Ukraine’s disputes over the 80th anniversary of the Babi Yar massacre
Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English
Keywords: Babi Yar massacre; Ukraine’s politics of memory; political aspect of the conflict;
On 29 September 2021 and 6 October 2021 two competing ceremonies were held in Kyiv to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the massacre at Babi Yar, where Kyiv Jews and representatives of other ethnic and political groups were exterminated. No comprehensive commemoration of these crimes was offered, either during the Soviet era or in the last 30 years of Ukraine’s independence. It was only in recent years that two projects to commemorate the Babi Yar massacre emerged. However, a sharp dispute between their initiators is ongoing. The first project, proposed by the Academy of Sciences and supported by ‘patriotic’ groups, presents the Holocaust against the backdrop of the martyrdom of other nations, and views Ukraine as a victim of two totalitarian systems. The other project, which is a private initiative, focuses on commemorating the genocide of the Jews on Ukrainian soil. However, this one has sparked controversy mainly due to the involvement in it of sponsors and contributors from Russia. This project has received backing from both the Ukrainian and Israeli governments due to its advanced stage of implementation, its cutting-edge design and its focus on Holocaust.
Although the COVID-19 pandemic did trigger a recession in Belarus, the greatest blow to the country’s economy has been its deep political crisis. This was caused by the authorities rigging the results of the presidential election, which in turn provoked mass opposition from the citizens. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, focused on remaining in power, resorted to unprecedented repression, which over the following months completely shattered many years of efforts to improve the investment climate and to achieve a partial liberalization of the economy. These efforts included a flagship initiative to develop the Belarusian IT sector. 2020 revealed the Belarusian economy’s great sensitivity to the global economic slump and the regime’s inability to launch free-market reforms. As a consequence, although in 2020 Belarus’s GDP fell just0.9%, the country found itself in an extremely difficult situation due to the magnitude of other threats to its economic stability. Belarus’s inability to effectively refinance its foreign debt using funds offered by Western institutions, its significant budget deficit (approximating the level recorded in the crisis years of the 1990s) and the state sector’s largely unpayable debt to the local banks will all result in continued aggravation of the economic crisis. Alongside this, they will provoke a rise in Russia’s importance as the only ally and lender to an internationally isolated Belarus. Without Russia’s assistance, the risk of the Belarusian economy collapsing will increase significantly in 2021.
Keywords: LNG market; Russia; Russian LNG production and exports; Russia’s energy strategy;
Expansion on the liquefied natural gas market has become one of the priority areas in Russia’s energy policy in recent years. This has been reflected in the statements made by government representatives and the many strategic documents that have been adopted recently. In particular, on 16 March this year the government approved a document entitled The Long-term Programme for the Development of Liquefied Natural Gas Production in the Russian Federation which envisages ambitious plans for further development in this area: an output of 80 to 140million tonnes of LNG in 2035. The assumptions of the strategy fit in with the trend of regular increases in the production and export of Russian LNG which have been visible in recent years (from 11 to nearly 30 million tonnes in 2016–19). It can be concluded from these announcements that Russia is planning to increase its share in the global liquefied natural gas market to over 10%, and possibly even up to 20–30%. The expansion in this sector is also an argument for Moscow to strengthen its political and military presence in the Arctic. Increasing the Russian share on the European LNG market may also be a kind of remedy for Gazprom’s loss of influence in some EU countries.
Under the radar of big politics: cooperation between China and Ukraine
Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor,Jakub Jakóbowski / Language(s): English
Keywords: China and Ukraine; Foreign policy; Sino-Ukrainian; Russia; USA; Economic cooperation; Kyiv and Beijing;
Chinese-Ukrainian relations are still defined by the events of 2014: the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Their consequences continue to block high-level political dialogue between Kyiv and Beijing, which Washington (and to a certain extent Moscow as well) also does not want. However, Sino-Ukrainian economic cooperation is expanding rapidly, with trade as its main driver. In 2019 the PRC became Ukraine’s most important trading partner due to the rapid rise in Ukrainian exports. Beijing itself is sceptical of Ukraine’s post-2014 political transition and its turn to the West, but it is interested in Ukraine’s military technologies, raw materials and agricultural potential. Since President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, Ukraine has clearly been seeking a new opening in its relations with China, looking to widen the foreign policy space in the game between the West and Russia. However, it remains essentially excluded from financial and investment cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Any significant deepening of relations between Kyiv and Beijing would first and foremost require a resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the existing dynamic economic cooperation ‘under the radar’ of great-power politics still has considerable potential.
