THOUGHTS AS SUCH
THOUGHTS AS SUCH

Summary/Abstract: Sainsbury has contested the widespread view that Fregean senses as individuated by modes of presentation are capable of being individuated independently of the needs of semantics. He also holds that there are meanings as something similar to Fregean senses but individuated by a combination of the demands of a reported speech and a Fregean test in terms of rational cotenability (Sainsbury 2002, p. 155). In so doing, he claims that meanings can be finer-grained than senses (modes of presentation). But, in arguing in favour of this view, Sainsbury seems to individuate senses as modes of presentation on an independent basis. Having noticed this, my key point will be that, whether he individuates these modes on an independent basis or not, it is mysterious what role such modes are supposed to play. Following this, we shall see that the demands of a reported speech are of no help in establishing the point that Sainsbury wants to make. On the other hand, on the account that will I suggest senses as modes of presentation are introduced to play a specific role.

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