FREE REPRESENTATIVE MANDATE IN PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEMS - DEMOCRATIC ACQUISITION OR MANIPULATION OF VOTERS Cover Image

СЛОБОДАН ПОСЛАНИЧКИ МАНДАТ У ПРОПОРЦИОНАЛНИМ ИЗБОРНИМ СИСТЕМИМА – ДЕМОКРАТСКА ТЕКОВИНА ИЛИ МАНИПУЛАЦИЈА БИРАЧА
FREE REPRESENTATIVE MANDATE IN PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEMS - DEMOCRATIC ACQUISITION OR MANIPULATION OF VOTERS

Author(s): Nikola Perišić
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Civil Law, Governance, Administrative Law
Published by: Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци
Keywords: proportional electoral system; free mandate; tied mandate; parliamentary groups; National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia;

Summary/Abstract: Proportional electoral systems use a system of electoral lists that can be open or closed to voters. In the Republic of Serbia, a proportional electoral system with closed electoral lists for voters is used. An additional specificity of the electoral system in Serbia is that the entire country is one electoral unit. Such an electoral system is used in three other countries, not including Serbia. In such electoral systems, the question arises as to whether the parliamentary mandate should be free or tied to the list on which the candidate was elected as a deputy. Political parties tried to protect themselves from the departure of MPs from their ranks through the so-called blank resignations that would be activated when an individual leaves the parliamentary group or political party to which they belong. However, since 2011, the electoral law in Serbia, at the suggestion of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, explicitly defines the mandate as free, and it was this change that led to the frequent departure of deputies from the lists on which they were elected, and the most drastic consequences of such behavior is the formation of parliamentary clubs of parties that are not passed the election threshold or even did not exist at the time of the election process. This raises the question of whether there has been manipulation of the electoral will of citizens expressed in the immediate elections for the parliamentary composition, to the detriment of the democratic legacy, which prescribes that the deputy is autonomous in his actions in relation to the political party to which he belongs. This paper answers precisely to this dilemma, through the analysis of all multi-party compositions of the National Assembly in Serbia.