Despite intensified diplomatic efforts, Türkiye has still not agreed to start the ratification procedure for Sweden’s - nor Finland’s - NATO membership. The accession process may drag on until after Türkiye’s presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2023. During this time, Sweden, which is the target of increased hybrid attacks, should enhance the cooperation with NATO countries to strengthen resilience.
Growing input costs constitute a serious problem for EU farmers. Although this year higher prices for agricultural products and state aid protected them against a drastic loss of income, in the long term, high prices of fertilisers, fuel, and energy related in part to the war in Ukraine threaten profitability and complicate planning. In the meantime, this summer’s drought demonstrated how destructive climate change is for agriculture. Faced with multiple challenges, Member States are prioritising financial support for farmers and maintaining the level of production in the EU. In the name of these objectives, they are ready to delay implementation of the green transition in agriculture.
The outcome of the general elections in Denmark on 1 November marks a continuation of existing policies that have led to landmark security and defence decisions in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Converging threat perceptions and the launch of the Baltic Pipe’s receiving terminal in Nybro - crucial to Polish energy security - could be the basis for an expanded partnership between Poland and Denmark.
Preparing for Russian Hybrid Activities Against NATO and EU Countries
Author(s): Anna Maria Dyner / Language(s): English
Keywords: NATO; EU; hybrid activities; Russia;
In pursuit of its goals in Ukraine, Russia will intensify hybrid activities, including information warfare, cyber-attacks, or acts of sabotage against the critical infrastructure of NATO and EU countries. These actions are intended to increase fear in the European public about an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict and further deterioration of the economic situation. In this way, Russia seeks to weaken Allied unity, which is necessary to continue the support for Ukraine, implement new strategies of the Alliance and the EU, and react quickly to emerging threats. The importance of building state and societal resilience at the level of individual states and both NATO and the EU is growing.
The COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the resulting disruption of supply chains have intensified the ongoing debate in Germany over the preferred shape of German-Chinese relations. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government sees China as both a partner and rival. Reducing dependence on China is challenging due to its scale and the strength of the pro-China business lobby. This unsteady position will cause tensions in relations with partners, including the U.S., and conflicts within the governing coalition. Germany will continue to develop trade relations with China while blocking Chinese investment in critical sectors.
Author(s): Maria Piechowska / Language(s): English
Despite the ongoing military operations, Ukraine is already preparing for reconstruction. The concept it presented in Lugano, Switzerland, in July this year envisages not only the rebuilding of damaged facilities but also a comprehensive transformation of the state and economy. So far, it has not been possible to secure sufficient funding, and it also will be a challenge to coordinate such a wide-ranging undertaking. Early planning of reconstruction activities increases the chances of its success and boosts Ukrainian morale. It also allows Ukraine's partners, including Poland, to be better prepared to take part in the reconstruction.
France’s policy towards China is based on opposing aspirations. On the one hand, President Emmanuel Macron is trying to maintain the possibility of developing cooperation with China, fearing a bipolar U.S.- Chinese rivalry. On the other, he seeks to protect French and European industries more effectively against unfair competition from China and opposes Chinese ambitions to dominate the Indo-Pacific. According to the French president, reconciling these goals is possible through more effective cooperation within the EU, although France’s aim to reduce the trade deficit puts it in the role of a competitor to other EU Member States. In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Macron wants to use China as a means of pressure on Russia.
North Korea Continues to Develop Its Nuclear Forces
Author(s): Oskar Pietrewicz / Language(s): English
Keywords: North Korea; Nuclear weapons; military policy; foreign policy;
North Korea is conducting further missile tests to check new types of weapons and increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. The adoption of a new nuclear doctrine that allows pre-emptive nuclear strikes also serves this purpose. North Korea is taking advantage of the period of tension between the U.S., Russia, and China, which prevent the UN Security Council from adopting further sanctions. In this situation, the U.S. and its allies should strengthen defence and deterrence capabilities against North Korea and set achievable goals to reduce the risk of escalation of tensions before possible negotiations.
The U.S. “Missile Defense Review” (MDR) indicates that its priorities are defence of its own territory against direct attacks from North Korea and Iran, and protection of overseas bases and allies, mainly from China and Russia. The Biden administration confirms the plan for finishing the European element of the “missile shield”, but also suggests the need for increased military efforts by allies from NATO. The intense use of missiles and drones by Russia against Ukraine and increased risks of intentional or accidental strike on the territory of NATO confirms the necessity of strengthened integrated air and missile defence of the Eastern Flank of the Alliance.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has caused a serious humanitarian crisis in Europe at a time when global aid needs are growing dramatically and are now at their highest in history. The EU’s strong support for Ukraine poses challenges to the EU development cooperation system and risks reducing the EU’s involvement in other developing countries. There is an urgent need to increase spending on EU development assistance, as well as to create new instruments and mechanisms. In this way, support for Ukraine will not limit the assistance needed for other countries, including strengthening their resistance to Russian influence.
