Freedom vs. Eternalism: Some Objections to the Inside Out Perspective
Freedom vs. Eternalism: Some Objections to the Inside Out Perspective

Summary/Abstract: The free will problem has traditionally been viewed as an incompatibility between the concept of freedom and the concept of determinism. This paper is concerned with a slightly different framing of the problem: with the compatibility between free will and the metaphysics of time. Carl Hoefer, in his 2002 article “Freedom from the Inside Out” has argued that the source of the free will problem is our unconscious assumption of the A-theory of time. He also argued that if we adopt a B-theory of time and imagine our actions from a static block universe perspective, then freedom would be saved. He argues that this is the case, because bidirectional determinism in the static block does not privilege past to future determination. My aim in this paper is to present two new objections to Hoefer’s view. Firstly, I argue that his description of the A-series is problematic and does not help him establish that the A-series is the source of the free will problem. Secondly, I argue that his theory is susceptible to the threat of ontological fatalism and that this is in conflict with freedom understood as the ability to do otherwise.

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