WILLIAMS’ INFERENTIAL CONTEXTUALISM Cover Image

VILIJAMSOV INFERENCIJALNI KONTEKSTUALIZAM
WILLIAMS’ INFERENTIAL CONTEXTUALISM

Author(s): Jelena Pavličić
Subject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Contemporary Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: contextualism; conversational rules; conversational context; inferential context; methodological necessity;

Summary/Abstract: This paper is concerned with version of epistemic contextualism known as inferential contextualism which cheif proponent is Michael Williams. The general contextualist strategy attempts to interpret the cognitive claims as expressing statements which meaning is sensitive to the context in which they are uttered, which implies that the truth-value of these claims may differ from context to context. Versions of epistemic contextualism that explain context sensitivity of cognitive claims by referring to conversational factors of the participants in the given conversational context are usually called simple conversational contextualism. Williams accepts the basic contextualists assumptions, but, in contrast to simple conversational contextualists, insists that explanation of contextual sensitivity of cognitive statements is to be found in differences (which are mainly the differences in the methodological assumptions and inferential patterns) between the thematic areas which are the subject of knowledge in different contexts. We will try to show that Williams’ contextualism, despite some difficulties, does have certain advantages over the simple conversational contextualism.

  • Issue Year: 57/2014
  • Issue No: 3
  • Page Range: 43-60
  • Page Count: 18
  • Language: Serbian
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