Varia. Suffering in Mental Illnesses. Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives upon Subjectivity, Corporality and the Abatements of Personal Autonomy
Varia. Suffering in Mental Illnesses. Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives upon Subjectivity, Corporality and the Abatements of Personal Autonomy

Summary/Abstract: Within this paper we will offer a short overview of the conceptual distinctions offered by three different contemporary philosophical perspectives, namely phenomenology, embodied cognition and applied medical ethics which prove to be useful in approaching the issue of suffering involved in mental illnesses. The aim of this article is to argue that the suffering experienced in mental illnesses can be expressed firstly as a “pathology” of subjectivity or as a difficulty occurred in structuring the subjective mundane experience. Secondly, we will attempt to explain how suffering in mental illnesses can be conceived as dysfunctionalities in the experience of the lived body’s intermediation of the subject being-in-the-world. Finally, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that suffering in mental illnesses also employs a social component, by affecting personal autonomy and by distorting the decision-making process of the sufferer.

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