The UK’s Integrated Review and NATO’s north-eastern flank
Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English
Keywords: NATO’s north-eastern flank; UK; British Army; military alliances and partnerships;
In March 2021, the UK’s government published the Integrated Review – a new vision for the country’s security, defence, development and foreign policy until 2030. A few days later, it released a supplementary defence strategy reshaping Britain’s military capabilities. Both documents represent the culmination of the national debate on the UK’s international role after Brexit. They contain an ambitious concept of a Global Britain – an innovative country more strongly engaged in the world in terms of trade, diplomacy and militarily presence. Britain sees Russia as the main challenge to the Euro-Atlantic area, which is essential for the UK’s security, and China as the number one challenge globally. At a time of growing and permanent international competition, the UK has announced the biggest increase in its defence spending in decades. This is aimed at a technological leap forward in the Armed Forces, enhancing the nuclear deterrence and strengthening the Navy. However, this will come at the expense of some capabilities. From the perspective of the north-eastern flank countries, it is a positive sign that the UK aspires to be the most militarily capable European member of NATO, and that it relies on close military cooperation with the United States and the countries in the Nordic--Baltic region. On the other hand, there are concerns about personnel and materiel cuts in the British Army, which will limit its ability to deploy larger forces on NATO’s eastern flank in the event of a conflict with Russia. At the same time, the UK’s plans to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific do not appear to compete with its current military involvement on the eastern flank, which is the second largest after the US.
The digitisation of Ukraine: anatomy of a success story
Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English
Keywords: digitisation; Ukraine; Diia; pandemic;
On 23 August, on the eve of the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, a law came into force recognizing electronic ID cards and passports as equivalent to their physical counterparts. Earlier, on 6 August, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law providing for all offices to operate on a paperless basis. One of the main election slogans in his winning campaign in 2019was ‘the smartphone state’, and this has also been a key idea towards modernising the country on the anniversary of its independence. The idea assumes that most administrative services will – in as convenient a manner as possible for the citizen – be transferred online, in order to cut back on the need for visits to offices and reduce the role of officials. While many of Zelensky’selection promises have not been implemented, the country has in fact made impressive progress over the last two years with regard to digitisation as broadly understood. Mykhailo Fedorov, the minister for digital transformation, can be considered the father of this success. He brought about the launch of the Diia website and application, which has already made it possible to deal with most important matters online; by the end of Zelensky’s term of office, all administrative services are to be available via the Internet. Automating these processes will reduce the risks of corruption and improve the provision of public services – something which is often very burdensome in Ukraine – and also increase the competitiveness of the economy and the effectiveness of bureaucracy.
Pressure being stepped up cautiously: the EU’s and US’s sanctions against Belarus
Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English
Keywords: EU’s and US’s sanctions against Belarus; Belarusian regime; Aleksandr Lukashenko; Russia;
The rigged presidential election held in Belarus on 9 August 2020 and the brutal crackdown on the participants of post-election demonstrations triggered immediate criticism from the leaders of EU member states. These developments, combined with Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s unwillingness to engage in a dialogue with the opposition, resulted on 19 August 2020 in the EU deciding to prepare a set of sanctions involving a ban on more than 30 representatives of the regime entering the EU and freezing their assets. Due to the absence of unanimity among the EU member states, the sanctions were only imposed on 2 October 2020, when the US introduced its belated and mild visa restrictions. In Belarus, the crackdown continued, which prompted the EU to adopt, in November and December 2020, another two packages of sanctions (the latter targeting seven Belarusian businesses and other entities). The restrictions imposed by the EU and the US, albeit belated and cautiously approached, should be viewed as a symbolic gesture of disapproval which poses no direct threat to the regime, but which serves as a semblance of moral support for the rebellious majority of Belarusian society. In addition, in August 2020 the EU announced its assistance programme for the empowerment of civil society in Belarus.