Germany Works Towards Independence from Russian Raw Materials
Author(s): Łukasz Jasiński,Zuzanna Nowak / Language(s): English
Keywords: Germany; Russia; raw materials; economic policy; relations;
The failure of Germany’s now-discarded Eastern policy has forced it to take steps to increase its resilience to Russian pressure in the area of energy. The biggest and fastest changes are targeting the goal to become independent of Russian raw materials, especially gas. This has required Germany to change its approach to the use of LNG and nuclear power, among other energy sources. The crisis-related rise in energy prices is a major concern for the German public and is affecting the government’s ratings and bolstering the pro-Russian party Alternative for Germany (AfD).
NATO’s northern flank plays an increasingly important role in the security of the Euro--Atlantic area. Russia’s forces in the Northern Military District pose not only a conventional threat to Norway, but also a nuclear threat to the whole NATO, including the United States and Canada due to submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Russian Federation has been consistently increasing its military presence in the Arctic and its military activity along Norway’s borders. Deterring Russia in the High North, in increasingly close cooperation with the allies, is thus a key task for the Norwegian Armed Forces. Oslo is gradually lifting Cold War restrictions in the defence sphere and intensifying military cooperation with the US, which is stirring up political controversy in the country. From the US perspective, NATO’s northern flank is becoming more vital for containing Moscow. That is why they signed the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement with Norway, expanding US troop access to military infrastructure there.
Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English
Keywords: NATO 2030; Alliance; NATO Strategic Concept; collective defence; Russia; China; European security;
The NATO summit held in Brussels on 14 June was intended to show a return to transatlantic unity after four years of the Trump administration. The new President Joe Biden wanted to demonstrate that the United States is resuming its leadership role in the transatlantic community; that NATO is still an important alliance for the US; and Washington is committed to the principles of Article 5. The Alliance is also adapting to changes in the security environment by adopting the NATO 2030 agenda and deciding to develop a new strategic concept. However, the parameters of this adaptation will be subject to further negotiations between the allies, particularly with regard to strengthening deterrence and defence on the eastern flank, and with regard to how and to what extent the Alliance should engage in containing China. At the same time, as NATO adjusts its course to focus on deterrence and defence, other formats for security cooperation between the US & Europe and among the European countries are being developed.
Protest suspended – Belarusian society one year after the presidential elections
Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English
Keywords: Belarusian society; presidential elections; Protests; national awakening;
The progressive decline in living standards in Belarus and the authorities’ dismissive attitude towards the COVID-19 pandemic have intensified public disillusionment with Alyaksandr Lukashenka. This led to an increase in the civic activity of Belarusians – previously seen as passive –in the campaign prior to the presidential election on 9 August last year. The revival of social life was accompanied by a growing national consciousness. Both processes mostly concerned the relations between the authorities and civil society, and to a lesser extent the geopolitical orientation, although later polls revealed the first signs of waning trust in Russia and a greater openness towards the West. The forged results of the vote this time gave rise to unprecedented protests, and the violent reaction by law enforcement only fuelled greater resistance among citizens. The lack of concessions shown by the authorities and the weariness of the demonstrators resulted in the demonstrations being brought to a halt at the end of 2020. At the same time, the authorities started to systemically and thoroughly eliminate independent media and third sector structures to discourage citizens from any manifestations of opposition. Despite the use of instruments characteristic of a totalitarian regime, there are numerous indications that the grievances have not been permanently suppressed. The Belarusian citizens who opposed the authorities last year mostly retained their pro-democratic views and aspirations to structure the state according to the Western model. They will rise rapidly to greater prominence as the oppressive regime backed by Russia continues to lose its credibility.
Lukashenka’s last line of defence. The Belarusian security apparatus in a time of crisis
Author(s): Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): English
Keywords: Belarusian security; Aleksandr Lukashenko; The authoritarian model of power; Russia; KGB;
The political crisis which has been raging in Belarus since August 2020 and the growing public discontent with the regime have become the greatest challenge to the current government in recent history. Lukashenka has not considered the possibility of stabilising the situation by means of at least superficially holding a dialogue with society. He has resorted to repressive methods to crush the crisis and adopted a model of state management that resembles a state of emergency. The state’s internal security institutions have become the most important pillar of Belarusian authoritarianism, to a degree holding Lukashenka hostage to their vision of the world. The ever-expanding legal instruments allowing for the radical ramping up of repression against the regime’s opponents have reinforced the police state system in which all spheres of activity, not only social, but also economic and educational, have been placed under strict supervision by the KGB, the Ministry for Internal Affairs or the prosecutor’s office. This has led to the marginalisation of the civilian nomenklatura’s role, making it easier for representatives of the ministries of state power to consolidate their position in the administration. The position of the Belarusian security institutions has also been strengthened by their good relations with the Russian state power sector, especially with regard to coordinating activities against the West.
