Invázió a Disznó-öbölben és az Amerika-közi kapcsolatok feszültségei
The Bay of Pigs, 1961

Summary/Abstract: The article analyses the planning and execution of the landing of the CIA-backed Cuban exile brigade between April 17–19, 1961. The focus rests on those elements of the CIA plans which prove that the planning of the operation was heavily influenced by the perception of the U.S. officials about the possible support for or opposition to the operation by other members of the Inter-American system. These perceptions emerged as important after the change of the plans in November 1960 from clandestine to open invasion. After the change of administration, these perceptions influenced Kennedy to curb direct U.S. support for the landing party in the plans. The existing sources prove that these perceptions of Latin-American belligerency led to misunderstandings between the White House and the CIA about the scale of support and the very nature of the operation during the last months of the planning, and contributed directly to its disaster.

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