The dispute over Nord Stream 2: the stances and the outlook
Author(s): Ryszarda Formuszewicz,Szymon Kardaś,Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): English
Keywords: Nord Stream 2; gas pipeline; Baltic Sea; Russia; Germany; USA; EU;
Russian ships resumed laying the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline on the Baltic Sea bed in February this year. Russia’s goal is to complete the project and put it into operation as soon as possible. This coincided with media reports that representatives of Germany and the new US administration had been searching for compromise arrangements to determine the conditions for construction to be completed and operation to commence. These would include options for a moratorium on launching it but, above all, the creation of guarantees to maintain the limited transit of Russian gas through Ukraine or a ‘snap back’ mechanism enabling shutting off/limiting flows via NS2 in the event of problems with supplies or transit through Ukrainian territory. Berlin hopes to agree on the terms on which the US will tolerate the gas pipeline, or will at least play for time so that construction can be completed while the talks are underway and the certification necessary for its launch can be obtained. It is unclear what actions the Joe Biden administration will take regarding this issue. On the one hand, it has criticized the project but on the other, it has not imposed any sanctions that could stop its implementation as yet (19 March 2021) and it is striving to improve relations with Germany.
Lignite in the Czech Republic and Germany: controversies and prospects
Author(s): Michał Kędzierski,Krzysztof Dębiec / Language(s): English
Keywords: Czech Republic; Germany; Lignite; Lignite production and consumption; electricity production; coal industry;
Lignite still plays an important role in the Czech and German power industries, remaining one of their key sources of electricity. These countries, together with Poland, are the largest producers and consumers of this fuel in the EU. The share of lignite in both countries’ energy mix is trending downward under the influence of the EU’s climate policy ambitions, particularly the rising costs of CO2 emission allowances. The lignite industry in the Czech Republic and Germany is also linked to capital, with some mines in Eastern Germany being owned by Czech corporations. The activity of lignite-fired mines, power plants and heating plants in both countries has caused a number of controversies, including environmental ones. Local communities affected by the negative impact of the mines’ operation have engaged in protests, and the significance of environmental issues in national politics is also rising. Both Berlin and Prague are planning to stop mining and burning lignite. Germany has already set a coal exit date of 2038, and the debate in the Czech Republic is approaching a conclusion of setting the same date, or even five years earlier. The decision to give up using this fuel is posing socio-economic challenges for the coal regions, which face numerous structural problems.
Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska,Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English
Keywords: Sputnik V; Europe; Western vaccines; disinformation; Production of the vaccine; COVID-19 pandemic;
Since Sputnik V was registered in Russia in August 2020, a major global promotional campaign for the vaccine has been under way with the involvement of the state authorities, led by President Vladimir Putin. Recent weeks have seen the intensification of such a campaign in the European Union, which has been backed up by disinformation activities targeting Western vaccines. However, Sputnik V production levels have been low so far, and they do not meet the needs of either Russia or the countries that have signed up for it. Russian announcements that its production would soon begin outside the country, including in Europe, have also failed to come true. Available information shows that about a third of all Sputnik V doses delivered to the market are exported. However, an analysis of the contracts signed and the volume of deliveries made places Russia at the bottom of the global list of producers and suppliers. Like other manufacturers, it has to keep choosing who to send vaccines to first (and in what quantities). In effect, Europe and Latin America have been the priority destinations for shipments abroad, although even those contracts are not being fulfilled on time. Bulk quantities of Sputnik V are unlikely to arrive in Europe before autumn 2021.
Eradicating Polishness. Lukashenka on the Polish national minority schools in Belarus
Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English
Keywords: Aleksandr Lukashenko; Polish national minority; Belarus schools; Repression; Polish school system in Belarus;
The Polish national minority school system in Belarus was created from scratch in the 1990swith financial support from Warsaw and an organisational effort of the Polish minority in Belarus. Although in its first years it developed relatively smoothly, since 2005 Polish schools have been under constant pressure from the local and central authorities. The goal of this pressure is unchanging – it involves the Russification (or, less frequently, Belarusianisation) of the young generation of ethnic Poles living in Belarus. In addition, hostile actions were carried out during spells of the political thaw in Polish-Belarusian relations (most recently in 2016–2020), which saw a major development of economic and investment cooperation and numerous high-level visits. However, the most severe blow to the Polish school network occurred in March 2021. This should be viewed both in the broader context – as an element of the wave of repression against civil society following the 2020 presidential election, and in a narrower context – as another blow to the Polish minority. One manifestation of this has been the arrest of the leaders of the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB) and of the principal of a Polish community school in Brest. Alongside this, the prosecutor’s office has launched a series of inspections in other Polish minority organisations across Belarus and in privately-owned schools offering Polish language courses. This campaign suggests that a plan approved by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is being implemented to undermine independent Polish organisations in Belarus and ultimately destroy the Polish national minority school system.
