related issues that are very important to both sides, and it is highly unlikely that it will be resolved in the coming months. While these issues have always been at the core of Budapest’s foreign policy, especially with regard to the countries where the Hungarian minorities live, Kyiv neglected them until 2014. However, since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the aggression in the Donbass, Ukraine has been taking comprehensive measures aimed at decommunisation and derussification. The consequences of this include on the one hand a Ukrainisation of the public space, the media and the education system, and on the other restricting national minorities’ rights in Ukraine as regards the use of their language in the education system. For those reasons, both sides are likely to firmly stick to their stances and to be looking for current political benefits resulting from the conflict rather than taking action to reach a compromise.

Serbia-Kosovo negotiations – playing for time under pressure from the West

Serbia-Kosovo negotiations – playing for time under pressure from the West

Author(s): Marta Szpala / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia-Kosovo negotiations

The negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement to normalise relations between the two states are to enter a new phase in September. Although the negotiations, which have been going on since 2011 under the oversight of the European Union, may have prompted the incorporation of the Serbian minority and the territories it inhabits into Kosovo’s institutional system, they have been at a standstill for three years. The authorities in Prishtina are unwilling to agree to further concessions to the Serbs until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s independence, at least on a de facto basis. Any compromise will come at a high political cost for the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo, due to hostility on the part of the public and the opposition in both states. Meanwhile, the EU and the US are putting pressure on Belgrade and Prishtina to reach an agreement by no later than mid-2019. The Serbian and Kosovar elites cannot ignore this pressure as they largely owe their political positions to support from the West, and for this reason the authorities in both states wish to play for time and prolong the talks. They are doing this by periodically escalating tensions and putting forward solutions that are unacceptable to the other party or the international community. One example of this was the proposals made in July by the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučic and Hashim Thaçi, to exchange territory and change borders, which caused a great deal of controversy inside and outside the countries. Moreover, divisions between countries in the West, which do not have a united strategy regarding the negotiations, may hamper moves to reach a compromise. The United States is pushing for a quick resolution of the dispute, even if this means reviewing the borders. . However, Germany is opposed to that solution as it fears that this would strengthen separatist movements throughout the entire Balkans. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will try to exploit these divisions, while the success of the process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations will in fact depend upon effective pressure from the West.

China’s offer to the EU: tough negotiations or a coalition against Trump?

China’s offer to the EU: tough negotiations or a coalition against Trump?

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Konrad Popławski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Donald Trump; China; EU; USA

Donald Trump’s aggressive policy towards Beijing and the spectre of a trade war have served as a catalyst for the resumption of dialogue between China and the EU. Within a period of less than two weeks, the Chinese prime minister held three meetings with EU leaders: within the 16+1 framework, a German-Chinese intergovernmental consultation, and a China-EU summit. Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was intended to show openness to the EU’s demands to liberalise access to the Chinese market, and to neutralise allegations that China has been exploiting divisions between EU member states. Beijing hopes that improving the climate of the talks, together with making some small concessions to Brussels, and especially to Berlin, will allow it to bring the EU onto its side in its conflict with the United States at relatively little cost. This puts the EU in a dilemma. On the one hand, supporting the pressure Washington is currently putting on Beijing could lead to a real opening-up of the Chinese market, and also reduce the growing imbalance in international trade whose roots lie in China. However, this risks a collapse of economic growth in China, which would mean losses for many European companies. On the other hand, if the EU cooperated with Beijing on this matter, it could strengthen the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, and also help to defend the Iran agreement and the Paris agreement on climate change. However, if Brussels openly joins the Chinese coalition against Washington, that could cause serious divisions within the EU and in trans-Atlantic relations, and also limit Beijing’s determination to undertake domestic reforms.

A stinking business. Environmental issues, protests and big money in the waste business in Russia

A stinking business. Environmental issues, protests and big money in the waste business in Russia

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

Keywords: waste business; Russia

In recent months, Moscow oblast has seen a series of social protests against environmental problems caused by municipal waste landfills. The waste disposal sites are overloaded, lack adequate safeguards, emit toxic gases and contaminate the groundwater with harmful effluent. The situation is most severe in Moscow oblast because the capital city generates the largest volumes of waste; however, the problem itself extends beyond environmental concerns into the economic and social spheres. Waste management in Russia is marked by notorious overloading of legal waste disposal sites and the emergence of illegal waste dumps, inadequate waste disposal practices leading to air pollution and groundwater contamination which affect local residents, and bad practices by businesses with links to President Vladimir Putin which have monopolised the waste collection sector.

The Free State of Bavaria and its party: the CSU faces an electoral test

The Free State of Bavaria and its party: the CSU faces an electoral test

Author(s): Kamil Frymark / Language(s): English

Keywords: Free State of Bavaria; CSU

The Christian Social Union (CSU) has ruled Bavaria continuously for sixty years. The CSU’s domination of the province’s political scene, together with its influence on federal policies through its partnership with the CDU in the Bundestag, has made the party one of the most effective groups in Europe. In the medium term Bavaria will have to face challenges connected with the transformation and digitisation of industry, which could undermine the province’s current economic model. In addition, the CSU is being confronted on the political scene by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a grouping which has a similar profile to the CSU in several aspects. The elections on 14 October 2018 could permanently change the balance of power in Bavaria’s Landtag, lead to a serious weakening of the CSU’s dominance in Bavaria, and affect Germany’s federal politics.The CSU owes its electoral success to a conservative profile combined with the province’s economic achievements, as well as the ability to adapt its programme to changing social trends. Voters see the party as both a guarantor of Bavaria’s economic success and the advocate of the interests of vulnerable social groups. However, the CSU is undergoing a transformation which may result in it losing its status as a mass party appealing to all social groups. These changes are structural in nature; they result primarily from the aging of its traditional electorate and the inflow into Bavaria of residents from other German provinces. This process is overlapping with a strong polarisation within German society (including Bavaria) regarding its approach to the migration crisis. The biggest beneficiary of these changes has been the AfD. A good result for this party in the elections to the Bavarian parliament could permanently change the balance of political forces there. The CSU would be unable to defend an absolute majority, and it would have to seek coalition partners in order to form further governments.