CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE SUBJECT’S POINT OF VIEW Cover Image

EKSTERNALIZAM MISAONOG SADRŽAJA I SUBJEKTOVA TAČKA GLEDIŠTA
CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE SUBJECT’S POINT OF VIEW

Author(s): Vojislav Božičković
Subject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Contemporary Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: Externalism; Mental Content; Cognitive Perspective; Epistemic Transparency;

Summary/Abstract: In relation to perception-based demonstrative thoughts, I argue that, their intentions notwithstanding, Fregean and non-Fregean anti-individualists alike fail to provide a theory of content that explains the subject’s cognitive perspective. I propose an individualist alternative that meets this requirement in conformity with the view that difference in thought-contents needs to be transparent, as does their sameness, if thought-content is to serve to explain the subject’s cognitive perspective.

  • Issue Year: 61/2018
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 5-23
  • Page Count: 19
  • Language: Serbian
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