Wrestling in Greenland. Denmark, the United States and China in the land of ice
Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English
Keywords: Greenland; Denmark; USA; China; diversification of Greenland’s foreign relations; Chinese investments in mining in Greenland;
International interest in Greenland has been growing for several years. This trend is a result of the increasing global competition between the US, China and Russia (including in the Arctic)and the acceleration of climate change, which is opening the region up to commercial and military activity. The independence aspirations of the island’s inhabitants are also of note in this context. Copenhagen seeks to maintain sovereignty over Greenland because it strengthens Denmark’s significance in the world and provides access to the Arctic. The US has increased its visibility in Greenland due to Chinese investments, and has even considered buying it. For Beijing, the island represents a potential area of economic expansion, providing a valid argument for China to become a major player in the Arctic. This growing interest pleases Greenlanders, who see balancing between Denmark, the US and China as an opportunity for new investments and building the economic foundations of sovereignty.
A hydrogen alliance? The potential for German-Russian cooperation in hydrogen energy
Author(s): Michał Kędzierski,Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English
Keywords: German-Russian
cooperation; hydrogen energy; energy cooperation;
Joint hydrogen energy projects are components of the comprehensive Russian-German energy cooperation which has been ongoing for more than five decades. Due to increasing demand for hydrogen resulting from Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende) and to the potential of the hydrogen sector in Russia and its focus on export, the fundamental interests of the two states are well aligned. In 2020, Moscow and Berlin stepped up their political dialogue in this field, and companies from Germany and Russia went on to conclude their first agreements. The new aspect of this cooperation with Berlin is also important to Moscow in political terms.
TurkStream on the diversifying south-eastern European gas market
Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota,Mateusz Seroka,Marta Szpala / Language(s): English
Keywords: TurkStream; south-eastern European gas market; European line of TurkStream; Bulgaria; gas transit;
December 2020 saw the completion of another part (Bulgaria–Serbia) of the European section of the TurkStream gas pipeline, through which gas has been exported from Russia to south--eastern Europe since January 2020. The capacity of the entire route is not yet being fully used, but it has already reduced Russia’s dependence on transit via Ukraine. In 2020, around12 bcm of gas was sent via TurkStream instead of Ukrainian pipelines: half to Turkey, and the rest to Bulgaria, Greece and North Macedonia. Ultimately, the pipeline will also transport gas via Serbia to Hungary, Austria and Romania. The rapid implementation of the entire project, in a region where infrastructure investments usually take a long time, represents a success for the Kremlin. Neither the economic challenges linked to the COVID-19 pandemic nor the political opposition of the US to new links between Europe and Russia (which will mainly strike at the Nord Stream 2 pipeline) have got in the way of the project’s completion.
Although the importance of global climate challenges is systematically growing, the actions which the Russian authorities have undertaken in this area to date have been very limited. Moscow has not evaded international cooperation to combat climate change, but at the same time it has not undertaken any very ambitious commitments in this regard. The benchmark for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that Russia has agreed to is exceptionally favourable to it. Thus, the reduction goals which the Kremlin has announced do not require the authorities to make radical changes to the Russian economy. Individual Russian companies are showing greater interest in the climate agenda, but it is difficult to consider the results of their activities as significant, especially compared to the experience of international companies. The measures undertaken to change the Russian energy mix are also poor: renewable energy sources only account for a marginal share in electricity production in Russia (in total, about 0.4%). It is true that the Russian authorities have begun to notice the importance of climate challenges; this has been confirmed, among other things, by the latest editions of the strategic documents regarding the development of the state. However, these documents do not offer any ambitious climate policy measures. The authorities’ lack of determination and the interests of lobbying groups from the oil and gas sector may prove to be the most serious barrier to changes in this area in the coming years.
Zelensky’s Ukraine: the mechanisms of power are failing
Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English
Keywords: Volodymyr Zelensky; Ukraine; The Verkhovna Rada; oligarchs; corruption;
President Volodymyr Zelensky gained full power under a year and a half ago, but it is already becoming increasingly difficult for him to implement his declared political goals. This is due to the increasingly weak control he wields over his own Servant of the People party, his incompetent choice of collaborators and, more broadly, his lack of a comprehensive vision of reforms. Since the government reshuffle in March 2020, Zelensky has abandoned his plan to carry out a comprehensive reconstruction of Ukraine’s political elite by replacing its main figures with untainted ‘new faces’. This is what he had promised to his voters. However, he has failed to find an effective mechanism for selecting suitable candidates for key positions, which negatively affects the process of reforms being implemented. Servant of the People de facto losing its parliamentary majority, which had previously enabled it to independently enact laws, forces this party’s representatives to constantly strive to reach agreements with other parliamentary groups and groups of influence. This is yet another factor undermining the effectiveness of actions carried out by the Ukrainian leadership. Moreover, there are constantly more indications that corruption is being tolerated and there has been a return to the direct control of law enforcement bodies. This, in turn, reinforces the feeling that in his governance style and practice, ‘anti-system’ Zelensky is increasingly resembling his ‘pro-system’ predecessors.