A durable state. The 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence
Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English
Keywords: Ukraine’s independence; USSR; Political history of Ukraine; Russian aggression; Malorossiya;
On 24 August 1991, Ukraine proclaimed independence, and a few months later (together with Russia and Belarus) it brought about the dissolution of the USSR. At the time of its foundation, the Ukrainian state was a continuation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on the one hand, this delayed the de-Communisation of the organisational and legal system, but on the other, it saved the country from having to build up state institutions from scratch. After nearly a quarter of a century, the hour of its greatest trial arrived – revolution and war with Russia. Ukraine passed this test: it did not unilaterally implement the political part of the Minsk agreements which posed a direct threat to it, nor has it fallen into the group of ‘failed states’. The main threat to its future is not so much the ongoing conflict in the Donbas or the weakness of the economy, but rather demographic collapse: during its nearly thirty years of independence, it has lost a fifth of its population.
The Zapad-2021 strategic exercises, scheduled for 10–16 September, are the most important training programme yet undertaken held by the Russian Armed Forces and the Belarusian army which cooperates with them. As they involve as many as 200,000 soldiers, they will also be the largest military exercises conducted in Europe for nearly 40 years. The training phase actually began in July, and will peak during the officially announced dates. The accompanying disinformation operation began even earlier, at the end of 2020; the aim was to present the exercises as a defensive action by the alliance of Belarus and Russia against allegedly rising aggression by NATO. The Zapad-2021 (zapad meaning ‘west’) exercises are a test of how ready the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus are to conduct operations on NATO’s eastern flank, but they also represent a test of the state structures, in terms of the comprehensive security of their activities and operation in conditions of armed conflict. Particular importance should be attached to the attempt at verifying how effective both countries will beat conducting information warfare, the goal of which is to confirm the potential enemy in the belief that Russia is militarily superior, and that it is ready to use force for political purposes.
The Czech Republic’s struggle with e-government during the COVID-19 pandemic
Author(s): Martyna Wasiuta / Language(s): English
Keywords: Czech Republic; e-government; COVID-19 pandemic; digitisation of public administration;
Against the backdrop of the CEE region, the Czech Republic stands out when it comes to the digitisation of the country’s economy and society. The achievements of its private sector in this field make it one of the leaders of digitisation in the EU. Czech programmers are among the world’s most talented IT specialists, which is demonstrated by the fact that one of the world’s most popular antivirus programmes was developed in the Czech Republic. However, this positive picture of digitisation is clouded by the country’s major delays in the development of public services and Internet infrastructure. The oligopolistic structure of the mobile telephony market is dominated by three large operators offering services at prices that are among the EU’s highest and forms a serious barrier to expansion of the infrastructure. In addition, the country’s delays in developing new solutions, combined with insufficient competence on the part of Czech officials, discourage citizens from using e-government services, which they consider not to be particularly user-friendly. Although the pandemic has triggered significant progress in this field, certain key problems remain unresolved. Another obstacle slowing down the pace of digitisation involves tension within the ruling coalition, which in turn undermines the coordination of digitisation activities in the public sector as a whole.
The EU’s security and defence policy: in search of a compass
Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English
Keywords: EU’s security and defence policy; Military-technical cooperation; EU’s military missions; The Strategic Compass;
In the EU, work is underway on the Strategic Compass, a security strategy that is intended to define the Union’s priorities in crisis management, capability development, partnerships and resilience for the next 5–10 years. It aims to define the EU’s role in an increasingly complex security environment where NATO and the US are redefining their priorities. The Strategic Compass is also intended to maintain the momentum of the EU initiatives launched in 2016, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation or the European Defence Fund. The process of developing the document, and the EU’s security and defence policy in general, has been marred by the member states’ conflicting threat perceptions and interests. Nevertheless, under pressure from France and the European Commission, the EU has been making some progress in this area. The Strategic Compass will set the framework for Union’s future actions. However, implementing the strategy will depend on the member states’ commitment to the means and goals agreed, and thus cannot reflect the interests of one group of EU countries alone.
Digitisation in Romania accelerates during the pandemic
Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English
Keywords: Digitisation in Romania; COVID-19 pandemic; public’s limited digital competences; e-government sector; e-commerce; Cybersecurity;
Romania stands out as having one of the EU’s least developed systems of online public services, which contrasts with its extensive telecommunications infrastructure offering very fast and cheap access to the network. This is due both to the policy of the governments, which until 2019 did not show much interest in the digitisation process of the country or failed to propose a comprehensive programme for its implementation, and to the resistance of the public, who were distrustful of the e-government solutions offered. However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a breakthrough: on one hand, it spurred the authorities to introduce legal changes and deploy new technological solutions that had hitherto been postponed, and on the other, it forced Romanian society to use public digital services.
Please note that there is a planned full infrastructure maintenance and database upgrade of the CEEOL repository.
The search is temporarily unavailable.
We apologize in advance for the inconvenience and thank you for your kind understanding.
There are validation problems in the fields. Please check the fields again and enter the correct data. (The fields with a red outline are required. The fields with correct data are with a green outline and "" symbol, fields with incorrect data are with a red outline and "" symbol. Pointing at the question mark "" placed at the end of fields displays additional information for the correct way of completing.)
