Der Einsatz von EU-Konditionalität bei den Verhandlungen um eine Polizeireform in Bosnien und Herzegowina
The Use of EU Conditionality in the Negotiations of a Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Summary/Abstract: Abstract. This paper analyses the role of the European Union in the negotiations over a police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2004 and 2008. The EU applied the instrument of conditionality in order to introduce a model of the police force based on principles formulated by former High Representative and EU Special Representative Paddy Ashdown in 2004. As these principles could hardly be defined as European standards, the EU was unable to convince local politicians of the necessity to adopt them. However, as a consequence of the Union’s adherence to the model, animosities increased not only between the Bosnian parties but also between the EU and Bosnian politicians (Serb politicians in particular). Tensions only subsided when the EU accepted a less ambitious police reform in 2007. This paper therefore analyzes the ways in which the EU’s instrument of conditionality was increasingly weakened in the course of the negotiation process, ultimately losing its credibility in Bosnia.

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