Belarusians on Poland, Russia and themselves. Analysis of a public opinion poll commissioned by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
Author(s): Team OSW / Language(s): English
Keywords: Belarus; Russia; Poland; Aleksandr Lukashenko; Vladimir Putin; Angela Merkel; Volodymyr Zelenskiy; Andrzej Duda;
Belarus is the only country in Europe where public opinion polls are not published on a regular basis. This is a result of repressive policy of the Belarusian government, which has effectively banned sociological research related to politically ‘sensitive’ topics such as political ratings. This means that little is known about the attitudes of the Belarusian people or their views on political issues. At the request of the OSW and on the basis of questions it prepared, Belarusian interviewers conducted a telephone survey between 26 November and 16 December 2020 with a representative sample of1000 respondents, the aim of which was to examine Belarusian opinions about selected countries, including Poland and Russia. It should be emphasised that no one has conducted a similarly comprehensive public survey for many months.
The (pan-)Turkic Caucasus. The Baku-Ankara alliance and its regional importance
Author(s): Mateusz Chudziak,Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English
Keywords: Baku-Ankara alliance; The Nagorno-Karabakh war; Georgia; security;
The Nagorno-Karabakh war of autumn 2020 and the military parade organized in Baku after its end, which was jointly hosted by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, highlighted the potential of the alliance between both countries. The close ties between Baku and Ankara result from a strategic choice made almost three decades ago. The diverse activities they have undertaken to strengthen their cooperation have varied in intensity over that period, but their overall direction has remained unchanged. As a result, Azerbaijan has gradually distanced itself from Russia, and through its cooperation with Turkey, it has moved closer (albeit mainly economically) to the West. Ankara, on the other hand, has strengthened its position in the South Caucasus. This has led to the formation of an Ankara-Bakuaxis, which presents a challenge to Moscow because it limits Russian influence in the region. However, the Turkic duo has been taking care not to antagonize Russia directly; one expression of this approach is their acceptance of Moscow’s key role in resolving the Karabakh conflict.
In December 2020, Russia launched a mass-scale action for vaccinating its citizens with the domestically produced Sputnik V coronavirus vaccine. It was only on 2 February 2021 that the Gamaleya Institute, which developed the vaccine, announced the results of its phase-III clinical trials which showed that the vaccine’s efficacy rate was more than 91%. The way the Russian leadership reports on Sputnik V’s production and rollout is chaotic and the published data is incompatible and non-transparent. Only rough information has been shared regarding the number of vaccinations performed thus far: the Ministry of Health has failed to provide precise figures and, according to estimates by the Gamaleya Institute, the immunisation campaign has so far covered 1.5–2 million citizens. However, these figures are inconsistent with the data reported by the individual regions.
The Bohemianisation of the media. The acquisition of the Czech media sector by local billionaires
Author(s): Krzysztof Dębiec / Language(s): English
Keywords: Media; Czech media sector; media ownership; foreign media markets;
The deal finalising the sale of Nova TV to PPF on 13 October 2020 completed the process of key Czech media organisations being taken over by local capital. At the beginning of 2008, foreign entities controlled the vast majority of the Czech media market. However, a wide section of the popular press titles and radio and TV stations was taken over by domestic billionaires in the following years. They took advantage of the problems the owners of traditional media outlets had to face: both temporary (the decline in advertising revenue during the economic crisis) and structural (the increasing popularity of the Internet at the expense of the printed press). The expansion of domestic business empires in this sector was quickly branded as anoligarchisation of the media in the Czech Republic. Local billionaires treated their new assets as tools of political influence. They do not rely on the mass media as a source of profits. Instead, they use it as a means for protecting their businesses from attacks by competitors or state interference. The mass media has even become a tool for gaining or consolidating a political and business position. There are many indications that, for similar reasons, the richest Czechs are also buying media outlets abroad in countries where they do business.
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