TILLICH AND NAGEL: A METAETHICAL COMPARISON
TILLICH AND NAGEL: A METAETHICAL COMPARISON

Summary/Abstract: To pass moral judgment about others as well as ourselves is a common custom and a significant trait in our lives. Indeed, such an attitude and activity undergird the foundation of much of human social relationships and transactions. But, are we truly in a position to engage in such ethical evaluations? Paul Tillich and Thomas Nagel deliver a negative response to the question and counsel their respective readers and audiences to refrain from engaging in moral assessment of others as well as ourselves. Although the two thinkers come from diverse, if not diametrically opposite, backgrounds and pursue different intellectual and theoretical objectives, they seem to converge on this counsel and the groundings for it. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to examine their respective reasoning from a comparative metaethical perspective to note their underlying reflections on human condition and, more importantly, to trace the ramifications of such a comparison.

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